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Schleiermacher, personal and speculative



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SCHLEIERMACHER



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SCHNITZ-ARMACHER

AND SPECULUM

ROBERT MUNRO B.D.


EDITOR

*Es glänzt ist für den Augenblick gewesen
Die Aechte bleibt der Nachwelt unverwes*

THE VANDER GARTEN

PRESENTED TO THE LATE QUEEN

1903



SCHLEIERMACHER

PERSONAL AND SPECULATIVE

BY

ROBERT MUNRO B.D.

OLD KILPATRICK

*Was glänzt ist für den Augenblick geboren ;
Das Aechte bleibt der Nachwelt unverloren.*

—Goethe.

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TO

The Rev. Alexander Whyte, D.D.,

ST. GEORGE'S CHURCH, EDINBURGH,

This Book is Dedicated

P R E F A C E

SCHLEIERMACHER'S name is one of the greatest in the history of modern thought. He was distinguished as a theologian, a preacher, a philosopher, a moralist, and a statesman. No field of speculation, or of activity, was alien to him. He was a many-sided ethical genius, excelling not in one sphere, but in many spheres.

Yet, significant and far reaching as his influence is, he is to English speaking peoples little more than a name. This is, no doubt, in great measure due to the obscurity of his style, and to the fact that his principal works can only be read in German.

The present Study was originally intended for Professor Knight's *Philosophical Classics*. When it was nearly completed, I was laid aside for months by a serious illness; and, in the interval, the publishers decided to discontinue the series. On recently taking up the discarded task, I was encouraged to believe it might be of interest as

throwing light on some aspects of the life and the teaching of the man. It is with that hope that I now venture to make it public.

The biographical sketch is chiefly based on Schleiermacher's Letters, and on every reference, of a contemporary kind, that helped to a better knowledge of the unique and complex personality. I have, of course, consulted all the lives, reminiscences, funeral orations, and celebrations that have been written in Germany—especially the elaborate lives by Dilthey and Schenkel.

In the exposition of the philosophical and ethical views, which is derived directly from his published writings, I have sought, as far as possible, without comparison or criticism, to allow Schleiermacher speak for himself. For those who have not time to wade through the ponderous volumes in which his speculations are contained, this plan has at least the merit of presenting an outline of what he really thought and taught.

It was my intention to have added a section on Schleiermacher's theology; but the limits of the present work rendered that impossible. Nor is this, perhaps, much to be regretted, as most that is of permanent value in his *Glaubenslehre* has been incorporated in the leading theological systems

that have since appeared through the inspiration of his thinking.

My thanks are particularly due to the Principal and Senate of the Glasgow University for putting at my disposal their magnificent library; to Mr. George Reimer, Berlin, for the gift of several interesting and rare booklets and pamphlets; to the Rev. W. M. Metcalfe, D.D., Paisley, who kindly read and corrected all the proofs of the biographical part; and to Professor Hastie, Glasgow, who verified my translations in the chapters on Will and Feeling, and made a few suggestions. I am also deeply indebted to my brother—the Rev. W. M. Munro, Vicar of All Saints, Newport, Monmouth—for his unfailing help and encouragement.

The portrait is from Andorf's engraving of the bust of Schleiermacher by the celebrated sculptor Rauch. It was printed for me by Reimer, Berlin.

OLD KILPATRICK,
March 6, 1903.

LITERATURE

SCHLEIERMACHER'S works are published by Reimer, of Berlin, in 30 volumes. The lives and appreciations are numerous. A few of the more important need only be mentioned. *Aus Schleiermacher's Leben in Briefen*, by W. Dilthey, 4 volumes (partly translated by Frederica Rowan); *Schleiermacher's Briefwechsel, mit einer biographischen Vorrede*, by W. Gass; *Leben Schleiermacher*, by W. Dilthey—a valuable study of the man in his intellectual development and relation to the thought of his time—(only one volume of this great work has as yet appeared); and *Friederich Schleiermacher*, by D. Schenkel—the best complete monograph on the subject. The appreciations of Auberlen, Lücke, and Twisten are interesting. R. Haym's colossal work, *Die romantische Schule: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes*, must not be omitted by any one who would fully understand the romantic period in Schleiermacher's life. Mrs. A. Sidgwick's *Caroline Schlegel and Her Friends* gives a good account of the men and the women who acted a part in that curious phase of German thought and upheaval. The expositions and critiques of Schleiermacher's speculative views are many and wearisome. The works of Bender, Vörlander, Weissenborn, and Schaller give the most comprehensive statement of the

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philosophical, ethical, and theological positions. Very suggestive too, in this connection, are the contributions of Sigwart (*Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, bk. ii.); Fischer (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1848); D. F. Strauss in his *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*; R. A. Vaughan (*Essays and Remains*, vol. I.); J. D. Morell (*Philosophy of Religion*); Alb. Ritschl's *Schl.'s Reden u. Nachwirkungen*, etc. 1874; and Lipsius, on the *Reden*, in *Jahrbuch f. prot. Theologie*, 1875. More recent discussions are those by Otto Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. I., *The Development of Theology in Germany*, pp. 44-56 and 103-130; O. Ritschl, *Studien ueber Schl.* (in *Stndien u. Kritiken*, 1888); Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology*, pp. 46 165, translated, with a Preface, by Professor Hastie; and the Rev. John Oman's translation of the *Reden*, with Introduction, 1893. A selection of Schleiermacher's sermons was done into English, in 1890, by Mrs. Mary F. Wilson; and in the same year Dr. Hastie's English edition of the *Christmas Festival* appeared.

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PART I

PERSONAL CAREER

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE most brilliant period in the intellectual history of Germany is that embraced by the latter half of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century. The national mind, after having practically slept since it was rudely disturbed by the Reformation, then suddenly awoke, and set itself to complete the task which it had undertaken, but had left unfinished, three hundred years before. By a mighty effort it tried to throw off the old bondage and narrowing influences of the Middle Ages ; and it essayed to set out, free and unfettered, in search of truth and reality. In philosophy, poetry, literature, and art it put forth its best strength, and attained the highest altitude it had yet reached. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer ; Lessing, Klopstock, Wieland, Herder ; Schiller, Goethe ; Tieck, Novalis, Richter, and Schlegel, are all the products of this activity, the voices that give expression to the thought and the aspiration of the new era.

Yet significant and comprehensive as was this movement, it was a movement on almost purely

intellectual and humanitarian lines. It glorified the individual and the race. It was a magnificent representation of culture and morality as the only adequate regenerators of the world. Religion, the real essence and inspiration of life—that which emancipates the soul from the trammels of the temporal and makes it one with the Eternal—it all but ignored. At the time there were, no doubt, in Germany respectable enough representatives of Christianity ; but, with the exception of Klopstock, they stood outside the new movement, and could not claim intellectual kinship with its great master spirits. They consequently found it impossible either to retain their hold on the minds of men, or to win fresh acceptance for the old, traditional view.

It was when these influences had attained their limit—when the mental activity of the age had reached its highest level, and when religion was at its lowest—that Schleiermacher appeared. Equal in intellect and acquirement with the greatest thinkers of his generation, he at once took his rightful place among them. He was not simply a theologian whose widest outlook never extended beyond the range of religious thought : there was scarcely any department of knowledge represented by the modern scientific tendency with which he was not acquainted, and which his wonderfully active and creative spirit did not enrich. His labours in Philosophy, Ethics, *Æsthetics*, History

of Philology and Literature, have a permanent value, and cannot be neglected by the student of these sciences.

But, while Schleiermacher stood in the current of all the chief movements of his time, it was principally in the religious sphere that he influenced his age, and is an influence still. Identifying himself neither with the negative rationalistic school nor with the traditional orthodox party, he claimed for religion, at a time when it was fashionable to disparage it, an eternal place in the progress of humanity. The claim, backed as it was by wide knowledge of theology, philosophy, and the scientific method, received more than a respectful recognition. Christianity, from his viewpoint, became once more a mighty spiritual potency. Like a second Luther, by his unaided individuality, he called his generation back to religion, and showed that true culture and the perfect humanity are to be found in Christ and His kingdom alone.

This constituted the real significance of Schleiermacher for his own age. He showed not only the reasonableness but the necessity of religion ; and he led men from the barren fields of intellectualism to the consideration of the emotional and the spiritual in the human soul.

He was not, in the ordinary sense of the term, the founder of a theological school : he was rather the instigator of a new tendency. From him

started that impulse which produced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries what is most memorable in the theology not of Germany only, but of Great Britain and America. Neander, Nitsch, Twesten, Ullmann, Julius Müller, Dorner, Tholuck, Rothe, Martensen, Schweitzer, Usteri, Erskine of Linlathen, Maurice, Hare, Tulloch, Mansel, F. W. Robertson, Bushnell, and Henry Drummond, are, among others, some of the great souls that were more or less moulded by his creative spirit. Even Baur and Strauss, Hofmann and Kliefoth, far as they diverged in thought from Schleiermacher, came under the spell of his all-dominating genius, and received an abiding inspiration. He may indeed be said to have done for theology what Kant did for philosophy; and no one can claim to know the trend of modern theological thought who is not acquainted with the scope and influence of his speculative system.

II.

EARLY DAYS.

FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST SCHLEIERMACHER was born at Breslau on the 21st November, 1768. His father, Gottlieb Schleiermacher, a chaplain in the Prussian army, seems to have been a man of some culture and force of character. He was the son of the famous preacher and enthusiast whom Jung Stilling delineates in his *Theobald* as "Pastor Darius." In early life Gottlieb came under the influence of the fanatical movement with which his father was for a time so intimately associated; but the impression which it made upon him was neither deep nor lasting. His mind was of the strong, vigorous order; and it had an affinity for the philosophical and the scientific rather than for the fanciful and the imaginative. When he therefore broke away from the fanaticism of his youthful surroundings, he became a thorough-going sceptic; and, for twelve years, drifted sadly enough on the lonely sea of doubt. At length, after many wanderings, he found a solution of his difficulties and rest for his soul in the old evangelical faith which he had so long and persistently despised.

Schleiermacher's mother was also descended from an ecclesiastical family. Her father was chaplain in ordinary to the King; her brother was a theological professor at Halle; and many of her near relatives, particularly Spalding and Sack, occupied the highest positions in the ministry of the Reformed Church. From the little that is known of her she appears to have been a singularly pious, shrewd, and intelligent woman. Her chief sphere she found in the home, and the work she liked the best was the service of maternal love—the blessed ministry of shaping young souls for the present life and the life that is to be. During the frequent absence of her husband on official duty, she superintended with much wisdom and tact the early training of her children. From the first she formed a high estimate of the intellectual and spiritual endowments of Friedrich, her first born. Though never physically strong, he was a bright spirited boy, quick in perception and amiable in disposition. "The dear child"—so she writes to her brother—"gives us much joy and great hope. He has a most tender heart and a good head." "If Fritz goes on as he does he will become quite a proficient in languages. His masters are perfectly charmed with him. He is already in the third form; and although he is the smallest boy in the school he stands first in all his classes." This rapid progress at school gained for him the reputation of cleverness, and had the

unfortunate effect of making him conceited, proud, and intolerant. His mother tried hard to repress these manifestations of feeling and temperament ; but a curious experience which the child then had did more to bring this about than all her remonstrances. The young scholar could translate a Latin author tolerably well, yet he knew so little of the sense that he failed to form a clear conception of what he read. This consciousness, which he did not notice as characterizing his comrades, humiliated him greatly. It even made him entertain doubts as to his much vaunted superiority of faculties ; and he lived in constant dread lest others should make the same unexpected discovery.

When he was ten years of age his parents left Breslau, and took up their abode in the country. For the constitutionally delicate boy this was a pleasant and helpful change. Hitherto his little world had principally been the world of books : now, for the first time, he was brought face to face with nature. Soon he became, if not its student and slave, at least its wayward and wondering child. Former studies grew distasteful, or were discarded ; and he had no thought or attention for anything but the ever varying beauty, the freshness and the activity of rural life. These were happy, peaceful days ; and if they did not add much to the sum of his theoretical knowledge, they had a good deal to show in the way of strong animal spirits, and such multifarious stores of

practical information as residence in the country can alone bestow.

After two years of this free arcadian life, Friedrich was sent to a boarding school in Pless, in Upper Silesia, where he resumed his studies with much diligence. It was here, under a disciple of Ernesti, that his love for the classical languages and literature was first called forth. But with this widening of his intellectual horizon there came a peculiar kind of scepticism which troubled his young spirit. The more he studied the famous masterpieces of Greek and Roman thought, the more he doubted their genuineness. Fear of ridicule kept the solitary, sensitive student silent ; yet such was his passion for truth that it was not until after knowledge and riper investigation had shown him the utter groundlessness of his doubts that he was perfectly satisfied.

There is also evidence that at this early stage he was no stranger to the pain and harassment of religious doubt. The doctrine of eternal punishment and reward, and the question as to the relation existing between the sufferings of Christ and the guilt of men, especially disturbed his youthful fancy. The insolubilities which these problems raised bewildered and frightened him, and they brought many a sleepless night of misery. Even as volcanoes, on the eve of eruption, give premonitory signs of the terrible powers stirring far down within their mysterious recesses, so these early

movements of Schleiermacher's mind may be taken as indications of the hidden underlying forces of his soul, and of that complete intellectual upheaval that was silently preparing in its inmost depths.

III.

MORAVIAN INFLUENCE.

THE Moravian Church, established by Count von Zinzendorf in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, though historically a resuscitation of the old community of the Bohemian Brethren, was in reality a new fraternity. Its aim was to unite in holy fellowship all who loved the Saviour, and to constitute a visible Kingdom of God on earth. In its initial efforts after this high ideal the brotherhood was guilty of many fanatical extravagances, but latterly it became one of the purest and most unselfish agencies for maintaining and propagating the Christian faith. At a time when rationalism was supreme in Europe the society never wavered in loyalty to Christ; and it was the first, in the Protestant world, to undertake distinctly missionary work in behalf of the heathen. It was also distinguished, not only on the Continent, but in Britain and in America, for its religious activity and educational organizations. Indeed, among the many spiritual enterprises of the eighteenth century, this of the Moravian Brotherhood will always maintain, both as to importance and significance, one of the foremost places.

It was in 1783 that Schleiermacher became acquainted with this community. In the spring of that year, he and his sister Charlotte were sent to the principal Moravian school at Niesky, in Upper Lausatia. Though the instruction imparted was not the best possible, it was the best that he had yet received. Especially was he indebted to Hilmer, one of the teachers, whose lectures on history appealed to his intellect and enlarged his view ; and whose method of teaching Latin was at once so simple and philosophical that he acquired a fresh taste not only for that language but for the study of other languages as well.

Another who greatly influenced him at this time, was his school-fellow, Albertini, afterwards bishop of the Brotherhood. This rare and beautiful soul had much that was akin to Schleiermacher, and became "the confidant of his heart and the companion of his intellect." The two were inseparable. To the rest of the scholars they were known as Orestes and Pylades. They felt and thought and studied in common. Their literary undertakings were stupendous. Equipped with nothing but a dictionary and a grammar, they read through the works of Homer, Hesiod, Theocritus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Pindar. Then, by way of variety, and equally ill-furnished for the attempt, they tried to find their way through the Hebrew text of the Old Testament. It was a difficult task,

but they held manfully on till they came to the obscurities of Ezekiel ; and then they stuck.

It is easy to smile at these "colossal and adventuresome" efforts. Yet they were called forth by something more than mere love of learning or sense of novelty : they were the strivings of restless spirits in search of that peace which they failed to find in religion, as they knew it. This is the explanation which Schleiermacher himself gives. "We were," he says, speaking of Albertini and himself, "still striving in vain after supernatural feelings and for what, in the phraseology of the Brotherhood, was called intercourse with Jesus. The most violent strainings of our fancy were fruitless, and the spontaneous exercise of the same proved equally futile. Up till now we had sought consolation in Greek poetry, and that was a glorious *solamen*." A glorious *solamen*, a blessed anodyne, it might for the moment be ; nevertheless, in the more serious moods of each it proved an empty husk which but mocked the hunger of their souls.

In 1785, a new career awaited both Schleiermacher and his companion : the two were transferred to the seminary at Barby, which was really the theological college of the Brotherhood. They entered upon their course with large expectations. Hitherto they had been trying to find their pathway through the thickets and jungles of knowledge : now they hoped to discover light and guidance.

But in this they were once more disappointed. The teaching at Barby was the narrowest and most antiquated possible. It traversed, with saintly indifference, the well-beaten track of formulas and sentiments, as if it could afford to ignore the investigations and discoveries of modern philosophy and theology. The scientific spirit, which was then everywhere beginning to stir, it not only did not cultivate ; it banned it as an evil to be abhorred. Equally ignorant, too, was it of the new culture—the poetry, literature, art, and romance of the time—and its far-reaching moral and social significance.

If ever there was a safeguard against the rebel tendencies of the age, surely it was to be found within the pious and well-hedged enclosure of the Moravian Theological Hall. Yet the very narrowness of this institution—which was its glory—brought about the result that it most wished to avoid. Echoes from the great world of thought reached even as far as the Moravian solitudes. The eager youths, who had ears to hear, at first listened in wonderment ; but the wonder soon gave place to the murmurings and the language of revolt. Why was the tree of knowledge so sternly prohibited ? Was it that our masters were afraid to make known the results of modern research lest perchance they should approve themselves to our intellect ; or lest, mayhap, they should not be able to refute them ?

Among those who thus felt and reasoned was young Schleiermacher. He had been reading in secret some of the modern reviews, and he had managed, by means of forbidden correspondence, to become the happy possessor of Wieland's *Poems* and Goethe's *Werther*. These new voices awoke in him the old spirit of doubt. There was no *solamen* for him now in mere mental activity : the whole fabric of his faith had become disintegrated, and was ready to fall into pieces. He could no longer believe or accept the essential doctrines of the Moravian Church. Amidst the darkness of his outlook, only one course seemed clear ; he must forsake the community, in whose bosom he had spent so many happy and blessed days.

In the season of his early difficulties he could always go to his mother, assured as he did that he should obtain both sympathy and help. No one could read his soul as she could, and no one had such influence over him. But, alas ! she had been dead for more than three years ; and the perplexed student must, for the first time, open his mind and heart to his father. It was a trying task ; yet very deliberately he went through with it. In a most touching letter, in which he describes the history of his changed attitude towards the faith, he states his opinions in a way that could not be mistaken. "I cannot believe," so he writes, "that He who only called Himself the Son of Man was the eternal, true God. I cannot believe that His

death was a substitutionary atonement, because He never Himself expressly said so, and because I cannot believe that it was necessary. For it is impossible that God, who has evidently created men not for perfection, but for the pursuit of it, can eternally punish them because they have not completely attained unto perfection." This confession, which denies the central doctrines of the orthodox position, is followed by an earnest request that his father would endeavour to enter into his feelings and help him. Although his present career was hopelessly arrested, all was not lost ; there might still be some sphere for him outside the bounds of the community. The scholastic profession was always open to him. But, above all, he had an intense desire to go to the University at Halle. He was not without hope that in that centre of free thought and opinion, he might find the peace and expansion of soul for which he had so long yearned. "Should your circumstances at all allow it, I trust you will permit me to go to Halle, even should it be only for two years. You will at once see that my success in life depends on this."

It was with a heavy heart that he sent away this remarkable letter. After some weeks had passed, during which his distress and tension of mind became so unbearable that he wrote a second time, the longed-for answer came. Though granting permission to study at Halle, the reply was

otherwise more severe than his worst fears had pictured. "O thou foolish son," it goes on to say, "who hath bewitched thee that thou dost not obey the truth; before whose eyes Jesus Christ was pourtrayed, and who is now crucified by thee. You were running well, who did hinder you that you should not obey the truth. Such persuasion is not from Him who has called you; but a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. The same corruption of your heart, which four years ago made you fear that on account of it you would be entirely lost in the world, and which then drove you into the congregation of the Brotherhood, you have, alas! fostered only too well. It has now leavened your whole being, and driven you out of the congregation. O, my son, my son, how deeply do you afflict me! What sighs do you call forth from my soul! And, if the departed know anything of our state, O, what a cruel disturber of the peace of your blessed mother you must be, when even your step-mother, who is a stranger to you, weeps, along with me, over you. Go forth then into the world, whose honour you are seeking . . . And now, my son, whom I press with tears to my anguished heart, alas! with heartrending grief, I discard thee—and discard thee I must, because thou worshipping no longer the God of thy father, thou kneelest no longer before the same altar with him. Yet, once more, before we part, O, tell me, I beseech you, what has the poor, meek, and humble-

hearted Jesus done to thee that thou renouncest His Divine comfort and peace."

In such terms did the father, who had himself at one time been in doubt, write to his son when he was passing through the gehenna of spiritual conflict. That these passionate expostulations and outcries of disappointment did no good—that they chafed and wounded, rather than convinced or strengthened—can readily be imagined. Nevertheless, it says much alike for the father and the son that this controversy, bitter and painful while it lasted, was soon forgotten, and that the two were ever after united in the closest and most loving fellowship.

And so, after a long, weary struggle, which strained to the utmost his love for truth and his affection for his kindred, the gates of Barby were at length shut behind him. As an eagle, that has long in vain beaten its wings against the iron bars of its cage, glories in the boundless freedom of heaven, so he gloried when his bonds were cast aside, and the pure air of liberty refreshed his drooping soul.

But never, then nor afterwards, did he forget the infinite debt that he owed to the Moravian Brotherhood. He had, it is true, outgrown their formulas and their methods of thought—they were to him as things lifeless and dead—yet the influence of their simple piety and their noble ideals remained with him strong and active to the last.

It was here that his early love for the Saviour, and his deep religious feelings, were first called into existence. "Piety," he says, speaking of his Moravian training, "was the maternal bosom in whose sacred obscurity my young life was nurtured and prepared for the world, as yet closed to it. In this sphere my spirit breathed long before it found its peculiar place in science and in the experience of life. It helped me when I began to sift the ancestral faith, and to separate thoughts and feelings from the rubbish heap of antiquity. It remained with me, even when the God and the immortality of childhood's days had vanished before the doubting eye. It led me unintentionally into practical life. It showed me how I ought to regard myself, with my talents and defects, as sacred in my undivided existence. Through it, too, have I entered into the knowledge of friendship and of love." (*Reden über die Religion*, 4th Ed., p. 10.)

In a similar strain did he write years afterwards from Barby, the scene of his youthful struggles, and which he liked to revisit in times of intellectual weariness and troubled outlook:—"There is no place which revives, as this does, the living recollection of the entire movement of my mind from the first awaking to better things up to the point where I now stand. It was here that the consciousness of the relation of man to a higher world was first stirred within me. . . . It was here that

that mystic tendency, which has been so essential to me, first developed itself—a tendency that has saved and sustained me amidst all the storms of scepticism. Then it was only in germ, now it is matured ; and I can say, after all that has happened, that I am still a Herrnhuter (a member of the Moravian Brotherhood)—only a Herrnhuter of a higher order.”

IV.

EMANCIPATION.

THE University of Halle, where Schleiermacher was next enrolled as a student, in 1787, then enjoyed a widespread reputation. Through the successive labours of Christian Wolff, Baumgarten, and Semler—the founders of modern theological and Biblical criticism—the character of this University had undergone a complete change. From being the recognised head of pietism, it became the principal centre of the new rationalistic movement. Thither flocked the youth of Germany in the hope not only of being delivered from the bonds of traditionalism, but also of being put in possession of the results of strictly scientific investigation. Between 1780 and 1790 the theological faculty alone was attended by an annual average of eight hundred students.

And yet, although the University had a wide reputation when Schleiermacher matriculated, its reputation was pretty much a *nominis umbra*—the lingering shadow of its former greatness. Semler, who for thirty years had been the leading spirit of the place, was now an old man, finding puerile

delight in the problems and mysteries of alchemy, and otherwise manifesting that his eye had grown dim and that his strength had abated. And his colleagues, though learned and respectable, were lacking in creative and impulsive force. They were perplexed gropers in the vast labyrinth of knowledge ; library-men, knowing books and ideas, but without any experience of the thrill and the glory of launching out fearlessly into the boundless empyrean.

It can be readily understood that, surrounded by such influences, Schleiermacher did not gain much by his stay at Halle. Not that there was nothing to gain—for an earnest plodder there was much—but he had no claim then, or at any time, to that title. He was an independent seeker after truth, and could not tolerate anything that might even seem to bar the way to its sacred presence. He had also, as he tells us, something of that conceit which is peculiar to the self-educated—to whom, in a certain measure, he belonged—and which led him to form an exaggerated idea of his own views and methods. Indeed, with the exception of Eberhard, who inspired him with an enthusiasm for Plato and Aristotle, and the philologist, F. A. Wolff, who assisted him with his Greek studies, the other professors had not the slightest significance for him. He wandered alone on his own way, and simply ignored their guidance and help. Little wonder should he, in later years, characterize

this period as a chaos, formless and void, like that which preceded the creation of the Cosmos ! It would, however, be wrong to suppose that Schleiermacher did nothing while at Halle but vaguely idle away his time. The truth is, his stay there was full of intellectual activity. From the first, he lodged with his maternal uncle, Professor Stubenrauch, who, in these troublous years, was one of the few that really understood him. To his sympathy and encouragement he owed more than he owed to the entire faculty. This good man not only put his library at his disposal, but he took a loving interest in his studies. In this way, when the spell was upon him—and with Schleiermacher study was always more or less a fitful passion—the amount of work he got through was enormous. During the two years he was under this genial roof he made himself acquainted with the leading tendency of Greek philosophy ; with the systems of Leibnitz, Wolff, Kante, Fichte, and Jacobi ; with the general history of human opinion ; with the principles of mathematics, and with the minutiae of the English and French languages.

In 1789, Professor Stubenrauch exchanged his chair for the living at Drossen, a country town in Neumark. At this quiet retreat Schleiermacher spent a year in close and earnest study. Especially did he endeavour to bring system and harmony into his thoughts. Hitherto they stood separate and unrelated : now he desired to impart to them

a unity which would at least give them symmetry and coherence. With this intention, he traversed anew the field of Greek and of modern philosophy ; and he even tried to reconstruct the latter on the basis of the former.

It was while here, too, that, in seeking to form some clear idea as to what career he should adopt, he resolved to devote himself to the work of the ministry. Theology, though it had been temporarily displaced by philosophy, was the study that still retained him. His inmost being was religious, and the kind of action that suited him best was that which came within the scope of religion. Though he manifested an early liking for philosophy—a liking which never afterwards left him—yet there need be no doubt that, had he made choice of it as his exclusive vocation, it would have failed to reveal his true self and power. These, for him, could only find their highest expression in religion. That he should, therefore, have presented himself as a candidate for license does not surprise us : it was the inevitable destination of his peculiar individuality.

On being licensed, he was appointed to the situation of tutor in the family of Count Dohna of Schlobitten in Prussia. His connection with this noble family afforded him the opportunity of gratifying one of the intensest longings of his nature—the longing for the refinement of social life. While at Halle he did not make many

friends, and the little he saw of the world was seen through the eyes of others. He was, consequently, awkward, shy, and reserved, lacking the ease and grace of manner that he admired so much in others. The consciousness of this defect gave him the acutest pain ; and he often sighed for a wider, freer life, which should develop the resources of his nature. That life he now found in the society of the Schlobitten family. " My heart," he writes, speaking of this period, " is properly cultivated here. It is neither allowed to wither under the the weeds of a cold erudition, nor are its religious feelings deadened by theological subtleties. Here I enjoy that domestic life which warms my feelings, and for which man, after all, was destined."

It was here, while under Count Dohna's roof, that he made the real acquaintance of women. Before this, as he assured his friend Brinckmann, " he only knew them from hearsay." Now he was brought into the closest fellowship with them, and began to understand something of their power in unfolding and educating what is best in the human spirit. They touched chords in his being that till then had been untouched. They had brought music into his life ; and the magic of their presence had thrown over his hard, sceptical thoughts the glow and the enthusiasm of love. The Countess and her accomplished daughters—especially the lovely Frederika—deeply influenced his impressionable nature. Their beauty of form and character,

their charm and grace of manner, inspired him with those profound feelings of veneration with which he ever afterwards regarded all women. To his stay at Schlobitten that bias towards "the eternal womanly," which so strongly characterized him through life, may be directly traced.

But this rural paradise, where he spent three happy years, had its evil spirit which destroyed his peace and drove him out. The Count, who had been a soldier, and was accustomed to be obeyed, held peculiar crotchets regarding education. These he, every now and then, propounded to Schleiermacher, and ordered him to put them into practice. For a time the tutor endeavoured, as far as was consistent with his native dignity, to humour him. On one occasion, however, when the Count was specially assertive and insisted, in presence of the children, that a certain method should be carried out, Schleiermacher firmly and decisively refused. The Count lost his temper, and spoke about dismissal. That was enough. Though the way to restoration and favour had been opened, after the first outburst of passion had allayed, Schleiermacher could not bring himself to stay. And yet to go was painful. Schlobitten had revealed to him a new world, and breathed upon him the fresh, warm love of womanhood. He had formed ties that were new and strong and necessary, and the sudden breaking of them was as the coming of a great sorrow. What it cost him to leave no one

knew. It was as if the gate of heaven had been closed against him, and the angelic vision had been withdrawn. The happy Schlobitten was henceforth but a memory, sweet and beautiful, and colouring his ideal of the family life and its eternal import.

After his return from Prussia, Schleiermacher spent half a year as a public teacher at Berlin. He had scarcely time to come under the influence of that great intellectual centre when he was called to be assistant minister to an aged relative at Landsberg on the Warthe. The position was, in many ways, a difficult one ; yet he filled it with much acceptance and ability. As a preacher he made a favourable impression, and indicated even then that his real strength and capacity lay in that direction. But he was not simply content with preaching. He tried, in every possible manner—by personal influence, by visitation, and catechising—to educate and elevate the people. It was no easy task—for they were profoundly ignorant and had been sadly neglected—yet he persevered at it, manfully and with varying success, during the two years of his ministry at Landsberg.

But still, faithfully as he discharged the duties of his office, he did not neglect his favourite studies. Kant, with whose speculations he had been already more or less familiar, and whose personal acquaintance he had formed while at Schlobitten, was obtaining an increasing ascendancy

over him. He was beginning to understand his system, and to see how far it threw light on the problem of knowledge ; how much of it was true, and how much of it he could safely take as the starting-point for the development of his own thought.

Another who occupied him much at this time, and whose influence had powerfully affected him, was the "holy and repudiated Spinoza." This profound thinker had for more than a hundred years been all but forgotten. Now, however, the labours of Jacobi and others had helped to create a new interest in him. Among those who had thus been led to study his wonderful system was the young assistant clergyman at Landsberg. The impression it made upon him was deep and epochal. Perhaps, with the exception of Kant, no one had yet given such an impulse to his thought, or had brought such light and harmony into his intellectual outlook as did the much neglected Baruch de Spinoza.

Shortly after going to Landsberg, Schleiermacher's life was saddened by the death of his father. The bond between them had of late grown very close. The old man, always a voracious reader, and ever desirous of knowing what was freshest in thought, latterly conducted his studies on almost the same lines as his son. Even Plato and Spinoza and Kant and Bahrdt were not alien to him. Thus, although the theo-

logical position of each remained radically unchanged, their sympathies had widened and found a common meeting-place. In early days, through prejudice and self-will, they had misjudged each other, but now they had learned to love and appreciate one another with unrestrained confidence. It was while this friendship was closest, and while each was becoming indispensable to the other, that death intervened. For Schleiermacher the sudden and unexpected separation was the first real sorrow of his life. In a letter to his sister Charlotte, at Barby, he gives touching expression to the effect it had upon him. "I have scarcely courage to speak to you about the sad event which heaven has ordained for us. I can return you nothing but the mournful echo of your own lamentation—and not even that can I give you. His loving, tender soul stands in a thousand images before me, and I cannot yet reconcile myself to the melancholy certainty that all is past. It is the first time in my life that I have really experienced an irreparable loss; for when our dear mother died I was merely a child. . . . A rare happiness we possessed and have lost. . . . Peace, peace be with his dust, and may his soul find pleasure in his children."

V.

ROMANTIC PERIOD.

TOWARDS the close of 1796, Schleiermacher was appointed chaplain at the *Charité*, or the Hospital, Berlin. This position, though it afforded little scope for his preaching powers, was of much significance as bringing him into contact with the varied life of the Prussian capital.

Berlin at this date was undergoing a complete social and intellectual transformation. It stood at the parting of the ways, between the old order and the new.

As to the old, both socially and intellectually, not much that is good can be said. Berlin society, under the libertine influence of the Court, and the low moral ideals that were then everywhere proclaimed, was utterly depraved. The wildest infidelity was promulgated, and the grossest corruption practised. Social life had sunk to an inconceivably low level. The sanctity of marriage and the claims of the family were honoured lightly, or altogether disregarded. To such a depth, indeed, had the city at this time reached, that it had won for itself the unenviable reputation of being called the modern Venusberg.

Literature and philosophy also shared in the common degradation. It was the age in which Ramler was accorded a place among the Immortals ; in which Nicolai was held to be the prince of critics, a veritable literary Goliath, dealing destruction to all the champions of the younger generation ; in which Mendelssohn was accounted the only philosopher ; and in which Garve and Engel were put forward as the authorised oracles in ethics. The movement represented by such men—it was called the *Aufklärung*, or the Illumination—had no doubt, at first, a very definite purpose to serve, but in the end it became mere darkness and chaos, giving out as it went a miasma fatal to the free and healthy development of the human spirit.

But if Berlin was morally and intellectually under the shadow, there were plentiful indications of the coming of a better day. The splendid revolution, inaugurated by the modern poets and philosophers, was even then beginning to make itself felt. To the younger generation Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller were disclosing, as by magic, the glories of the ideal, and calling upon men to seek for the perfect life in the beautiful forms and conceptions of antiquity. On the other hand, Kant and Fichte opened up the sphere of the subjective, and showed the grandeur of the human personality and the boundlessness of its moral power. These creations of the new-born spirit—so original in thought and expression, so human in their aims

and interests—stirred Berlin to its depths. They awakened it out of its gross slumbers, and brought it, for a time at least, back to its real manhood.

Then, again, in addition to this marvellous movement, there arose another, as its outcome, yet different from it, which helped to bring in the new epoch. This was Romanticism, the glorification of the fantastic and the sentimental, the subjection of the mental and the moral to the imaginative and the natural. This new tendency, while generally accepting the fruits of modern culture, as represented by the poetry of Goethe and the philosophy of Kant, sought to retain and etherealise the natural sensuous life, with which, in another form, Berlin society was already too well acquainted. It was the re-action of the rising age against the narrowing influences by which the the instincts of the mind and the heart had been so long suppressed. It was the protest of clever men and women, like Schlegel, Tieck, Bernhardi, Wackenroder, Henriette Herz, Dorothea Veit, Caroline Schlegel, and Rachel Levin, against the supremacy of intellect and reason, to the exclusion of feeling and imagination and those inner impulses of the soul, without whose presence the true purpose of life cannot be attained.

Schleiermacher did not, on going to Berlin, immediately come under the influence of these strong currents of thought and action. His earliest friends in the city were Sack and Spalding, the

orthodox leaders of the Reformed Church. He was consequently, at the outset, lonely and dull enough. He had no one to whom he could utter the silent voices of his spirit, no one who could either understand him or sympathise with him. He did nothing, he tells us, at this period but gaze idly in upon his thoughts in the same listless manner in which the Indian gymnosophist contemplates all the day the point of his nose !

The first to break this monotony was Friedrich Schlegel. The two met at a literary society the summer after Schleiermacher went to Berlin. The casual acquaintance then formed gradually ripened into a friendship distinguished not less for its warmth and closeness than for its significance in the life history of each.

I.—INFLUENCE OF SCHLEGEL.

Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel was one of the principal Titans who helped to dethrone the decrepit dictators of the *Aufklärung*, and to usher in a new and more hopeful era. When he took up his residence in Berlin—about ten months after Schleiermacher went there—he had only attained his twenty-fifth year ; yet he was even then the foremost litterateur and critic of the rising generation. He was an æsthetic genius, with strong historical instincts. The beautiful and the ideal had an unceasing attraction for him. They were

the basis of his culture, the material that went to form the shape and texture of his being. The poetry and art of Greece and Rome, the creations of the Middle Ages, and the marvellous poetical and philosophic productions of his own century, all occupied him, and filled his soul. He rooted himself in the past and in the present ; but he radically differed from each. Instead of seeking with the poets of antiquity, and with Goethe and Schiller among moderns, the real in the ideal, he reversed the process, and tried to make the ideal real ; instead of finding, with Kant and Fichte, the unity of thought in the universal, he placed it in the personal ego, independent and irresponsible. He assigned to the individual the formation of his own world and his own destiny. The tendency of all his efforts was to dethrone the moral ideal, and to enthrone in its stead the particular inclination or fancy of each. He was, in short, the apostle of a spiritualized or glorified naturalism.

Schlegel, on settling at Berlin, at once became the rallying point around which gathered the young and ardent spirits who had insight enough to discern the heavens and the coming change. Tieck and Schleiermacher, Bernhardt, and Wackenroder, were the first who were captivated by his critical views, and his questionable mystical naturalism. Each of these, in his own way, had arrived at conclusions not far remote from those of Schlegel : what they lacked was a personal leader.

That, they had now found ; and, under the guidance of this new leader, they became the chief representatives of that transient phase of thought—dignified by the name of *Romantic School*—which played such havoc with the traditional standards, and occupies such a phenomenal position in the history of German thought and literature.

The influence of Schlegel upon Schleiermacher was immediate and overpowering. The gay, open-hearted young man, with his knowledge and enthusiasms, his wit and originality, “created a glorious change in his existence.” He constituted the necessary complement to what was lacking in his nature. Schleiermacher’s mental activity had hitherto been purely subjective. The world of his thought he shared with no one. It was a kind of cloudland whose solitary pathways had been guarded against every intruder, and whose stillness no friendly voice ever disturbed. The first to alter all this was Schlegel. He broke through the enhedgements of Schleiermacher’s soul, and discovered the rare world within. His genial presence awakened what was dormant, and set in motion what was latent and inert. The great mass of thought that till now had remained inarticulate became articulate, and the silent “gynosophist” discovered that he too was a thinker.

In another way Schlegel also influenced Schleiermacher : he led him to a profounder study of

literature and art. This more vigorous form of mental activity widened the solitary student's somewhat narrow horizon. It made him feel that it is not good for philosophy to be alone; and that, self-sufficient as it may be, it can gather from every sphere of knowledge. The benefit that he derived from acquaintance with the beautiful literary and artistic creations of all ages was a permanent gain, and stamped itself on the form of his thought and expression. Indeed, as Schleiermacher himself gratefully admitted, his friendship with Schlegel produced a new epoch in his philosophic and literary history.

Bracing and powerful as the friendship of Schlegel was for Schleiermacher, it must, however, be said that it had for a time a disturbing effect on his spirit. Schlegel's strong point was not morality. He had openly broken with it—and in the Romantic movement there was no provision made for it. This, to a nature so essentially pious as that of Schleiermacher, must ultimately present itself as a fatal want. Yet so engrossed was he in the schemes of his friend, so enslaved was he by the new culture, that he did not, at once, discern the defect. His moral sense was being unconsciously neglected, and there are indications that he failed to grasp the proper proportion of things. This was particularly the case in the publication of *Confidential Letters on Schlegel's Lucinde*. *Lucinde* was a distinctly immoral work, and the

Letters, which were a defence of it, were a sad mistake. However full of deep moral truth and well-expressed thoughts, they were still nothing but "a beautiful commentary on a bad text." And if, at this distance, the character of their author requires that they should be apologised for, it may be said, in extenuation, that they were the outcome of the strong if, perhaps, blinded admiration with which he regarded Schlegel.

II.—FRIENDSHIP WITH HENRIETTE HERZ.

It was a frequent saying of Schleiermacher that he was better understood by women than by men. Certain it is that some of his warmest friendships were formed with women. Without their sympathy and insight we should not have known him as we do. His letters to his fair correspondents are in great part self-revelations, and if we did not possess them much that we know as to his life and habits would have been for ever lost.

At the time that Schlegel, by the strength of his personality was leading the unknown preacher of the Berlin *Charité* to a knowledge of his true destiny, Henriette Herz was silently and unconsciously conducting him towards the same goal.

This cultured and lovable woman, whose reputation for force of intellect and beauty of person long lingered as a kind of tradition in Berlin, was

the daughter of a Jewish physician, and was married, while almost a child, to Dr. Marcus Herz, a man more than double her age. Though the marriage was childless it was singularly happy. The tastes of the two were in many things alike ; and they filled up the spare hours with the pleasures of intellectual society, and in the pursuit of literature, and science and art. Their home was the recognised centre of all that was best in the culture and refinement of Berlin.

Schleiermacher was introduced to this brilliant circle by Count Alexander Dohna, a son of his former patron at Schlobitten. He was then without fame or reputation ; but the Herzes very soon discerned the treasure of intellect that lay hidden in the little body of their new friend, and did what they could to develop it. They introduced him to the most notable people in the city, and made him see that he could more than hold his own among such men as Friedländer, Maimon, Engel, Moritz, Teller, Zöllner, Gentz, and the brothers Humboldt. But, better than this, they received him into the closest intimacy of their social and domestic life. So attached did they become to him, and he to them, that no day passed without his spending part of the evening in their company. It is even related how, in their anxiety for his safety along the dark roads, they presented him with a small lantern constructed so as to allow of its being fixed to the button-hole of his coat.

Thus accoutred, he made his way each winter night to and from his friend's house!

Much as Schleiermacher gained from these influences, it became increasingly manifest that Mrs. Herz was his principal teacher. He learned more from her in those days than he did from the entire circle of her distinguished friends and associates. She had much that he was deficient in, and what she lacked he was able to bestow. They studied together Goethe, Shakespeare, and Plato. She taught him Italian, and he imparted to her what he knew of the physical sciences. They conversed freely on all subjects, and they walked abroad in the most unconstrained fashion.

But morally, even more than intellectually, did she help to mould his nature. Hitherto, during his years of lonely study—and especially when dominated by Schlegel—his understanding and imagination had been chiefly developed. Now, however, under the genial spell of one of the most beautiful and accomplished women of her time, the spiritual and emotional side of his being was called into action. Indeed, it may be said that Henriette Herz did for Schleiermacher's moral life what Friedrich Schlegel had done for his intellectual: she awakened it from its slumber, and pointed to the path of duty and achievement.

There were not wanting ill-natured people who whispered that the intimacy existing between Schleiermacher and Mrs. Herz was based upon a

warmer sentiment than friendship. The wits of Berlin even went so far as to make the two the objects of their stupid satire. But the suspicion was unworthy as it was unjust. Their relation to each other was of the most open and undisguised character, and not a shade of passion coloured it on either side. They could well afford to make light of the stupid calumny ; for a purer, a more disinterested, and, in some respects, a more unique friendship perhaps never existed than that which they maintained for each other.

III.—LITERARY LABOURS.

Schleiermacher had now reached the age of thirty, yet, with the exception of translating some English sermons and writing one or two papers for the *Athenæum*, the short-lived organ of the Romantic School, he had done no real literary work. But his day, long delayed, had at last come. His profound study of philosophy, especially of Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling ; his thorough acquaintance with the great classical works of his own and other lands, and his close identification with the modern forms of culture, were about to bear fruit worthy of his genius. Though he had entered into the spirit of his age, and assimilated its most diverse elements, as few had done, he had never lost his

early piety—those religious instincts that were called into life at his mother's knee, and in the home of the Moravian Brotherhood. These were as the anchor which kept him from drifting into the abysses whither so many of his associates had been carried. Much as he was the product of forces alien to the common religion, much as he lived in an atmosphere in which nature and the individual will or Ego were regarded as all and everything, his religious life was not destroyed, neither did it degenerate. Kinship with what was newest and most revolutionary in the past and in the present left him, what he always was, a Herrnhuter, but a Herrnhuter of a higher order than in the old Silesian days.

It was fitting, therefore, that when the ferment within him had subsided, and his thoughts and ideas called for expression, Schleiermacher should have made choice of religion as the medium through which to utter them. Religion was the master-passion of his spirit, and around it, as around a living centre, he felt that all that he had yet learned took shape and found its rightful place. What he sought to do was to represent religion, "this great spiritual phenomenon," in the light of man's inner nature, and to claim for it an essential and independent place in the human soul. This had been his aim ever since he had begun to think about the matter; and now in the fulness of his strength he was constrained as by an inward

necessity to give utterance to the hope and the light that were in him.

The *Discourses on Religion, Addressed to the Cultivated among its Despisers*—Schleiermacher's first important work—was written at Potsdam, far from the disturbing influences of the Metropolis, in the beginning of 1798. While occupied with the task, he so threw his soul into it that every energy of his being was brought into action, and the whole time he was engaged upon it seemed but as one long day. Each discourse, when it was finished, was sent to Henriette Herz that her opinion regarding it, as well as that of Schlegel and the other interested friends, might be obtained. But though opinions and suggestions enough were freely tendered, they were never in any case acted upon. At length, on the 15th of April, after three months of unremitting toil, the final touches were given to the *Discourses*, and the following year they were published.

The *Discourses*, both in style and matter, were singularly fresh and original. Their easy flow, their brilliant and eloquent sentences, their use of plain, simple language, and their subtle dialectic skill, formed a striking contrast to the dull and laborious fashion in which religious works were then wont to be written. And if the style was remarkable, not less remarkable was the matter. Schleiermacher did not appear as the defender of a dogma or a creed, of a priesthood or a Church.

His purpose was higher. He saw that the men of his age were despising religion because they did not understand its meaning. The doctrines, and the ceremonies, and the uses of religion, which they mistook for the thing itself, were in reality not religion at all: they were simply its external and necessary manifestations. Religion, he taught, is inward, of the soul, independent of holy records, dead traditions, and political systems. Although there can be no true knowledge or action without religion, yet it is neither a form of metaphysics, nor of morals, nor a combination of both. It is the direct feeling that each one has in himself of the infinite and the eternal. "It is the intuition and sentiment of the universe," "a sense and taste for the eternal;" "the immediate consciousness of the universal being of all that is finite in the infinite and through the infinite, of all that is temporal in the eternal and through the eternal. This seeking and finding of the universal being in all that lives and moves, in all becoming and change, in all action and suffering; and to have and to know, in immediate feeling, life itself as the infinite and eternal life—that is religion. . . . It is a life in the infinite nature of the whole, in the one and the all, in God, having and possessing all in God, and God in all."

As thus defined, religion, though it has an inner organic unity in its movements and manifestation, is something more than a mere system of doctrines

and propositions. It is a state of feeling immediate and true for all. Its range is infinite, and it cannot be included under any individual form, but only under the content of all. The religious man is thus ever the most tolerant, for to him the sphere of religion is boundless as the life of nature and of humanity. It is the systematisers of truth who have always proved the narrowest, and who have been the fiercest in their defence of the empty form. "The adherents of the dead letter, which religion discards, have filled the world with their clamour and tumult ; the true contemplators of the eternal were always peaceful souls, either alone with themselves and the infinite, or, if they looked about them, they willingly conceded to each, providing he understood the great reality, the form that pleased him best."

So independent, indeed, is religion of dogma that it can exist apart from those doctrinal ideas that are usually considered to be the condition of all religion. Miracle and revelation, God and immortality, though immediately given in consciousness, are, as dogmatic conceptions, not necessary to the existence of the religious spirit. Instead of preceding and creating the pious disposition, they are the result of it. They are the expression of the feelings common to every religious man. "You are right to esteem lightly the poor parrots who derive their religion entirely from another, or connect it with a dead book, by

which they swear, and by means of which they prove all things. Every holy writing is in itself a glorious production, an eloquent memorial of the heroic time of religion; but through servile veneration it becomes simply a mausoleum, a monument, witnessing that a great spirit once was there, which is there no longer. . . . Not every one that believes in a holy scripture has religion; but only he who understands it in a living and immediate way, and who could, therefore, the more easily dispense with it." "If in the contemplation of what is about us we see no miracles of our own, if in the depths of our being no revelations arise when the soul longs to drink in the beauty of the world and to be pervaded by its spirit; if in the most important moments we do not feel the impulse of the Divine Spirit so that we speak and act from our own holy inspiration; if we are not at least conscious that our feelings are the immediate influence of the universe, while we still know that some part of them is our own that cannot be imitated, but can attest its pure origin within ourselves, we have no religion."

In this theory of religion there is, it must be admitted, much that is one-sided and exaggerated, much that even Schleiermacher modified or overpassed. His limitation of religion to the "intuition and feeling of the universe" is indefensible; and those critics who, like Sigwart, Lipsius, and Pfeiderer, maintain that such a restriction, when pressed, as it is pressed in the *Discourses*, makes

religion merely a product of the subjective consciousness to the exclusion of all objective reality, are in the main right. And yet, notwithstanding this imperfection of representation—which Schleiermacher himself was the first to see and to attempt to correct—his view of religion was a great advance on the old dogmatism with its outward forms and alien apparatus. It made religion a conscious life, not a mechanical system, an influence of the Divine upon the human spirit, and not a thing of arithmetical calculation. “The soul,” so Pfleiderer expresses it, “was recognised as the place from which the religious processes take their rise and run their course. The activity of consciousness was seen to be the medium by which that inner product is broken up, reflected, projected to externality, in short translated into the language of religious notions. Thus the fundamental thought of all modern philosophy, which formed more or less consciously the tendency of the philosophy of religion from Lessing downwards, was for the first time carried out in a thorough manner in the field of religious science, thus laying a new foundation, inaugurating a new era, for this science. This is the immortal work of Schleiermacher, and the merit of it remains to him, even though we should confess that the first attempt to carry out this principle was inadequate and one-sided.”*

* *The Philosophy of Religion*, by O. Pfleiderer: Williams & Norgate, London and Edinburgh; vol. i., p. 316.

The impression which the *Discourses* created was deep and electrical. Many were tired of the old, lifeless dogmas, and they equally despaired of the arid scepticisms that tried to usurp their place. To such the manifesto of Schleiermacher came as a very voice from heaven. Claus Harms—afterwards distinguished as a preacher and a champion of the faith—tells how he read it with breathless interest, and how it became the “birth-hour of his higher life,” and “the impulse to an eternal movement.” Zaremba, the missionary, dated the beginning of his spiritual life to the influence of the *Discourses*, which came into his hands while acting as court-diplomatist at St. Petersburg; and it is well known that it was through the reading of them that Neander, the great historical genius of Germany, was led to the study of the gospel. Novalis, who like Schleiermacher had been in his youth a member of the Moravian Brotherhood, expressed himself as being “possessed, penetrated, inspired and set aflame” by the work. Schlegel—not perhaps a judge of the moral import of the book, nevertheless a very competent critic as to its literary form—praised the *Discourses* as “the first of their kind, full of energy and fire, yet perfectly artistic, and written in a style that would not have been unworthy of the ancients.” Even such mighties as Goethe, Schelling, Fichte, and J. P. Richter, deigned to notice the brilliant little work, and to speak of it with respect.

Indeed, with two notable exceptions, the *Discourses* were everywhere received with favour as a much needed utterance. Strange as it may seem, the only hostile voices raised against them were those of the advanced rationalistic and the narrow orthodox parties. Antagonistic and apart on every other point, they were at one here. The rationalistic section disliked the book because of its spirituality, and because they had discernment to see that though new in form it conserved much that lay at the heart of the old theology. The orthodox leaders, on the other hand, saw nothing in it but barefaced unbelief, rampant atheism and undisguised pantheism. There were few, indeed, even of the most far-seeing, who hailed it as the dawning of a new era alike in religion and in theology.

The *Monologues*, the next noteworthy creation of the Romantic period in Schleiermacher's life, was published in 1800, as a new year's greeting to the coming century. Like the *Discourses*, this work was the outcome of an inner necessity, and was finished in an incredibly short time. It is a self-revelation—an utterance in the world's hearing of what he had spoken and acted in the innermost sanctuary of his being. It is a description of his own ideal life, a free unfolding of the aims and activities and hopes of his soul.

But although interesting on account of this self-portraiture, this self-idealisation of their author,

the *Monologues* have a far greater significance than what attaches to the merely personal and autobiographical. They do for the ethics of the individual what the *Discourses* did for the religion of the race: they assert its free and independent existence, and they indicate how it can be attained and developed.

The opening Monologue, entitled "Contemplation," strikes the key-note of the entire series. This outer world, this "mirror of the spirit," "with its eternal laws and fleeting phenomena," is not the sphere of man's real self and activity. It is only when man turns away from it to the inner world; when he withdraws himself from finite forms and events, and concentrates his attention on the innermost essence of being—the absolute self-consciousness—that he finds his own true and eternal personality. The one—the outer—is fleeting, shadowy, limited, and unreal; the other—the inner—is supreme and permanent, the primary source of existence and of freedom. The life that is shaped in the one is bound as by chains, is subject to necessity, conflict, and finality; whereas the life that is lived in the other is free and unfettered—a life which "the world cannot change and time cannot destroy, for it is itself the creator both of time and of the world." "Holy freedom, thou art supreme over all. Thou dwellest in me, in all. Necessity has its sway outside of us; it is that distinct note in the beautiful conflict of

freedom by which we are made aware of its presence. I can only contemplate myself as free ; what is necessary is not my act, it is only its shadow, it constitutes the elements of the world which I, in joyous fellowship with all, help to create."

This inner life, reached through self-contemplation, is man's real and abiding life. It is that true form of his being which, amidst the activities of the world, should ever stand out clear and distinct before the eye of the soul. "Begin even now thine eternal life in constant self-contemplation. Care not for what shall be, weep not for what has been, but have a care not to lose thyself, and weep when thou art carried away into the stream of time without bearing heaven within thee."

From these lofty heights of the human spirit—which so far correspond to the idealism of Fichte—Schleiermacher, in the second Monologue, descends into the plains of reality and experience. Here, however, he no longer follows Fichte as his guide. Looked at in its relation to the world, the "eternal self" is not, as that philosopher maintained, the same and identical in all men ; it is the individual and distinct shape that humanity has assumed in the personality of each. This view, that every soul is an original expression of the ideal human type, a representative moment in the universal whole, came to him with all the force of a discovery. "With superb joy I still think of the time

when I found the consciousness of humanity, and knew that I should never again lose it. From within came this grand revelation, produced by no doctrine of morals and no system of philosophy. . . . In the stillest repose, in the most stolid inertia, I bear within myself, unbroken, the consciousness of entire humanity."

This individuality, distinct from the vast whole of which it is a part, should ever aim at developing itself according to its own peculiar disposition. To be individual, to be one's self, is the highest destiny of man. "Every one should represent humanity in a particular way, with a new combination of its elements, in order that it may reveal itself in every possible manner, and may give effect, in the fulness of space and time, to all the different forms which may proceed from its depths."

But this is only possible where perception and love—the two necessary conditions of morality—are present. Through perception we distinguish between ourselves and what is foreign to us, between our own individuality and the individuality of others. But this knowledge of humanity which we have in sense is incomplete without love. "Love is the attractive force in the spiritual world. No real life and no real culture are possible without it. Without it all would resolve itself into a uniform and crude mass."

The closing monologues are occupied with the

bearing of these principles upon the present and the future. Though Schleiermacher saw with sorrow that his generation was attracted to the outer, worldly, sensuous life, and what it prized as morality and culture were but dead mechanical forms, he hoped that the time was not far distant when men would seek the true life of the soul, and when all their actions will be glorified by the power of an almighty love. These genial glances into the future are strongly coloured by the spirit of romance, and they must have appeared strange and fanatical to those whose lives were enslaved by the present. But Schleiermacher cared little for what his age might think: he belonged to that larger era which he and the men of the future were hastening on. "I am, as to method of thinking and life, a stranger to the present generation—a prophetic citizen of a later world. To the future I am drawn by a lively imagination and a strong faith; to it belongs my every act and every thought. Indifferent is it to me what the present world does or suffers; far under me it rolls on insignificant, and with a rapid glance the eye surveys how great and confused is the course of its pathway."

VI.

LIFE AT STOLPE.

VERY beautifully Schleiermacher pictures in his *Monologues* the true ideal life which should be followed by each in the free determination of the spirit. But it is always easier to point the way to the ideal than it is to walk in that way. At the very time when in imagination Schleiermacher was hewing out so skilfully the block of life, there appeared in it the black vein of destiny. While the *Monologues* were taking shape, a tragic conflict was being enacted in his soul. This was brought about by the unlawful passion which he cherished for Eleanore Grunow, the wife of a Berlin clergyman. Her married life was wanting in all the essential conditions of happiness, and Schleiermacher felt that if this relation were persisted in, her inner life would be destroyed. He, therefore, advocated as a moral duty that the marriage tie should be dissolved. Eleanore did not love her husband, yet a strong sense of right made her cling to him ; and, although she did ultimately lend her ear to the idea of separation, when the time came for taking the decisive step, she drew back and renounced Schleiermacher for ever.

It was during this time of mental and moral aberration that Schleiermacher wisely determined to withdraw from Berlin and its unhealthy surroundings. This he did in June, 1802, when he was appointed to the post of Court Preacher in the quiet Pomeranian town of Stolpe.

Here, widely separated from the cause of his misery, he was still harassed by anguish of soul. Instead, however, of yielding to it, he sought to overcome it, to neutralise it, by intense occupation of mind and heart. Schlegel and he had, some time before, arranged to translate Plato into German. The work was in many respects congenial to both; but Schlegel had neither the method nor the perseverance to enable him to carry out his part of the engagement. The task, in this way, fell to be carried on by Schleiermacher, unaided and alone. With him it was no temporary whim to be laid aside at the bidding of some counter-attraction; it was a labour of love, a great life-work to which he felt he had been specially called.

It was fitting, then, that during this enforced exile at Stolpe, Schleiermacher should devote himself to this vast and arduous undertaking. He needed to be elevated above the cares and the passions of his soul, he needed the invigorating influence of the atmosphere that for ever plays on the ideal heights. The translating of his old favourite, Plato, supplied both these wants. The hard study requisite in order to get at his thought,

and to express it rightly, had a quieting effect on his inner life, and companionship with the most genial of all the ancient thinkers brought tone and vigour to his intellect. Thus what might have proved an irksome task became a bracing mental exercise attended with an ever increasing personal and scientific interest. The first volume of this magnificent work was published in 1804, and at once gave its author a foremost place among the best Greek scholars in Germany. Other volumes succeeded at stated intervals, and, in 1828, the sixth and last appeared. Schleiermacher was the first to indicate the method of Plato, and to point out the organic unity of the various Dialogues. His version, accompanied as it was by notes and introductions, not only helped to make the Platonic philosophy generally intelligible, it also gave an impetus to the study of Greek speculation. Unhappily, Schleiermacher did not live to complete the entire series; and students of the *Timæus*, the *Critias* and the *Laws* will regret that these are not included in his admirable rendering. Many translations of the divine philosopher have since been produced, and that under more favourable conditions, yet this one, begun at a time when countless linguistic difficulties had to be surmounted, still remains unsurpassed for painstaking accuracy, real insight, and true sympathy.

Another important work that Schleiermacher wrote and published about this time was his *Out-*

lines of a Critique of Former Systems of Ethics (1803). The *Critique* is divided into three books, in which the chief principles of ethics; the three great ethical ideas of duty, virtue, the good and the evil; and the ethical systems in relation to their content and form, are separately discussed. The work, which is the most mechanical of Schleiermacher's writings, cost him an enormous amount of labour. He called it his "gravestone," and more than once he was tempted to lay it aside altogether. "Alas," he confided to his friend Henriette Herz, "the writing of a book, especially of such a book, is a great sorrow; never in my life will I attempt the like again! I verily believe that all the time I have laboured at it I have not had one clever thought—nothing but critical shavings."

The design of the *Critique* was to lay the basis for a true theory of ethics; to do, in short, for morals what Kant had done, in his celebrated *Critique*, for knowledge. That it failed to accomplish this end was due to the one-sided principle of criticism adopted. Instead of looking broadly at the different ethical systems and estimating them according to their historical growth and results, Schleiermacher judged them individually according to their inner view, according to the way in which they treated the laws and ends of life, and summed up its facts under one leading principle. Tested by this method Plato and Spinoza alone escape censure and disapprobation. All the rest—

especially Kant and Fichte—were subjected to a merciless attack.

This great, though in many respects unfortunate, *Critique* was the only one of Schleiermacher's works that was badly received. Its style was cold and heavy as lead, its thought hard and repressed, and its arrangement irritating and confused. Besides, the personal element, which added such charm to his other writings, was altogether wanting. Indeed, so pronouncedly is this the case that the author congratulated himself that the personal is so veiled that it would be impossible for a critic, from a mere perusal of the book, to say what were his peculiar ethical views. It can therefore be readily understood that the *Critique*, able and suggestive as it undoubtedly is, does not constitute pleasant reading, and that it is the least known of all Schleiermacher's more important writings.

In addition to these extensive intellectual labours, Schleiermacher threw himself with energy into the work of his pastoral charge. He endeavoured to create an interest in religion by brightening and reforming the church service, by personal visitation, and by direct catechetical instruction. Nor was it in his own district alone that he sought to elevate the religious sentiments of the people. His contact with church members in other parts of the diocese, and his fellowship with the clergy—whom he describes as being degraded, sensuous, and without spiritual and

intellectual susceptibilities--indicated that the evil of religious indifference was widespread and radical. How to arrest this decay of the spiritual and moral life was a problem which at this time constantly occupied him. The only immediate remedy he could think of—he made it known in a pamphlet published in 1803—was the thorough re-organisation of the Churches. He would have the Lutheran and Reformed Churches no longer stand apart, seeing that the doctrines which were the occasion of separating them had now ceased to have any confessional significance. He would have the service of public worship made more simple, more beautiful, and more ennobling. He would have none to enter the ministry of the Church who had not a special call to the office ; and he would make provision by which it might be rendered easy for those who had made a mistake in choosing the clerical life, to withdraw from it and to follow some other career.

Reforms such as these he was hopeful would give new vitality to the Church ; but he was scarcely sanguine enough to believe they would take place in his day. Self-interest and the inveterate force of custom drew, he knew well, too strongly in the other direction. And yet he often longed for the blessed time when the spiritual lethargy which, like ice, bound the hearts of men should break up, and the true life of the soul, free and unfettered, should move on in its divine course.

VII.

PROFESSOR AT HALLE.

HELPFUL as the seclusion at Stolpe was, in counteracting some of the more doubtful effects of the Romantic School, it became, after a time, intolerably dull. The intellectual and social life of the place was not high, and Schleiermacher craved, with the old yearning, for true kinship of spirit. With the returning tone and stability of his inner life, there came also an irresistible longing to take a new and onward step. But that was impossible in the stagnant and unsympathetic Stolpe.

"The invisible hand of Providence and the action of man himself are one and the same." So Schleiermacher once wrote, and the truth of the assertion finds illustration in the present instance. When he was anxiously looking about him, and wondering where next the lines of his life would lead, he received offers of two professorial appointments. That to the chair of theology at Würzburg, which came first, he resolved to accept. He was, however, dissuaded from doing so by the intervention of King Friedrich III., who wished to retain him in Prussia. In a few months after-

wards, he was appointed theological professor and university preacher at Halle.

No one could be more conscious of unfitness for being a teacher of theology than Schleiermacher. Not only did he feel that his position was not clear or strong in outline : he knew that he lacked a really scientific knowledge of the field embraced by theology. Though he had always an interest in certain aspects of theological truth, the systematic study of the subject had hitherto failed to absorb him in the same way that philosophy did. But now, with his unfailing energy and indomitable courage, he at once set about remedying this defect. His natural gift of acquirement, his various knowledge and intimate acquaintance with the ancient languages, made this easier than it would have been for most. In a comparatively short time he overcame the immediate difficulties of his new calling, and was able to discharge the duties of his office with increasing confidence.

From the first, he desired to make his course as varied and useful as possible. He lectured thrice a day on exegesis, dogmatics, and ethics. The mere labour involved in such a feat would have been impossible had he not adopted the plan of simply noting down the leading thoughts of each lecture, and trusting to the moment for suitable language in which to clothe them. This method, not always successful, became in his case an eminent success. He had a rare talent of

expression, and, when moved by his theme, the freshness, vivacity, and clearness of the spoken word were even more admirable than anything which he attained in his most elaborately polished and studied utterances.

As soon as he entered upon his duties Schleiermacher was met with a strong academic opposition. His colleagues, according to their individual bias, regarded him with suspicion as being either an atheist, or a pietist, a Spinozist, or a mystic. For the representatives of orthodoxy he was too broad, for the champions of rationalism he was too narrow. Still, much as he had to contend with in this respect, the force of his unique personality triumphed over every obstacle. Before many sessions had passed, no name in the professoriate of Halle bore such a powerful intellectual significance as did that of Schleiermacher.

The most notable friendship that Schleiermacher formed while at Halle was with Heinrich Steffens. He and this distinguished natural philosopher—whose appointment as professor only dated a few weeks anterior to his own—entered into the closest fellowship of life and thought. They shared each other's views and ideas, and they mutually communicated what they knew. For both, this friendship was a distinct gain; and if the events of after-years tended to separate them, they could not but recall with gratitude how much they owed to each other.

It was while here, too, that he made the acquaintance of Goethe. This most splendid of the moderns had, as a thinker and a pioneer of the new way, influenced him profoundly; yet personally he failed to make the same kind of impression. He was very friendly, very amiable, very brilliant, and that was all. There was no true interchange of thought, no revelation of each other's real individuality. This was owing principally to what Schleiermacher describes as a peculiarity of his own nature: he could allow no one to enter into the innermost sanctuary of his being until he was satisfied as to the purity of his character. Mere brain power, however magnificent, had no attraction for him unless it was regulated by a loving, human heart. "For his intellect alone," he declared, "I love no man. Schelling and Goethe are two mighty intellects, but I should never feel tempted to love them, and certainly I shall never make myself believe that I do so."

Schleiermacher's sojourn at Halle was too much occupied with academic activities to be productive of much literary work. The *Christmas Festival*, published in 1806, is of interest as containing the germ of his future Christological views. This little book is written in the form of a dialogue, in which the principal speakers, in trying to explain the meaning of the festival of Christmas, are skillfully represented as describing the different phases of Christianity then existing, or perhaps, as Strauss

has suggested, the various forms through which his own religious thought had passed.

Leonard, the representative of critical rationalism, opens the discussion by assigning a merely human and symbolical interest to the festival. It is an ideal after-growth, independent of the gospel stories regarding Christ's reputed incarnation. Consequently this mystic after-growth, and not "the earthly personal activity of Christ," has given currency to faith in His birth, miracles, death, resurrection, and ascension. If, therefore, Christianity is what it is, "a strong and mighty factor" in human affairs, this is to be accounted for otherwise than by referring it absolutely to the historical Christ.

Ernest, who next follows, takes up the opposite view. For him, Christmas has a real and spiritual significance as resting indubitably on the fact of Christ's advent, "which is the one universal occasion of rejoicing, because there is no other principle of joy than redemption; and in the development of redemption, the birth of the Divine Child is the first distinct stage." The existence of a Saviour is not dependent merely on historical records: it is a necessary postulate of man's higher being. The contradictions in human nature—the contrasts between appearance and reality, between time and eternity—can only be resolved by One who, while real man, bears in Himself the sublime unity of God, and is raised above all contrasts and limitations. Such a

deliverer, such a resolver of the perplexities of life, is Jesus Christ. In Him, as the Head and Founder of a better kingdom, there is access to a new world—a world in which the soul can be attuned to divine harmony. The essential meaning of the Christmas festival therefore consists in this—"that we should become conscious of the inner ground and uncreated might of a new, untroubled life, and that we should discern already in the earliest buddings of this life its fairest efflorescence, and even its highest perfection."

The next speaker, Edward, is the representative of the speculative conception of Christianity. For him, Christ is the man-in-himself, the man behind the man (*der Mensch an sich*), the eternal existence in the process of becoming, the identity of the divine and the human. In keeping the festival of Christmas we do then but celebrate ourselves—that human nature or eternal existence to which we should ever seek to attain in and through the fellowship of the Christian Church. "In this way each of us ought to see in the birth of Christ his own higher birth, by which alone whatever of devotion and love there is within us exists; and through which also the eternal Son of God appears in us. Therefore it is that the festival issues forth, like a heavenly light, from the darkness of the night. It is a universal pulsation of joy in the whole new-born world which only those who are spiritually diseased or paralysed fail to apprehend."

The dialogue is closed by Joseph, the Moravian type of Christian. The discourses of his friends seem to him very foolish ; for it is not words but joy that he feels constrained to utter in presence of the great mystery. " All forms are for me too stiff, and all discourse too tedious and cold. An ineffable object requires or produces an ineffable joy ; my joy, like that of a child, can only laugh and exult. All men are to me this day as children, and they are on that account so much the dearer. The anxious wrinkles are once more smoothed away ; years and cares are no longer imprinted on the brow ; and in all there is the anticipation of a beautiful and pleasing existence."

Besides the *Christian Festival*, the only other literary work that Schleiermacher produced at Halle was his critical estimate of the First Epistle to Timothy. This is an acute and learned discussion as to the authenticity of the Epistle conducted on the principles of scientific criticism applicable to all literature. The appearance of this essay added greatly to the reputation of its author as a critic and a scholar. At the same time, his rejection of the Epistle as altogether un-Pauline, and his endeavour to disassociate the divinity of Christianity from mere questions of authenticity, gave much offence in the theological world, and helped to deepen the suspicion that still attached, in many quarters, to the name of Schleiermacher.

VIII.

LOVE OF FATHERLAND.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S life at Halle was becoming yearly more useful. His spiritual nature was gaining in strength and maturity, and as it did it brought with it an increasing personal influence.

As a professor, he created a new life-movement. His scientific knowledge, his religious enthusiasm, his kinship with the modern spirit, and his love for what was permanent in the old, opened up new regions of thought and action. Earnest seekers after truth found in attending his lectures that reason was never fettered as if it were an enemy to be feared and not a friend to be loved. And as they advanced, and came under the spell of his wonderful personality, they discovered that something more than the cold light of reason was leading them along the narrow pathway that lies between truth and error. The glow of religious feeling—the infinite suffusing the finite—God in the heart—here, too, was guidance sure and certain, within its own sphere, as that of thought itself. Thus, in their search for the real and the eternal, they were conducted to it through two sides of their being ; and when they found what

they sought, their conviction rested not only on intellectual, but also on religious, certainty. "I am," said he, describing his position to Jacobi, whom he characterised as "a heathen in understanding, a Christian in soul"—"I am, as to my understanding, a philosopher, since that is the primary and independent activity of the understanding; but as to my feeling, I am altogether a religious man, and, as such, a Christian who has driven out the heathen element, if, indeed, it ever existed in me." . . . "Reason and feeling exist in me side by side, but they touch each other and form a galvanic pile. The innermost life of the spirit consists for me in this galvanic process, in the feeling of reason and the reason of feeling, yet so that the two poles always remain separate."

As a preacher, also, Schleiermacher exercised an ever growing influence. His wealth of moral ideas, his faculty of applying divine principles to the wants and events of the time, and the deeply penetrative and persuasive character of his words, gave him a power over his audience which was as remarkable as it was beneficent in its results.

This increasing power, both as a professor and a preacher, was, however, unfortunately arrested at the period of its greatest promise. Napoleon, who had been trampling, under his iron heel, the nations of Europe, had in his victorious career entered Germany with the design of crushing its life and independence. On the 14th October, 1806, the

fatal battles of Jena and Auerstädt were fought and won, and after the lapse of a single day the conqueror was in possession of Halle. The town was given to plunder, the University was suppressed, and its students dispersed.

For Schleiermacher, scarcely any event more disastrous could have happened. It left him without office, without money, without comfort. His house was pillaged ; his personal effects were appropriated ; even his " shirts, with the exception of five, and all the silver spoons, with the exception of two," were carried away. And, as if this were not enough, he was compelled to afford quarters to as many soldiers as his house could contain. In his case the old prophetic word found perfect fulfilment, " that which the palmer worm hath left the locust hath eaten ; and that which the locust hath left hath the canker worm eaten ; and that which the canker worm hath left hath the caterpillar eaten."

Schleiermacher had long foreseen this calamity to the German nation, and he did what he could to prepare the people for it. In the pulpit, and out of it, he endeavoured to arouse patriotic feeling and to awaken the sense of nationality that had long slumbered, or was altogether dead. His strong Protestant convictions, and his efforts in behalf of national and individual freedom, placed him in the front rank of those noble and patriotic men who, like Stein, Arndt, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and

others, did so much in the time of humiliation for the Fatherland and her liberties. In this respect, what a contrast does he present to Hegel, Goethe, and Schiller! They, when the evil day came, were ready to do homage to Napoleon, and to welcome him as the "great world-soul." They had no word to speak to the national heart, no message to inspire new life or to cheer the despondent: they were simply solicitous about their own interest, and they fell in obsequiously with the new order!

Nor was the patriotic activity of Schleiermacher a mere spasmodic movement which occupied him while the hour of danger lasted and ceased when it passed. Like religion, like knowledge, like friendship, patriotism became with him a reality which he followed with a passionate earnestness. Till the last, and even when unjustly suspected—as most of the men were who helped on the liberation of Germany—he never wavered in his endeavour to form and direct the constitutional life of the nation. He loved his country with a deep paternal love; and no suspicion or annoyance or jealousy could ever come between him and the deep impulses of his heart.

It was, too, one of the chief rewards of his life that these labours were not in vain. His disinterestedness and consistency had accomplished two of the noblest aims that any one can directly or indirectly set before him: the betterment of

his generation, and the reconciliation and esteem of his enemies. He lived to see achieved many of the schemes that were dear to him ; and the king, though tardily, at length, in January, 1831, recognised his devotion and loyalty by conferring on him the Order of the Red Eagle—an Order which, however, he never wore.

Men have from the earliest times, at least since the days of Marathon and Thermopylæ, crowned with honour the heroic souls who loved their country and fought for its liberty and independence. Even had Schleiermacher done nothing except what he did when Germany was under the heel of France, he would have deserved well of his fatherland, and his name should be had in everlasting remembrance.

The critical period immediately following the suppression of the University at Halle was anything but conducive to mental work. That tyrannous act—almost justifying Schleiermacher's view that Napoleon "hated Protestantism as much as he hated speculative philosophy"—rudely disturbed the repose of our author's academic life. It deprived him at once of the leisure and the means requisite for sustained study. But more than that. For the time, at least, it almost exclusively directed the energies of his ever active soul into a new channel. He had to forsake the peaceful cloisters of *Académie*, and go down into

the busy arena of life, with its conflicts, intrigues, and politics.

And yet, unfavourable as the times were, Schleiermacher found opportunity, in the breaks and pauses that occur in the busiest of lives, for a certain amount of literary activity. He superintended the publication of his *Treatise on First Timothy*; he published several volumes of his translation of Plato; and he wrote, for the *Literary Gazette*, a critical notice of Fichte's idealistic view of the world as elaborated in his *Characteristics of the Present Age*. Also, the patriotic sermons which he preached at this time are distinguished for their vigorous thinking and their wide and almost prophetic outlook.

IX.

THE PREACHER.

IN the days of distress succeeding the suppression of the University at Halle, Schleiermacher had been frequently invited by the people at Bremen to become their pastor. The post was in many ways desirable. It would free him from financial embarrassment ; it would deliver him from the immediate distractions of his surroundings : and, above all, it would enable him to provide a home for his sister Nanni, who had lived with him at Halle, and who now shared his adverse fortunes. But, attractive as the place was, he felt it would be an act of " treason against his inner vocation " to desert Prussia in the time of her humiliation. Instead, therefore, of accepting preferment elsewhere, he determined to remain at the centres where he knew he could be most helpful. First at Halle, then at Berlin, he devoted himself to the service of his country, while he managed, by means of teaching and literary work, to earn a livelihood for his sister and himself. The times were hard for many, not less than for him ; and never was he happier than when he identified himself with

the common lot, and toiled on in the cause of liberty and of a wider, more hopeful life.

In 1809, this round of civil and social duty, which was threatening to change the theologian and the philosopher into a practical politician, was broken in upon by a circumstance of great moment and full of significance for his future. This was his elevation to be minister of Trinity Church, Berlin—one of the principal charges in the city. The appointment not only raised him once more into direct public life, it afforded boundless sway to what was always one of the most marvellous activities of his nature : his wonderful preaching faculty. Much as he excelled in many directions, in the pulpit he transcended all his other efforts. Here he was at his best ; and here his influence, if from the nature of the case transient and for the hour, was widest and most far-reaching. As the place which he occupies in the history of the Christian pulpit is one of the highest, it may be desirable to describe with some minuteness his character as a preacher.

Schleiermacher did not take up preaching as an occasional mental exercise ; it was a necessity of his nature—the service that gave fullest expression to his soul. For forty years did he engage in almost unbroken succession in this noblest of all earthly callings. No sphere of activity had such an attraction for him, and none so perfectly called into play every faculty of his being. The pulpit

brought him into contact with living men and women. It called forth his social and religious instincts—those feelings of brotherhood which were first cultivated in the Moravian circle, and which were to him as the very breath of life. It gave unrestrained scope to the formative power of his strongly ethical character. In preaching, he found the opportunity which he always sought, of influencing the human spirit with its capacities, its needs and hopes, and of building it up in holy fellowship. Here, taking his stand on the mighty word of God, he entered into the holiest sanctuary of the inner life, and he sought to awaken the forces that had long slumbered, and to make distinct the voices from afar that everywhere spoke of a lost love that could be found, a lost home whose door still stood open to receive the penitent. For him the sermon was not a mere work of art, a thing to be shaped with infinite care, and to be touched and re-touched like the creations of the painter or the sculptor. It was a living word of God speaking through a human soul to a human soul. Its purpose was to stir up devotion, not admiration; to bring rest to the weary, to conduct the heavy laden to Christ, and to show all men that it is in religion alone they can find their purest joys, their highest service, and their fullest life.

How then, it may be asked, did Schleiermacher seek to realise this ideal of what a sermon should

be in his own preaching? The ten volumes of sermons which have been published in his name afford sufficient material for an answer to this question. The first thing that strikes us in these discourses is the plain, simple, and direct style in which they are written. There is an almost entire absence of the poetical figures and the splendid rhetorical outbursts that characterise his early works. Illustration is used but sparingly, and there is little attempt at pictorial representation or sensuous appeal. The sentences move on with a kind of rhythmical swing—always clear and strong, and sometimes rising into great beauty of expression and perfection of finish. The late Dr. Ker, himself one of the finest of recent preachers, points out a defect which is almost inevitable in such a style of preaching. “The structure of his sentences tends to monotony. The periods are so long, involved, smooth, and harmonious, that short sentences, even if abrupt, would give relief; they are like the large rolling waves of mid-ocean that fold out but do not break with shocks of thunder and spray. But, with all this, his style has great beauty and soothing power—of a Ciceronian, not of a Demosthenic, kind.”*

But greater is the content of these sermons than the style in which they are clothed. Christ, the Church, and the Christian life, these are the themes

* *History of Preaching*, p. 302.

which they invariably discuss. They are well-worn themes, and in the great common-place preaching one knows what kind of thoughts gather around them. It was not, however, in Schleiermacher to be common-place; and perhaps in no other capacity is he so fresh and original, so deep and prophetic, as when he is discoursing of these sublime realities. The divine love, of which Christ is the incarnation, does not in his teaching evaporate into a mere vague and impalpable insincerity; it is the most real and practical force in the universe. Its relations to us and to our future, to the world and its mysterious struggle, assume here a new form and become luminous with a new meaning. Christ Himself, the loveliest of all heaven's messengers, is represented, not simply in the glories of His person and in the inscrutable relations of His being: He is ever portrayed as a saving, spiritualising power that has entered into our lot and is eternally one with our destiny. The Christian Church—too often the arena where worldly men act their little ambitions and cherish bitter hatreds—is likewise here described as the undivided body of Christ, where each and all are bound by the same loves, aims, and hopes. The spiritual life, too—for many so monotonous, and pictured by the crowd in colours so poor and mean and earthly—is here glorified as by the touch of a hand from the Eternal. Little our lives may be—low in ideal, disappointing in attainment—yet there is a

hope in them, even in the lowest, that can never be suppressed, and that must find its fulfilment

“ At last—far off—at last to all,
And every winter change to spring.”

Even amidst our present embarrassing wealth of sermonic literature, there are few sermons that are better worth reading and studying than those of Schleiermacher. One cannot peruse them without being brought nearer to the true and the good, and without being impressed with the nothingness of all earthly pursuits, in comparison with the grandeur of the spiritual life.

As is well known, Schleiermacher did not write his sermons before delivering them. He allowed his mind to become filled with his subject during the week, and not till late on Saturday, or on Sunday morning, did he place a single note on paper. All he then jotted down was his text, and the general outline of his theme. This he called his “ bill of fare,” and with it he entered the pulpit, where the sermon took shape in the direct utterance of his inner thought and feeling. He began at first slowly, with the wondrously penetrative and sonorous voice pitched in the ordinary conversational key. Then, as his subject arranged itself, thought followed thought in rapid succession, the words became faster, the preacher more animated, and he usually ended when the full rich tide of his discourse had reached the flood. During

the latter years—after the death of his dear Nathanael—he was sometimes, when picturing the unfathomable love of God in Christ, filled with a great emotion, and the tears fell down his cheeks, and his voice sounded like harp-tones from a higher world.

In the accepted sense of the term, Schleiermacher was not what might be called a distinctly popular preacher—one who draws the gaping multitudes that are here to-day and to-morrow are not. His manner, if always earnest and impressive, was too calm and thoughtful for that. Besides, his sermons were not infrequently so dialectic in character as to suggest that they had been modelled after the pattern of Plato's Dialogues. Little wonder, if in such circumstances, his audience should have been principally drawn from the cultivated classes. Schleiermacher himself ascribes it as a strangely mixed company. "No draught of the fishing net was ever more varied than my congregation. Herrnhuters, Jews, baptized and unbaptized, young philosophers and philologists, elegant dames, and the beautiful image of St. Anthony, always hovered in motley vision before my gaze." Yet no one could long hear him—even the most illiterate, providing his soul was at all open to religious influences—without being drawn into the secret of his power. His unsurpassed improvising faculty by which his spoken utterance far excelled his written word, the sympathetic and persuasive character of his repre-

sentation of Christ as the Saviour of man, his ever clear and practical message spoken "from the times and to the times," and his unfailing enthusiasm for humanity and his faith in its ultimate triumph ; these endowed him with power to touch the hearts of men, the poor alike with the rich, the learned not less than the unlearned. His preaching was for all, because he saw in every son of man a possible citizen of the Kingdom of God, and he yearned to set him on the way, and to conduct him to the all-glorious Leader and Captain of the world's salvation.

Schleiermacher's power as a preacher is not yet spent ; for his sermons are still inculcating on the Church the fact that the real function of the pulpit is to exercise a creative and moulding influence upon the form and character of the religious life. He was no retailer of lifeless formulas, no advocate of schemes that have been tried and failed. Few knew the needs, the sorrows, and the longings of his age as he did ; and in the name of Christ he sought to grapple with them faithfully and resolutely. His message was not a doubtful one—it had in it head and heart—and he hurled it at the men of his day as the long-drawn waves dash against the rock-bound coast. And as the waves wear away the seemingly so solid barrier, and eat out for themselves sunny ways into the wide coast land, so he left on his generation the mark of his presence,

and he caused rivulets of gladness to flow into many a barren and lonely waste. Never did the world more than now cry out for such preaching—strong, loving, triumphant and Christo-centric. Should the Church become indifferent to this cry—should it fail to witness to Christ as the only redeeming and recreating agency in the human soul—the Kingdom of God on earth will, no doubt, still continue to exist, in a sluggish and unauthoritative manner, until it is once more awakened out of its sleep of worldliness by some new messenger of the Spirit and Love of Christ; but, in the meantime, the Church itself, as a manifesting, guiding, ethical and religious force, will cease to be the true Church, and must take a place, and that not the highest, among the transient and secular influences which each age calls into existence.

X.

PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN BERLIN.

SHORTLY after his appointment as preacher at Berlin, Schleiermacher began to direct his thoughts to what proved to be the most helpful event in his career. He had always a longing for the tenderness, the sympathy, and the bliss of domestic life. The union and fellowship of the married state, when sanctified by a pure and holy love, he regarded as the ideal condition of social life—the condition that develops what is highest and noblest and most self-sacrificing in the human soul. No other relation appeared to him at once so beautiful and sacred, so exquisite in happiness and so boundless in its possibilities. For himself, though no sentimentalist—he called sentiment the phthisis of the mind—he had long felt that he could not thrive alone. Solitude brought death to the fairest flowers and fruits of his spirit. “I stretch out all my roots and leaves towards love. I must be in immediate contact with it; and when I cannot enjoy it in full drafts, I instantly become dry and withered. Such is my inner nature.” He felt, too, that he drew more closely to women than to men, “because there was so much in his soul that

men failed to understand." And yet, much as his whole being had in it tendencies that were favourable to married and home life, he had, owing to the misplacement of his affection, failed to reach it. But, at the age of forty-one, what he had hitherto failed to reach, he now attained. In May, 1809, he married Henriette, the young and beautiful widow of his friend, Ehrenfried von Willich, pastor at Stralsund.

Schleiermacher's wedded life was singularly happy. His home was a sweet sanctuary of love. No acrid moods, no jars or discords ever disturbed its peace or marred its joy. The two lived for each other and for their children. The principles that Schleiermacher had been unwearied in teaching, and which found special expression in his *Sermons on the Christian Household*, were carried out into practice by both him and his wife, and with the best of results. Even the last letter which Schleiermacher wrote to her—written twenty-five years after their marriage—breathed the same strong glowing spirit of love that prevailed in the earlier days.

Only one shadow darkened the brightness of their domestic life. This was the loss of Nathaniel—their only son—who died at the age of nine. It was a great sorrow. But very calmly and patiently did Schleiermacher bear it. "I know well that such a wound, inflicted in mine old age, will never heal." "I made it my special duty, ever

since the boy began to attend the gymnasium, to take him under my more direct guidance. Finally, I arranged that he should study in my room; and I can say that there was no hour in which I did not think of the boy, or was not solicitous about him; and now each moment I so much the more miss him. There is nothing to be done but to submit, and to blunt my sorrow by means of hard work. For battle against it I will not and cannot, and give myself up to it I must not. On the very day of his burial, I began to attend to my affairs as formerly, and life went on in the old round; only everything went on more slowly and more heavily."

The funeral discourse which he delivered over his son's grave, while the tears streamed down his cheeks, is one of the most celebrated and pathetic of all his discourses. It is pervaded by a deep spirit of resignation; and it finds consolation and hope only in Him who is the Resurrection and the Life, and who in the might of His soul prayed for His children the ever memorable prayer, "Father, I will that they also whom Thou hast given Me be with Me where I am, that they may behold My glory which Thou hast given Me."

Schleiermacher's marriage and settlement in Berlin, marked a new era in his life. He threw himself into the fresh channels of activity and usefulness that opened up on all sides, and it was now that he gave proof not only of his marvellous

aptitude for work, but also of his equally wonderful organizing and creative power.

When the Government resolved to found a University at Berlin—a step rendered imperative by the suppression of the University at Halle—Schleiermacher took a leading part in the work. His rare educational knowledge, and his perfect acquaintance with the requirements of the age, eminently fitted him for such a task. The broad spirit in which it was conceived, and the form which it ultimately assumed, were due in great part to his enlightened views and untiring labours.

In 1810, this, now the most flourishing of the German Universities, was formally opened. As was fitting, Schleiermacher was placed at the head of the theological faculty. His past record, both as an original thinker and as a distinguished professorial teacher, amply justified his appointment. But if any doubt ever existed on this head, it was removed by the publication of his *Brief Sketch of Theological Study*, which appeared some months after he entered upon office. This little work is not only of interest as defining Schleiermacher's peculiar views, but also, as showing for the first time, that theology has a distinct claim to be regarded as a science. It sums up and classifies all the facts and data of theological thought under the three heads of philosophical, historical, and practical. *Philosophical theology* is regarded as including apologetics and polemics.

Its object is to institute a critical inquiry into the nature of Christianity as a form of belief, so as both to defend it against hostile attacks, and to assert its true nature and claims. It thus constitutes the basis of scientific theology, the starting-point from which every intelligent student must begin. The next division, or *historical theology*, deals with all that helps to represent the life of the Church in its different relations and phases of development. Exegesis, the History of Ecclesiastical Life and Doctrine, Dogmatics, including Ethics and Church Statistics and Symbolics, find a place under this head. *Practical theology*, or the theory of Church government and of Church service, is the last of the great divisions into which Schleiermacher resolved theological science. His treatment of this branch of theology, and the place he assigned to it, helped to deliver it from neglect, and to create for it a fresh and deeper interest.

Wide and varied as was the course which Schleiermacher thus outlined, he faithfully carried it out in his class-room. He lectured three hours daily on almost all the subjects embraced in his sketch of theology as a science. And, as if this was not enough, he regularly supplemented these lectures by others on such subjects as psychology, dialectics, history of philosophy, ethics, and politics. For twenty-four years did he engage in these Herculean labours, and ever with increasing success. Few have cultivated

with greater assiduity the art of teaching, or have been honoured, as he was, in exciting the enthusiasm of his students, and in imparting to them an abiding impulse. He seems never to have lost the novelty, the keenness, and the zest that are inseparable from the active pursuit of truth, for he was always penetrating more deeply into its mysterious domains. This freshness of spirit, this almost youthfulness of wonderment, invested his utterances with an attraction whose spell never wholly left those who came under it. To have felt the personal influence of such a man, to have been moulded and guided by him, was not only a rare privilege ; it was an eternal possession enduring, with ever growing vitality, through all the weary after-days of conflict, doubt, and endeavour.

While Schleiermacher was thus thrilling the people of Berlin with his pulpit eloquence, and adorning the University by his brilliant powers as a teacher, he still continued to take a real and practical interest in science, in politics, and in Church government. He was elected not only a member of the Academy of Science in Berlin—which has been described as “a kind of Arcopagus in the scientific world”—he was also chosen its secretary and chief spokesman on occasions of state. His contributions to the Transactions of this learned society, especially his papers on ethical questions, have still a scientific value.

As a politician, he was, as we have already seen, one of the most active leaders of the Liberal Party in its struggle for freedom and advancement. In this capacity, he occupied several important public offices in the State ; but whether in office or out of it, the good of the nation was an interest that lay near to his heart, and in the pursuit of it he spent much that was best in his thought and energy.

Schleiermacher's labours in the purely ecclesiastical sphere, are specially notable. His liturgical battles, his efforts towards the reform of Church life and worship, and his zeal for the union of the two great Protestant communities, can only be mentioned. There is, however, one aspect of his ecclesiastical activity which, in the light of present day discussion, is worthy of more than a passing notice. This is his view regarding confessions and confessional doctrine.

One of the influences of the *Discourses on Religion*, was to make religion and theology fashionable. Instead of being relegated to an obscure corner, they came to occupy the first place in the thoughts of men. But, as frequently happens in such circumstances, the new impulse spent itself in aimless and visionary schemes. Needed reforms were, no doubt, attended to, but much that was unnecessary or impossible, was also contemplated. Among these, the question of a new creed, and the binding obligation of the old one, held a prominent position.

This movement towards Confessionalism was regarded by Schleiermacher not as an advance, but as a retrogression. It started from the old idea that a confession is necessary, and of binding obligation, because it is the ground of the Church's doctrine and practice, and because it is needed in order to guard the faith of Evangelical Christians against the corrupting influences of unbelief. Schleiermacher shows that both of these positions are utterly untenable. The present aspect of the Church's life and doctrine cannot be the outcome of the theological speculations of a past age. The spirit of the Reformation—the true Protestant spirit—is that which maintains that there is, and must be, growth in knowledge both as to doctrine and practice. "What is best and most essential in our theology, is the noble form which Dogmatics assumed at the Reformation, and the active impulse which was then received towards the study of the Scriptures and concerning the Scriptures." . . . "The scientific form, if it never advances, can become nothing but scholastic exactness in Dogmatics, and grammatical and philological perfection in Exegesis. In that case, theology as a mere sphere of tradition, must perish in its isolation from modern culture."* But, although holding that there must necessarily be growth where there is a living faith, he was

* *Werke*, vol. v., pp. 441-442.

averse to a periodic revision, or interference with the Symbols. The very conception of such alteration appeared to him to be contrary to the genius of Protestantism. "There is in our Church neither any single man to whom we can assign this task, nor any valid form of revision in which all can concur. We acknowledge no majority in matters of faith to whose decision the minority must bow." *

Dealing with the other plea put forward in favour of creeds—the plea that they are necessary in order to keep Evangelical Christians sound in the faith—Schleiermacher is equally confident that it is not well founded. Creeds are no safeguard against unbelief. Apart from the consideration that they take no account of distinctly modern phases of doubt, such as naturalism and free thought, they are not even a permanent rule of opinion on the points which they discuss. Their meaning is not always clear, and stands in need of interpretation; but differences of interpretation give rise to differences of view. Creeds cannot, therefore, be absolutely regulative of the Church's faith. All that they can do, as witnesses to the continuity of truth, is to demand that the later doctrinal developments be not altogether out of harmony with the spirit of the earlier. When anything beyond this is claimed for them, as if they had the power of stereotyping the form of

* *Werke*, vol. v., p. 443.

belief, they are exalted to a position which endangers the very truth which they are supposed to defend. It is vain, then, to hope that the time may come when the Church will only believe what is formally tabulated in her Confessions. "Such a time can only come when what is best in our theology is stifled by creeds, and when all connection between theology and general scientific culture has ceased." *

It is in another way than by stringency of creed, that Schleiermacher would strengthen the faith and deepen the life of the individual and of the Church. He would bind those already in Church fellowship more closely together; give the laity a greater voice in the management of ecclesiastical affairs; and stir up the Christian activity of every Church member. Such a living union of heart and will—and the attainment of it need surely be no chimeric hope—could scarcely fail, he maintained, to lead to oneness of faith in those great truths in which the life of each and all finds its origin and progression.

Although, however, Schleiermacher attached but little value to creeds, he assigned to them a very much higher significance than he attributed to ordinary summaries of doctrine. The distinctive feature of the Confessions of the Reformation and the post-Reformation period is, that they mark the

* *Werke*, vol. v., pp. 440-441.

starting-point of a fresh form of Christianity. Their primary, if not their sole object, is to define the relation between this new form and the old, between Romanism and Protestantism. As thus indicating lines of development, and accentuating phases of opposition against the theory and practice of the Roman Church, creeds have an abiding value, and no one can willingly or knowingly depart from them, and yet claim to be a Protestant. Schleiermacher would, to this extent, make them binding and obligatory ; and he even suggested that some such formula as the following might be adopted : " I declare that all that is taught in our symbolic books against the errors and abuses of the Roman Church—especially what is taught in the articles concerning justification and good works, concerning the Church and the Church's power, concerning the Mass, concerning the ministry of the Saints, and concerning Vows—is in complete accordance with holy Scripture and the original doctrine of the Church, and that I shall, so long as the office of preacher is entrusted to me, not cease to teach these doctrines and to hold the instructions of the Church relative thereto." *

Schleiermacher had long contemplated writing an elaborate work on Christian doctrine. As early as the days of his professorship at Halle, he had

* *Werke*, vol. v., p. 451.

been gathering material for the undertaking, and planning the order of its construction. But he made no haste in giving the result to the world. He wished the work to be the ripest fruit of his theological knowledge, and the final expression of his faith. It was only in 1819, when he was over fifty years of age, that he set himself to give it shape. Very earnestly and carefully did he labour at the task, bestowing upon it infinitely more pains than he devoted to any of his literary productions. The first volume appeared in 1821, and the second during the summer of the following year. The work was entitled *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*. (*The Christian Faith Systematically Described according to the Principles of the Evangelical Church.*)

In this master-piece of theological thought, doctrines are tested not by their conformity to creeds, or the letter of Scripture, or the postulates, either of reason or of will, but as they are related to the inner Christian experience. This inner Christian experience, which is called the religious self-consciousness, or the immediate feeling of absolute dependence, is not only the first and essential factor in religion, it is also the standard by which all doctrines are tested. In applying this principle to the facts or propositions of dogmatic theology, Schleiermacher divides his doctrinal system into three great parts. (1) *The religious*

self-consciousness generally, or the feeling of absolute dependence. Under this head, the existence of the world, the nature of the divine attributes, and the original condition of the world and of man, are discussed. (2) *The religious self-conscious as disturbed and limited, or the feeling of sin.* The relation of man, the world, and God, to this mysterious fact of life, is here fully stated. (3) The third part, which occupies the whole of the second volume, is devoted to *the development of the consciousness of grace, or the religious feeling as made free by Christ.* This division treats of the person and work of Christ, the Church and its destiny, and the divine attributes concerned in redemption—the love and wisdom of God.

It may readily be conceded that Schleiermacher's system of Christian doctrine is not free from grave errors. Its view of the Christian consciousness is somewhat vague and mystical ; its representation of Christ is far from being clear or full ; its relation to Scripture, and especially to the Old Testament, is altogether meagre ; and its language is often obscure and confusing. Still, with all its faults, it remains alone and without parallel in modern theological literature. Its dialectic skill, its artistic arrangement, its spiritual glow, its strong ethical tone, and, above all, the position it assigns to Christ as the centre and heart of religious life and truth, give it a place that is perfectly unique. It effected what its author desired it should effect, a

reformation in the belief and doctrine of the Church. Its appearance marks an era in Protestant theology. The modern conception of the person and work of Christ, the idea of the Church as a divine fellowship or kingdom, the importance attached to the religious life rather than to abstract doctrine, and the thought that the content of ecclesiastical theology is not fixed and immovable, but living and adapting itself to the ever-growing Christian consciousness of the ages, are some of the results due to the impulses created by this, the greatest systematic representation of truth since the publication of Calvin's *Institutes*.

The *Christian Doctrine* was the only first-class work that Schleiermacher published while at Berlin. The other writings belonging to this period—*The System of Ethical Doctrine*, *The Christian Ethics*, *Psychology*, *Dialectic*, *Aesthetic*, *History of Philosophy*, *Practical Theology*, *Church History*, and *The Life of Jesus*—were published posthumously from his own and his students' notes of lectures delivered on these subjects. It is to this fact they owe their imperfect form, and that they are all but neglected except by the most daring and indefatigable students of the great master's works.

Schleiermacher's health was always uncertain. More than once had he to go down into the dark borderland of the valley of shadows. But this experience, however, trying or frequent, did not

sour his temper or overshadow his life. He loved society, and he delighted in the ever changing beauties of nature. Few things gave him more genuine pleasure than a long walking tour with some congenial companion. At such times, physical weakness was laid aside, and he became full of life and animation—a veritable child of nature enjoying its invigorating breath, and forgetting, under its blessed touch, his infirmities and cares.

In August, 1833, he set out in company with Count Schwerin for Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. This journey through the northern kingdoms was a kind of triumphal ovation. Everywhere, the glory of his name and work preceded him, and he was hailed with enthusiasm. At Copenhagen, a public banquet, at which all the national celebrities were present, was held in his honour. The famous Oehlenschläger wrote in Danish an ode of welcome for the occasion, and a young theologian—Hans Lassen Martensen, afterwards Metropolitan of Denmark—composed a German song in praise of the distinguished guest, which was sung with rapture by the audience. In the evening, many hundred students organized a torch-light procession, as a mark of their admiration and homage. *

* Martensen, in the first volume of his *Aus meinem Leben*, pp. 76-90, gives many interesting particulars about Schleiermacher's visit to Copenhagen.

On his return from Scandinavia, he felt greatly strengthened for the winter's work, and devoted himself to it with much of the old impetuosity of spirit. Nevertheless, though stronger in health, he was occasionally haunted by a presentiment that this journey would be his last, "with the exception of the long one," from which there is no returning. Sooner than any one anticipated—sooner than he himself expected—this presentiment proved, alas, too true !

In a letter to his step-son, dated the 30th of January, 1834—probably the last that he ever wrote—he says : "I have for three days been compelled to keep at home on account of a cough and hoarseness, which make it impossible for me to lecture. To-day, I had to go out to a baptism ; and I also attempted to lecture for an hour, but it went off very badly. From to-morrow, however, I hope to go on in the old way. And now, my dear, God be with you."

Thus it went on for some days. But the "cough and hoarseness," instead of passing away, grew worse. On the evening of the 5th of February, the symptoms changed, and acute inflammation of the lungs set in. All that medical skill could do, was tried, but without effect. He died on the morning of the 12th of February, 1834, in the sixty-sixth year of his age.

Schleiermacher had often expressed a wish that when death came, he might meet it "with full

consciousness, without surprise, and without deception." The interesting account which his wife wrote of the closing scene, shows that his wish was fully granted. "During the whole of his illness"—she states—"his mind remained unclouded. He enjoyed undisturbed rest, he attended carefully to every injunction, and no sound of complaint or discontent escaped him. To the last, he was cheerful and patient, although serious, and as if his thoughts were turned within." . . .

"The few precious sayings of his which I have been able to remember are the following. On one occasion he called me to his bed-side and said, 'I am in a condition which hovers between the conscious and the unconscious (he had been taking opium which caused him to doze frequently), but in my inmost being I experience the most blissful moments. I am led to think the deepest speculative thoughts, and they are to me perfectly in harmony with the most fervent religious feelings.' Another time he raised his hand, and said very solemnly, 'Here light a sacrificial flame.' Another time again, 'To the children I bequeath the saying of St. John, "Love one another."' Again, once more, 'I charge you to greet all my friends, and to tell them how deeply I have loved them.' " . . .

"The last morning, his sufferings perceptibly increased. He complained of intense inner heat, and the first and the last murmur escaped his lips, 'Ah, Lord, I suffer much.' All the characteristics

of death were now present : the eye became filmed over ; the death struggle had been fought. He then placed his two forefingers on his left eye, as was his custom when engaged in profound meditation, and began to speak.

“ ‘ I have never clung to the dead letter, and we have the atoning death of Jesus Christ, his body and his blood. I have always believed, and still believe, that the Lord Jesus gave the communion in water and wine.’

“ Whilst saying this, he raised himself up, his features became animated, and his voice clear and strong. He asked with ministerial solemnity, ‘ Are you also at one with me in the belief that the Lord Jesus likewise consecrated the water that was in the wine ’ ? to which we replied with a loud yes ! ‘ Then,’ he said very devoutly, ‘ let us take the communion, the wine for you, and the water for me (he had been expressly forbidden to drink wine by the doctor), but we must do without the clerk ; quick ! quick ! Let no one be offended at the form.’ After the necessary things were brought in, and we waited with him in solemn silence, his face was lightened up with a divine glory, and in his eyes there shone a wonderful lustre, from which there beamed, as he gazed upon us, the purest rays of love. Then, after a few short preparatory words of prayer, he began the holy service. First of all, he gave me the bread, then to each of those present, and lastly, he took it himself,

pronouncing each time in a distinct voice, the sacramental words, "Take, eat, this is my body." So clearly, indeed, did he speak, that the children who listened, kneeling at the door of the next room, heard every word.

"Likewise, he handed round the wine, repeating the words, 'This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins,' and, when he had also repeated these words to himself, he took the water, saying, 'Upon these words of Scripture I take my stand; they are the foundation of my faith.' On pronouncing the benediction, his eyes turned once more towards me, with a look full of love, and he said, 'In this love and fellowship, we are, and will remain, one.' He then fell back upon the pillow. The glorified expression still rested upon him. After some minutes, he said, 'I cannot remain much longer here;' and, shortly after, he added, 'Place me in another position.' We turned him on his side. He breathed heavily for a few moments; then the life-pulse stood still."

He was buried on the 15th of February, in the Trinity Churchyard, on the southern slope of the Kreuzberg, in Berlin. The funeral procession was one of the largest ever witnessed in the city. All classes mourned his loss, and honoured him in his death. The coffin, on which a big Bible lay, was carried by twelve students—thirty-six of whom were appointed to carry it in relays. Then

followed the mourners, the members of Trinity congregation, the representatives from the University, and the Academy, forming a line more than a mile in length. After them, came about a hundred mourning coaches, headed by the equipages of the King and the Crown-Prince. Everywhere along the route, many thousand spectators formed themselves into a dense wall, and watched the procession as it passed. At the grave, the Rev. A. Pischon, his colleague at Trinity Church, and Professor Heinrich Steffens, his old friend and associate, delivered funeral orations. Other tributes in due time followed. But it needed no word, however eloquent, beautiful, or sympathetic, to call forth universal sorrow. Not only Prussia, but enlightened Christendom, felt that the man who had been laid that day in his last resting-place, was one of the greatest personalities and thinkers of these last times.

XI.

CLOSING ESTIMATE.

MANY descriptions of Schleiermacher's personal appearance are found scattered in the literature of the period. That by Heinrich Steffens is perhaps the most interesting. Referring to his own appointment as professor at Halle, he says: "I was there destined to meet a man who created an epoch in my life. This was Schleiermacher, who had been called to Halle about the same time as myself, or a few weeks later, as *professor extraordinarius*. Schleiermacher, as is well known, was small of stature and somewhat deformed, though so slightly that it scarcely disfigured him. All his movements were animated and his features highly expressive. A certain sharpness in his eye might perhaps at first have a repellent effect. He seemed, indeed, to look through every one. He was several years older than I. His face was long, the features clearly defined, the lips firmly closed, the eye vivacious and full of fire, the look always earnest, collected and thoughtful. I saw him in the manifold changing relations of life—deeply meditative and sportive, jocular, gentle and angry, moved by

pleasure and by pain, but ever an unalterable calm, greater, mightier than any passing movement, seemed to dominate his being. And yet there was nothing stiff or rigid about this peacefulness of soul. A faint irony played upon his features, the warmest sympathy ever animated his heart, and an almost child-like pleasure shone through the outward calm. His unfailing self-possession greatly intensified the keenness of his perceptions. Even when engaged in the most lively conversation, nothing escaped him. He saw everything that was passing around him ; he heard all, even the most low-toned conversation. The sculptor has in a memorable way immortalised his features. His bust by Rauch is one of the great masterpieces of art ; and one who has known him so intimately as I have, can scarcely look at it without a feeling of dread. It seems to me, at such times, as if he were there in my presence, and as if he were about to open the firm closed lips for some striking utterance." *

It is much easier, however, to picture the little outward form with its notable physiognomy, its quick movements, its varying moods, and its

* *Was ich erlebte*, vol. v., p. 141-143. *Was ich erlebte* is a curious autobiographical work, throwing much light on the men and the manners of the period embraced by Schleiermacher's life. It extends to the inordinate length of ten volumes, containing over four hundred pages each !

underlying eternal calm, than it is to pourtray the man himself, the rare spirit that dwelt in this strange encasement. I have tried to delineate in the preceding pages certain phases of Schleiermacher's inner and outer life, and the representation may help to give some idea of the man. Yet, as one has said, "the accomplishments of our race have of late become so varied, that it is often no easy task to assign him whom we would judge to his proper station among men." Cuvier could, no doubt, from the character of a single limb, or even of a single tooth or bone, infer the shape of the other bones and the conditions of the entire animal. But it is different in the moral sphere: different where the range of activity is so wide and the character so complex, as in the life we are studying. Here there is room for as many estimates as there are preconceived notions and opinions—the handy critical apparatus which most men call to their aid in judging their fellow-mortals.

I shall then, even at the risk of going over old ground, indicate what seems to me to be the main features of Schleiermacher's spiritual portrait.

First of all there is his characteristic individuality. One who entered deeply into the spirit of his teaching declares that "each human personality contains in itself an eternal idiosyncrasy, and that therewith a talent is given and entrusted to it by God, which however much it may remain in many cases latent or inactive, must still be regarded as

existent if men are to be considered as created in the divine image." * Schleiermacher's name is peculiarly associated with this attribute of individuality. Indeed, as one writer affirms, it is to him that the Germans owe the use of the word *Eigenthümlichkeit*. The stamp of the divine impress upon his soul was for him a fact, the truest and greatest of all. He knew that he was superior to outward forces and agencies, and he refused to be moulded by them, as the stones on the sea-shore are shaped and rounded by the action of the never ceasing waves.

This individuality of Schleiermacher, this assertion of his real self, is the secret of his youthful doubts and perplexity. Truth was only truth as he knew it and made it his own. To go with the multitude and to repeat the watchwords of the day was then as now the easier way. But as he was true to himself he could not yield to any authority, however dear or venerable, that did not speak with conviction to his mind and heart. He was a loyal son of the Reformation, inheriting that genuine Protestant spirit which, in all the deepest concerns of life, listens to no voice but that of God in the soul.

The same peculiarity of nature, first fostered in the Silesian solitudes, is also the key to his attitude in all the developments of his later years. He

* Martensen, *Dogmatik*, p. 132.

did not regard religion, ethics, philosophy, politics, and the various interests in which he engaged, as so many branches of knowledge to be blindly accepted in the fashion most in vogue; they had life and meaning for him only when they had passed through the alembic of his being, and were stamped with the signature of his own creative personality. This is why, in all the higher ranges, he is more a thinker than a student, more a pioneer of better things than a pilgrim footing it laboriously along the beaten paths. His individuality kept him not only from looking at truth through what Milton calls "the deceiving glass of other men's opinion," it delivered him from the equally enfeebling influence of servile submission to stereotyped systems.

On the other hand, opposed to this element of individuality, and forming a notable contrast to it, was his almost boundless human sympathies. Self-centered and independent he might be, yet never did his life, like that of such prophets of individualism as Hegel or Schelling, isolate itself from the great common life. With Thomas of Aquino he could say, "*Theologus sum humani nihil a me alienum puto.*" All that was of human interest: every form of free fellowship, the family, the Church, and the State, had a living, personal fascination for him. The discovery of humanity—its relation to the individual and to God—its intimately connected life, and its triumphant move-

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ment—came to him with all the impulse of a new revelation. It showed him life in the boundlessness of its sweep, and the significance of its destiny. It raised him above the individual with its little aims and narrow outlook to the vast, palpitating, progressive whole; and it led him into the sphere where love, the divinest attribute of the soul, can find its true scope and development. Few have ever looked with a kindlier eye, and a more hopeful spirit upon the conflicting and chequered career of men. He was loving and tolerant, because beneath all the striving and toiling and sinning in the human world, he discerned the aspiration that is restless till it rests in God, the movement of that inward force which, on account of its very activity, bears in it the prophecy of a brighter day and a larger life. "Love," says Schenkel, "was the inmost source of his life, whence proceeded all that was greatest in the man. It made him pre-eminent in the relations of family life, of friendship, and of genial, social intercourse. To the dry light of reason it imparted a pleasing glow. From it sprang his unquenchable thirst for truth. It gave to his soul that breadth which enabled him to embrace all the forms of life and all the departments of science. It elevated his thoughts, so that in everything he aspired after the eternal. It also brought him into living touch with the corporate life of men, with the great

communities of State and Church, and with all the imperishable possessions of humanity."*

Another characteristic of Schleiermacher's inner being, was his strong religious aspirations. Religion was the most essential element in his nature—"the maternal bosom in whose sacred depths his life was nurtured." It stood related to him not as an outward spiritual phenomenon: it was the master-passion of his soul dominating his every thought and action. At a time when the common life was woefully artificial and corrupt, it not only kept him pure, it made him one of the greatest moral agencies of his generation. By his efforts, and by his life, he created a new spiritual atmosphere. He rediscovered truths that had been lost or hidden out of sight under a thick crust of error. He brought his age back to a living conception of religion, of the Church and of Christ. These, the greatest of all the world's regenerating influences, he rehabilitated, and so represented, that they bore a new significance and power. When he began his career, it was everywhere the fashion to ignore the peculiarly religious element in life; before he ended that career, religion became the all-absorbing question both in speculation and in practice. Amongst the forces which contributed to this remarkable change, the deeply

* *Friedrich Schleiermacher. Ein Lebens—und Charakterbild*, p. 575.

earnest and spiritual personality of Schleiermacher must always be regarded as the chief. The greatest moral genius of his time, he stamped himself upon the soul of Germany as no single individual has done since the days of Martin Luther.

But this, again, was only one side of Schleiermacher's complex nature. Alongside the religious element, there dwelt a hard, sceptical element. He began to think by doubting, and the habit never left him. Strong as was the religious bias of his mind, not less strong were his critical and scientific instincts. To the end of his days, he continued to be the man of doubt as well as the man of faith. However much he might insist that religion, as the immediate consciousness of the infinite, was separate and distinct from science or philosophy, whose basis is placed in knowledge, yet the two were in his case not alien or incompatible. He followed religion with as much earnestness as if he knew no science, and he studied science with enthusiasm as if it were the only object worthy of consideration. Thus it is that the author of the *Reden* and the *Christliche Glaube*, became the reformer of modern ethics, the interpreter of Plato, and the perfecter of Kant's theory of knowledge.

Another marked feature in Schleiermacher's spiritual character, was what Goethe calls "the eternal womanly." This characteristic is sometimes mentioned in a sneering, satirical way, as if it

indicated a certain weakness. A more foolish conception of the matter can scarcely be entertained. The strongest natures have always possessed a feminine side. The womanly is the element that tempers the manly, and prevents it from becoming cruel and tyrannous. Even in the Perfect Life there was, as a great English preacher reminds us, "the woman heart as well as the manly brain—all that was most manly and all that was most womanly." The "*ewig weibliche*" was, indeed one of Schleiermacher's most fascinating traits. It was as the green turf, with its gentle flowers and soft mosses, covering the hard, granitic rock beneath. His clinging to friends and society, and his dislike of solitude; his love of purity, and his hatred of injustice; his emotional, receptive nature, and his deep religious mysticism, are all the fruits of this tender and beautiful disposition.

If, however, this aspect of his nature was pronounced, the other side was not less strongly accentuated. In his little body—he was considerably below the average height—there dwelt a mighty heart ever ready to do battle against unreality and oppression and wrong. When he took up his position and his path seemed clear, it mattered not who might be against him: he held courageously on. In controversy—and his lot was often cast in that barren field—he struck hard and fearlessly. And we all know how he conducted

himself in the time of his country's humiliation. When kings and princes, the head of the Roman Church, and other leaders of men, were servilely doing homage to Napoleon as to a modern god of war, Schleiermacher denounced him from the pulpit at Halle, and his students, inspired by his courage, raised a loud *pereat* for the despot at the very moment when the French troops were wildly shouting in the market-place, *Vive l'Empereur!*

This grouping of positive and negative qualities in our estimate of Schleiermacher's character may at first sight appear arbitrary and mechanical. So in a sense it is. The many-sided nature of the man cannot well otherwise be expressed. His soul discovered a home in almost every domain of thought and action. The theoretical and the practical, the ideal and the real—the two opposite poles of being—found in him a common centre. He was ever trying in his own inner experience to resolve the contrasts of the universe into a living, harmonious whole. It is this that invests his life with an almost perennial interest. He never wearied in his attempt to penetrate the mystery of existence. The search after life's meaning was an unceasing delight, bringing as it always did strength to his thought and freshness to his spirit. "So long as a man is capable of self-renewal," says Amiel, rarest and loneliest of modern thinkers, "he is a living being. Goethe, Schleiermacher, and Humboldt were masters of the art. If we are

to remain among the living there must be a perpetual revival of youth within us, brought about by inward change and by love of the Platonic sort. The soul must be for ever recreating itself, trying all its various modes, vibrating in all its fibres, raising up new interests for itself." *

From the first, Schleiermacher cultivated this power of self-renewal. He was always, as by an inner necessity, stretching out his soul towards some new side of existence. Mental decrepitude and decay were the evils that he most dreaded in the midst of the years. Nowhere has he perhaps better expressed this feeling than in the Monologue on "Youth and Old Age." "Unimpaired I will bring my mind to old age, and never shall the spirit of youth forsake me. What delights me now shall delight me always; my will shall remain strong and my fancy active; nothing shall ever snatch from me the magic key which opens the mysterious door of the higher world, and never shall the fire of love die out. I will not see the dreaded infirmity of old age; I cherish strong disdain for every hindrance that does not further the purpose of my being, and I vow to myself an eternal youth." Thus he prophesied in the full force of manhood, and advancing years did not belie the prophecy. His life had always over it a freshness and glory as of the seasons in their end-

* *Journal Intime*, p. 186: Mrs. Humphrey Ward's translation.

less course. He never felt old, for he never stood still in the stream of time. "By the contemplation of self"—so he closes his *Monologues*, and with the quotation this biographical sketch may fittingly be brought to a close—"by the contemplation of self, man reaches such a height that despondency and weakness need never touch him; for immortal youth and joy spring from the consciousness of inner freedom and its actions. To this height have I attained, and I will never abandon it. And so I see with a smiling countenance the light becoming dim to the eye, and the white hair appearing here and there among the flaxen locks. Nothing that can happen shall ever disturb my heart; strong even till death shall be the beat of the inner life-pulse."

PART II

SPECULATIVE SIGNIFICANCE

PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.

I.—GENERAL VIEW.

THE philosophy of Schleiermacher, while not absolutely original, is very much more than a mere repetition of the results of the critical method. It is an independent study of the problem of knowledge—a study which, although making free use of the materials of past investigators, so builds them into an organic whole that the structure represents an entirely new view of truth. It is an attempt to discover the absolute unity underlying all philosophical enquiries, and in the light of which the most diverse speculations can be harmonized. In the search after this unity—which is the never-ending task of philosophy—it naturally allies itself with the thought of the past and of the present. It claims kinship not only with Kant and Fichte and Schelling, but with Plato, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz. Its aim is to reconcile the various differences in thought and in thought-systems; to do equal justice to realism and idealism, sensationalism and intellectualism. It emphasises the contrasts that lie at the ground of being, and it endeavours to show how they can

all be combined into a unity deeper than either thought or matter—a unity of which thought and matter are but the necessary, if mysterious, manifestations.

While thus related to all the great philosophical systems, the speculations of Schleiermacher cannot be summarily classified under any one of them. His view of the world of thought has an individuality distinctly its own. It may not be so brilliant or so startling as many of the post-Kantian speculative systems—and it has certainly not enjoyed the vogue that some of them have had—yet, for real suggestiveness, and for the power of adjusting itself to the development of thought, it is, perhaps, one of the most significant of recent philosophical efforts. It avoids, for example, the difficulties inseparable from such theories as those of Hegel or of Schopenhauer. At the same time it lays down the basis for a system of thought and being which is not so complicated, or so one-sided, as that advanced either in the name of a pure idealism or of a pure materialism.

One of the many services which Kant rendered to philosophy was the emphasising of the contrast existing between mind and matter. He brought scientific thought back not only to the dualistic position first clearly defined by Descartes: he accentuated in a more decisive manner than that thinker did the breach between nature and spirit. The spheres of the two were for him absolutely

distinct. We can only know one—that which has its side to us ; the other is beyond conscious experience, and cannot be known. Between thought and being there is an abyss over which there is no crossing. All that we can ever become cognisant of is appearance : the thing in itself—the noumenon or permanent reality behind phenomena—is inscrutable and incomprehensible.

It need not be wondered that such a conclusion, restricting, as it does, the range of knowledge within the limit of sense experience as dominated by intellect, was not accepted by succeeding thinkers. Indeed, the one aim of the later German philosophy—inspired as it has been by the movement created by Kant—was to remove, or explain away, the contrasts indicated in his system. The endeavour to break up the antithesis between thought and being, between mental representation and the universal substance, may be taken as the key to all the subsequent philosophical speculations. The theories of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Herbart, illustrate this fact. Each of these thinkers tried, in his own way, to reduce the contrast between spirit and nature ; and to find an ultimate unity which could account for both. A dualistic conception of the universe was for them, as a final result, an impossibility. They abhorred it in the same way in which nature is supposed to abhor a vacuum. And yet, in attempting to get rid of this conception, they

scarcely made any advance towards the solution of the problem of knowledge. All they really did was to explain the one side of the contrast in terms of the other. If they start with the rational element, as the ground of thought and being, they either ignore matter altogether, or show that it is conditioned by mind. If, on the other hand, they begin with the irrational, as the principle from which everything is to be deduced, nothing is easier than to prove that mind is the product of matter. That is to say, they acted pretty much in the same way as if they sought to explain the negative pole of a magnet by the positive, and the positive by the negative.

Schleiermacher did not, however, deal with the problem in this arbitrary and one-sided fashion. He freely accepted the distinction between mind and matter. That for him was a fact clear and indisputable ; and no solution which interpreted mental activity by material conditions, or material conditions by mental activities, was deemed conclusive. He could rest neither in materialism nor in idealism, as such. He was content to acknowledge, in the widest sense, the truth in each ; but he felt that to assign to either the supremacy, or the originating power was clearly unscientific—was, in fact, a relapse into that very dogmatism from which the new criticism strove to emancipate thought.

Still, sharply as Schleiermacher defined the opposite poles of thought and being, he did not

regard the antithesis which they constituted as being absolute and unresolvable. In the life of each there is a relative unity. We are in our own self-conscious existence not only thought, we are also being. The individual ego is the expression, in the form of contrast, of the identity of the real and the ideal. The world further represents another and wider aspect of the same thing. Here is a unity embracing the totality of all contrasts and relations. But just because it does—because it is the sum of the contrasted—it is limited, and cannot be the highest unifying principle. This, according to Schleiermacher, must be sought for neither in the empirical consciousness nor in the cosmological unity, but in the idea of God, or the Absolute. In this final identity there are no relations or distinctions, no within or without, no subject or object. God is the eternal indifference and neutralization of all the antitheses in the universe.

Of this absolute unity, from which every kind of contrast is excluded, we can know nothing. It transcends the limits of experience. It is timeless and spaceless. It cannot be apprehended either by thought or by will. Even feeling, or the immediate self-consciousness, fails to give adequate expression to this transcendent ground of all. Nevertheless, though it is, from its nature, unknowable, it is the necessary presupposition of knowledge and of action. It is the basis of all experience, all consciousness. Without it the

unity of the world would be as inconceivable as the unity of life were there no individual Ego. Without it, matter and mind would be for ever incommensurable, lying outside each other's range; and knowledge and certainty would alike be impossible. Without it, in short, there would be, on the one hand, mere chaos; and, on the other, empty abstractions.

The way in which Schleiermacher reached this result is very similar to that by which Spinoza was led to the central thought in his system. Spinoza set before him the perfecting of the Cartesian doctrine by reducing the opposed substances of thought and extension into one substance of which thought and extension were the two necessary attributes. Schleiermacher, starting with the antithesis of thought and being—which had, again, been brought into prominence by the critical philosophy—tried to reach the unifying principle presupposed by each, and demanded by a consistent theory of knowledge. The one developed Cartesianism in the line of its logical issues; the other did the same thing for Kantianism. They both sought for the entity at the ground of appearance and reality, and they both found it in the same idea—the idea of God.

This resemblance between the aim and results of these two great thinkers has given rise to the charge that the philosophy of the one is only a kind of spiritualized representation of the other.

This charge, which was made early, and was popularised by Strauss, has been often repeated since, and that by those who have evidently not inquired into its truth. Schleiermacher himself, who was, from his wide knowledge, the best witness in such a case, repudiated, in the strongest terms, the assertion that his system was identical with that of Spinoza. And the more the philosophies of the two are compared, the more clearly will it appear how widely they differ. God, the world and man, and their mutual relations, are the ideas peculiar to each ; yet the meaning which they severally assign to them is fundamentally distinct. Spinoza defines God as the infinitely absolute being, or substance, which is the immanent and necessary cause of all things. He makes no distinction between God and Nature ; and the world is merely a mode of the divine being. The absolute substance, with its attributes and modes, whether it be taken as conscious or unconscious, as abstract or real, is the One and All, moving for ever blindly in its separate lines of thought and extension, from higher to lower, the one to the many, the existent to the non-existent. Schleiermacher, on his part, does not conceive the Absolute as entering into, and constituting, the existence of all finite things. God is not simply represented as either the highest Power or Causality ; neither is He called substance, nature, or *Natura naturans*. He and the world are distinct ; yet they are not to

be separated. God is immanent in the world, as the unity of all the contrasts that exist in time and space ; but He is also the transcendental basis, timeless and spaceless, which makes these contrasts of the real and ideal possible. In the *Glaubenslehre* this relation between God and the world is further described as corresponding to creation and preservation. Again, in Spinoza's view, thought and extension are essential attributes of substance, existing as distinct and without causal relation. In Schleiermacher's system, thought and extension are not regarded as attributes existing apart and without causal relation : they are real contrasts that can act upon each other, and modify each other. Extension without intellect is nothing, and intellect without extension is nothing. It is as the one is related to, and acts upon, the other, that there can be any knowledge, any certainty. It is as reason brings order, differentiation, and light into the vague, chaotic multiplicity of finite things that there can be an intelligible world. Matter, as the organic stimulus, is naturally the *prius* ; but, in the self-conscious life of man, the real primacy must ever be assigned to reason. What Schleiermacher found was not matter and mind asserting themselves, each necessarily and apart ; but matter and mind existing, as if by a pre-ordained harmony, for each other, and acting upon one another ; yet so related, and so acting, that there is an ever-increasing supremacy of

reason over matter, the intellectual over the organic. The individual, he maintained, was a self-determining, self-authenticating product of the creative reason—the image of God, the mirror of the universe, the midpoint and centre of finite being. Here, in man's rational will, he discovered not only a sure basis for the ethical, but the true explanation of the entire cosmical process. In Spinoza's thought, the individual, as a mode of substance, is nothing but a necessary sequence, a mere accident ; a passing wave on the universal sea of being, appearing for a moment, then sinking into the depths whence it arose. In Schleiermacher's system, man, instead of being a necessary accident, like everything else in nature, is the ethical end, the teleological goal of the universe. Thus, although Schleiermacher has many points in common with Spinoza, it is impossible to equate his position, either in philosophy or in theology, in terms of Spinoza, as Strauss had early attempted, and as Professor Otto Pfeiderer has more recently tried to do.* Spinoza, notwithstanding the decided

* *Vide, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant*, pp. 110-120, where this effort to re-translate the leading principles of Schleiermacher into the formulæ of Spinoza is much more pronounced than in the earlier work by the same author on *The Philosophy of Religion*. The more recent estimate seems to indicate, on the part of Professor Pfeiderer, a certain lack of appreciation, not only of the several stages in Schleiermacher's mental development, but of the distinct and individual place he occupies in the history of philosophical and religious thought.

issues raised by his system, does not get beyond the old, dogmatic dualism of Descartes. Schleiermacher, on the contrary, though deeply penetrated by the Spinozistic spirit, is a true representative of the modern critical philosophy. While refusing to ignore the plains of realism—and here we see his kinship with Plato, Spinoza, and Leibnitz—he nevertheless stood on the heights occupied by Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, and Schelling. The task he set before him was to discover the unifying principle at the base of all contrasts, the real not less than the ideal; and, in the quest of this principle—whatever we may think of the final result—he helped to enlarge and correct the prevailing philosophy, created by Kant, in two of its most important positions: its theory of knowledge, and its idea of the ethical.

II.—STARTING-POINT AND SCOPE OF THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

SCHLEIERMACHER starts, in his analysis of knowledge, with thought (*Denken*) as a given fact. This is for all the most certain and the clearest phenomenon of mental experience—a phenomenon whose existence requires no proof. Whenever mind and matter, the inner and the outer, are brought into relation there, as a necessary result, thought is produced. How this conscious state—

this new condition different from both mind and matter—originates, he does not attempt to show. There may be—it is almost certain there is—a point in the development of human life where all is chaos; and where men are immediately one with every form of existence. But of such a stage of undetermined manifoldness, we can know nothing; for thought only comes into existence when the I and the not I, the one and the many, are consciously distinguished. It is then that outward objects, affecting the senses, leave a more or less vivid impression, and that this impression is seized upon by the intellectual activity, and converted into thought or language—for the two are really one and the same. Only at this stage, when sense impressions become transformed into concepts, expressed or unexpressed, is the mysterious process of the genesis of thought completed. Language is thus, according to Schleiermacher, not only identical with thought; it is the first definite evidence of its existence.*

But important as thought is, it is not the only form of mental or conscious activity; in addition

* *Vide, Psychologie*, hrsg. von George, 1864, pp. 132-182, for a singularly suggestive discussion on the identity of thought and language. This view has more recently been advocated, among others, by Helmholtz, Taine, and Max Müller. In Greek and Italian, speech and reason are expressed by the same word: ὁ λόγος, il discorso.

to it, there are the activities of will and of feeling. These are not separate faculties, which act each in its own independent sphere; they are manifestations of the one common activity of mind. Will has its intellectual as well as its volitional side; for he who does not know what to will can only will imperfectly. Yet, though will is thought, it differs from thought principally in its direction. In will, there is a movement from within outward; in thought, the movement is reversed. In the one, the outer world is acted upon by the conscious subject; in the other, the outer world acts upon the conscious subject. Feeling, too, is not specifically distinct from thought, as if it were an absolutely new capacity. It is, in fact, the harmony of thought and will, the element in which both become relatively one. Only in feeling, can there be for us an identity of these otherwise antithetic and all comprehensive factors of life.

Corresponding to these great movements of the human intellect, or consciousness, are the lines which Schleiermacher lays down in his investigation of the problem of knowledge. His critique is not simply a critique of reason, as such, but of reason in active manifestation. It is not a single but a triple analysis. He traverses the entire course marked out by Kant; and he sums up in one whole, the result of his findings.

He first analyses thought in the hope of dis-

covering the "transcendent ground" of the real and the ideal.* All that he finds here is the presupposition of its existence, as the explanation of thought and being, the *nexus*, without which mind and matter must remain apart and inexplicable. He next subjects will to a similar scrutiny. But, instead of will yielding a result different from what thought yields, Schleiermacher proves that its conclusions are exactly similar. Will, he maintains, possesses no reality, no content, that thought does not already possess. Finding in neither the transcendent unity which he knew must exist—if knowledge is not to be altogether chaotic and illusive—he sets out once more in the path of investigation. This time, in his analysis of feeling, he meets with more success. In the form of feeling, known as "immediate self-consciousness," he finds that the idea of God is immediately given; and he consequently concludes that the "indwelling being of God" is the final principle both of knowledge and of volition.

In thus taking thought, or the empirical consciousness in active process, as the starting-point of his investigation, Schleiermacher accepts the conclusion that all knowledge of reality is limited by experience. But his empiricism is much more comprehensive than that of Kant. For him

* "Transcendent" and "transcendental" are used by Schleiermacher as interchangeable words.

thought and will stood exactly on the same plane. On this account he rejected the leading results of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Will cannot, any more than thought, find, or postulate, God. That predicate of all thought and being lies "behind the veil." It is unique. It can neither be willed nor known. It must simply be accepted as the necessary principle of real knowledge—of volition not less than of intelligence.

The philosophy of Schleiermacher is principally contained in his *Dialectic*, *Psychology*, and *Æsthetics*. The *Dialectic* is divided into two parts, the Transcendental which considers the idea of knowledge generally, and the Technical, or Formal part, which regards the same idea in movement, or in the process of construction. This work is of the utmost value as explaining Schleiermacher's fundamental philosophical conceptions. The *Psychology* must also be studied, if one would obtain an intelligent view of his ideas regarding body and soul, the activities of sense and of thought, the function of consciousness in relation to the Ego and the non-Ego, and such like. It is full of large, illuminating thoughts, and the study of it forms a bracing and healthful discipline. The *Æsthetic*, though dealing with Art, in its principles and in its relation to Ethics, incidentally explains many points in Schleiermacher's peculiar view of self-consciousness, and its connection with the material world.

The present representation of Schleiermacher's theory of knowledge is based on the *Dialectic*. This imparts to the study a unity which it might otherwise lack. When, however, the *Psychology* or the *Æsthetic* helps to illustrate, or to supplement the *Dialectic*, they are either quoted, or reference is made to them.

III.—CRITERIA OF KNOWLEDGE.

KNOWLEDGE (*Wissen*) is thought; but it is thought of a clearly defined nature. Free or arbitrary thought, as when one forms the conception of a griffin or a fairy, has no title to be called knowledge. It does not set forth anything really existing in being; it is a creation purely subjective and indeterminate. The same thing holds good of the images built up in sleeping or waking dreams. However vivid these may be, they have no real object corresponding to them. They are the accidental products of the intellectual activity, and cannot be classed among the normal facts of cognition. The wide range of thought, known as religions, must also be placed in the same category. Its scope lies entirely outside the field of knowledge. Religion, in its various forms, takes to do with the individual, whether a person or a community, as determined by feeling; whereas knowledge occupies itself with reason and with being—

quantities that have not an individual, but a universal significance.*

Schleiermacher did not, however, attempt—in seeking to distinguish between knowledge and the products of fancy, imagination, and faith—to compare, in a general way, every phase of thought so as to mark off what is knowledge from what is not knowledge. Instead of entering upon such an endless task, he sought to define knowledge according to its fundamental characteristics; and, in this way, to draw a line, clear and distinct, between the thought that is knowledge and the thought that is not knowledge. The characteristics he enumerates are two: (1) Knowledge is that type of thought which is produced in a uniform manner by all thinking subjects; and (2) Knowledge is that type of thought which must correspond to being (*Sein*).† These criteria, the one conditioned by the other, are regarded as embracing all that is most essential and distinctive in knowledge.

1. The first of these criteria—that which demands the uniformity of the production of thought—raises knowledge at once above the individual to the universal self-consciousness. Man, as thinking, must, no doubt, begin, in the first instance, with personal experience; but man, as

* *Dialektik*, hrsg. von Jonas, pp. 109-110; *Psychologie*, p. 12.

† *Dial.*, pp. 43, 316, 386, 484, etc.

knowing, must be considered as an individual of the race ; and his knowledge is only knowledge as it is related to the uniform cognition of all individuals. What we may think in a merely particular or singular way may or may not be true ; but it is not knowledge : it is opinion. One can only be said to know anything when he has the conviction that all think regarding it as he thinks. Given a certain object to be known ; all, who are capable of having any knowledge of it, must not only know it as it is, but must obtain their knowledge of it in precisely the same manner. That is, the thinking process is identical in all, and the results of such a process must necessarily be the same for all.

This criterion of knowledge is really founded on the identity in all of the elements that are at the root of knowledge—the elements that constitute its typical form and content. These, on the one side, are the activities of intellect, or the reason ; and, on the other, the system of sense impressions, or the organic function. In the building up of knowledge, these two co-related factors are universal. They are the same, and they act in the same way, in the case of every rational being. Viewed in this light, knowledge “is that kind of thought which is the product of the reason and of the organization in their universal type.”*

* *Dial.*, p. 47.

Knowledge is, therefore, not the isolated and fragmentary view of a single individual looking out upon the world ; it is the common view of the race. It is what all men think. As contrasted with the crudity of personal opinion it is what might be called scientific thought. It is what is true for all ; because it has its ground in the permanent laws of the human reason and of organic being. As such, it is—although not absolutely perfect—something very different from partial or accidental knowledge. It is the agreement of ideas with ideas. It is that which renders the historical development of thought possible. Without it there could be neither certainty nor advance in the process of thinking.

It may, indeed, be objected that this characteristic of knowledge is defective in that it applies as readily to a universal system of error as to a universal system of truth. Men have, in the course of the ages, accepted as true many ideas which were afterwards proved not to be in accordance with reality. In the pre-Copernican times, for example, utterly erroneous notions as to the form of the earth and the course of the sun were universally believed. If, however, no amount of consensus in such cases can be taken as normative and final, it may be concluded that the principle of the universality of thought fails to bring with it certainty as to truth or reality ; and must, conse-

quently, be rejected as not an absolutely trustworthy criterion.

This objection would, no doubt, be perfectly valid, if the test of the universality of thought were the only test of knowledge ; or if it stood alone. But Schleiermacher is specially careful to show that it must not be so understood. He declares that the two characteristics, "the uniformity of the production of thought and the identity of the same with being, only constitute knowledge when taken together. If any one thinks about a thing as it really is, there is truth in such a thought. Still if he has not along with the thought the consciousness that all men must think as he thinks, he in fact knows nothing. Again, if we could conceive it possible that all men should formulate in the same manner a thought which, nevertheless, did not correspond to being, such a thought could not be knowledge, but universal error. Or, on the other hand, even if thought really agreed with being, but did not possess, in living manifestation, subjective uniformity, it would not be knowledge, but a correct opinion." *

2. Schleiermacher's second criterion—which requires the correspondence of thought with being—is, however, something more than a mere supplement to the first ; it is the fundamental characteristic of knowledge. In knowledge it is a necessity

* *Dial.*, p. 44.

of the universal consciousness that there be not only a thought but an object of thought. This object of thought must not be confounded with the thought itself, or with any of its modifications. It is not "ideas existing in the mind, or impressions, or phenomena, or qualities of matter: it is being; it is what Kant, using a somewhat barbarous phraseology, described as thing-in-itself.* The separation of thought and being is thus the first necessary presupposition of knowledge. But, as necessary as it is that thought and being should have a separate existence, so necessary is it that, in every act of knowledge, the one should consciously correspond with the other. What is given on the side of being, as undeterminate manifoldness, must coincide with what appears in thought, under the form of unity and plurality. While the two factors are, as Sigwart expresses it, "independent of each other, they yet exist for each other, in the whole and in the individual, so that the totality of what is perceived is the same as the totality of thought, and the outer substance corresponds in every particular to the inner form."† In other words, the world as interpreted by intellect is the world as it is. Knowledge is not purely subjective, or the creation of one's individual brain; it is thought

* Schleiermacher always translates *Ding-an-sich*, or thing-in-itself, as *Sein*, or being.

† *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, ii., 294.

corresponding to what has objective existence. Where there is no such correspondence—as when one thinks of a centaur or a wraith—there can be no knowledge. Even as there can be no shadow without a substance, so there can be no thought without an object.*

Being, it may here be noticed, is used by Schleiermacher in a twofold sense, according to the manner in which it is apprehended. If the knowledge of it comes from without—if it is conveyed to the mind through impressions and perceptions—it may be defined as that which exists outside our thought and which can affect the sensory system. It is that which, not originating in intellect, has yet the power of so influencing our organism as to enter into thought. It is, in short, the aggregate of external objects—the outer universe—all that exists in time and space.

If, on the other hand, our knowledge of being comes not from without but from within, if it comes from thought, finding expression in the determination and activity of the will, it may be defined as “thinking, human being, or intelligence.” It is that inner, rational being, which can act upon and modify outer objects. It is ethical, as contrasted with physical, being. It is what exists within us—that which we are—and which can

* *Dial.*, pp. 48-57, 183-184, 386, 484-488.

become the object of thought, not less than the form of being that is without.

Distinct as these aspects of being may seem, not only as to our knowledge of them, but as to their nature, the distinction is more apparent than real. "There is no difference between the knowledge that we have concerning our inner life movements, and that which we have concerning what has its being outside of us. Consequently, the twofold being to which this knowledge corresponds is not different ; that is, being which is object of thought, in as far as it becomes will, is not different from being which is object of thought, in so far as it proceeds from perception. Indeed, the two taken together constitute the totality of being, even as they also constitute the totality of knowledge." * Physical and ethical being are quantitatively different ; qualitatively they are the same. Both forms exist for thought ; and we know them precisely in the same way. But, although thought corresponds as well to the being without as to the being within, Schleiermacher, in his theory of knowledge, invariably uses the word in the first of these senses, as signifying what lies outside of the conscious mind.

That thought corresponds to being is a proposition which is apparently incongruous and impossible. Thought and being are quantities so

* *Dial.*, p. 49.

opposite as to seem absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable. How then can there be any correspondence or unity between them?

Schleiermacher answers this question by a direct appeal to the facts of consciousness. There thought and being are immediately given. At the same moment we are both, and we cannot be otherwise. The intellectual and the organic—that which thinks and that which is the object of thought—are implied in every act of self-consciousness. We are never pure thought, any more than we are pure being: our empirical self, or Ego, is always the result or the combination of the two. “We are something more,” Schleiermacher affirms, “than mere thought, and all that we are thus otherwise, nay, even thought itself, can become for us the object of thought. Now, if we call that concerning which we think being, we are at once being and thought.”*

This does not after all, it may be said, carry us far. Self-consciousness gives subject and object, thought and the thing thought; but self-consciousness is simply a process which has its existence within us. It rests upon a subjective basis—it is phenomenal, not real. If, however, we would prove that thought corresponds to being we must get beyond being as idea; we must get at it objectively, and as it is. Is such knowledge of objective existence possible?

* *Dial.*, p. 54.

Schleiermacher knew well the difficulty of this question. Yet, instead of allowing himself to get involved in abstract reasonings about it, he took his stand on the ground of experience, and showed that our knowledge of the objective—if obtained not immediately, but by a process of inference—is as sure and certain as our knowledge of the subjective. As soon as we arrive at the stage of self-consciousness we perceive that we are a unity composed of the intellectual and the organic, mind and body. These two sides of our nature are distinctly opposite—opposite as thought and being—yet in our conscious life they exist not in isolation but in combination. At each moment of existence we are organization as well as intelligence, being as well as thought. But our physical organization—and this is the path by which Schleiermacher would lead us to objective being—is immediately one with external being. The human organism and the world without are identical. They are parts of one whole. If, however, self-conscious existence is the immediate unity of mind and body, the inference is inevitable that our thought must be directly related to, and correspond with, external being; even as it is related to and corresponds with our own organism. “The correspondence of thought and being is,” Schleiermacher therefore asserts, “brought about through the real relation in which the totality of being stands to organization; and it may be said that all thought

is knowledge which expresses accurately the relations of determinate being with reference to organization." *

Thus far Schleiermacher, in his solution of the problem as to the possibility of knowledge, keeps within empirical lines. He does not enter into the deep, speculative questions lying behind the problem: he takes the facts of consciousness as they are, and brings them into evidence with regard to the relation of thought and being. The result—though conclusive within its range—suffers from the limitations of such a method. The empirical self-consciousness, if it is the only form of consciousness, can give no adequate explanation of the difficulties connected with thought and the world, mind and matter—difficulties old as the first reasonings of the human race. No one knew this better than Schleiermacher did. How he attempted a profounder solution of the problem, by claiming for knowledge a basis wider and more assured than that of the empirical consciousness of the individual or of the race, will appear in the subsequent exposition.

IV.—ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

SCHLEIERMACHER having indicated broadly the two distinctive marks of knowledge, next under-

* *Dial.*, p. 54.

takes the particular consideration of each, and the principles involved in them.

Starting with the first characteristic, or the universal validity of thought, he sets about to analyse a simple act of knowledge so as to reduce it to its ultimate elements. In this analysis he finds that two factors are absolutely indispensable to the production of thought—the organic and the intellectual. The organic, or sense activity, is that which connects us with the outer world. It is that which gives to thought its content, or which supplies it with objects. Without the organic function, there could be no sensation or perception, no arriving at the being without us, and no real data of knowledge. It is the starting-point of thought, the medium through which external existence mirrors itself in us. In sense the first necessary moment of knowledge must begin. Apart from it there can be no perception of objective being—no realization of the world in its infinite manifoldness.*

The part acted by the organic function in Schleiermacher's theory of knowledge is almost identical with that which Kant assigns to sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*). In each case the materials that go to form thought are supplied by the senses. The mind cannot, in any other way, reach what is without; or even be conscious of its existence.

* *Dial.*, pp. 47, 57, 387, 451.

The organic is the medium through which objects are given—the capacity whereby the affection of the organization becomes a co-agent in the production of thought ; and, without it, there can be, for us, no such thing as knowledge.*

But the organic function alone is not sufficient to constitute knowledge. The very lowest forms of animals possess, in a high degree, the activities of sense ; yet they have no real knowledge. The world is to them a vague and manifold externality—without beauty or order or distinction. In addition, therefore, to the organic, there is required, in the production of actual thought, the intellectual function. This seizes hold of the confused and chaotic impressions that come through the organic affection, and imparts to them unity and plurality. It invests them with form and character. Even as the senses are the channels through which objects are conveyed to us, so the intellect, or the reason, is that regulating principle by means of which objects can become thought. The one is the source of manifoldness ; the other is the source of unity. The one furnishes the stuff that goes to make thought ; the other imparts to this vague and undefined material the specific distinction that characterises thought. The one, in short, supplies the necessary complement to the other. “ Without

* “ Sinn = Vermögen, wodurch die Affection der Organization Mitursach des Denkens werden kann.”—*Dial.*, 63.

unity and plurality the manifoldness is undetermined, without manifoldness the determined unity and plurality are void." * In the better known phraseology of Kant, perceptions without conceptions are blind, and conceptions without perceptions are empty.

In every act of knowledge the material and the formal are thus present as constitutive elements. There can be no thought where they do not both co-exist, or where they are not implied. The organic, or the intellectual, taken alone is voiceless. It can give no message, it can impart no light. Without reason there can be no harmonising of objects, without organisation there can be no intelligence. Organisation can only give a confused manifoldness of impressions, while reason is the simple indetermined unity. But these are states outside the sphere of thought; and their silence is, for us, as the silence of the dead.

Every kind of thought must then be regarded as the product of the organic and the intellectual. This is true even of that kind of thought which is commonly regarded as having an existence not derivable from the data of experience. Universal real concepts—whether physical, ethical, or logical—though not directly existing through the organic activity, indirectly involve such an activity. They are originally based on lower concepts, which from

* *Dial.*, p. 64.

their very nature possess organic elements. And the reason why we at all assign a purely intellectual character to them is that we "do not immediately associate them with a particular experience, but with the tradition of an alien experience which is no longer fully realised." Universal formal concepts—which belong to the same type of thought—likewise contain an organic element. They can only be thought in as far as they are related to their content, which content is inseparably connected with organic activity. In subject and object, examples of universal formal ideas, we have illustrations of this fact; since in the one there is, what Schleiermacher calls "organic spontaneity;" and, in the other, what he describes as "organic receptivity." Thought, even the most universal and abstract, has a material or empirical basis. If it had not, it would be unthinkable; for it is only in the transcendental sphere—in the idea of God—that thought, with the absolute exclusion of organic activity, is possible.*

In the history of philosophy the almost invariable custom has been to confound the organic and intellectual moments of thought; or to deduce the one from the other. This is the *πρῶτον ψεύδος* alike of materialism and of idealism. Materialism maintains that the activity called intellectual is not only associated with certain conditions of

* *Dial.*, pp. 58-60, 368-369, 492, etc.

matter, but has a purely material origin. Idealism, on the other hand, regards matter either as mind asleep, or as a mere illusion. In the view of Schleiermacher, both theories are equally arbitrary and insufficient. Matter and mind are, according to him, distinct and independent quantities. Yet the one apart from the other is an empty abstraction. He never ceases insisting that matter without mind is chaos, and that mind without matter is meaningless. The one finds its realization only in the other. The manifoldness of the material comes to unity in the intellectual, and the intellectual becomes active only in the manifoldness of the material. *

This inter-relation of the natural and the spiritual, of organisation and reason, in all real thought, cannot be explained by anything existing in either. It is the primitive and necessary ground of cognition. And if the distinction between empirical knowledge and undetermined thought is to be maintained—if we are to have an idea of self as opposed to the activity of divided being, of the world as different from the conscious Ego, and of life with its contrasted states and relations—it must be accepted immediately and without proof. “This presupposition of the interdependence of the two poles (the organic and the intellectual), and the relation of a somewhat in the

* *Dial.*, pp. 63, 454, 494 ; *Psychol.*, pp. 9-10, 31-33.

one to a somewhat in the other, is not capable of proof. He who doubts it must surrender thought; since every act of thought really implies its existence. It is the co-relation of the world and the thought-activity of the human spirit. The world expresses itself in the type of the human spirit, and this type represents itself in the world." *

Although we cannot, however, account for the necessary combination of the elements that go to the production of thought, we can indicate its relation to the highest of all the world's contrasts—the contrast between the ideal and the real. "The activity of reason is grounded in the ideal; and the organic, as dependent on the impressions of objects, in the real. Being is thus posited ideally as well as really; and the ideal and the real run parallel as modes of being. There is no other positive explanation of this highest contrast but that which regards the ideal as that in being which is the principle of every activity of reason that does not in any way spring from the organic; and the real as that in being which becomes the principle of organic activity, in as far as this is not in any way derived from the activity of reason." This highest contrast—which may be called the cosmological—embraces all other contrasts. It is the utmost boundary of thought—the sphere within which knowledge ever moves, but can never tran-

* *Dial.*, p. 457.

scend. Yet this contrast of the ideal and the real is in itself "an empty mystery." We cannot rest in it. We must get beyond it to that one Being from which it, and all contrasts, are developed. This final unity is the Absolute Being, the identity of the real and the ideal, the transcendental ground of both knowing and being. It lies behind all knowledge, on the other side of the veil; yet though it cannot become the object of direct knowledge it must be always presupposed as the identity of thought and being. This unity, binding together all contrasts, though itself never appearing within the sphere of the contrasted, is God, or the Absolute Unity of nature and spirit.*

From the foregoing account of the constitution of thought, it might be inferred that individuals can only know what calls into play their own organic and intellectual activities. Such a conclusion, were it true, would be destructive of the idea of knowledge, for it would break it up into fragments, so that there could be neither breadth nor community of outlook. But the position of Schleiermacher is the very opposite of this. He maintains that the organic and the intellectual are the same in all; and that there can be, in the case of individuals, a substitution of the activity of these functions. It is this that gives to thought its universal character, and that makes it possible

* *Dial.*, pp. 75-9, 87, 121, 461-2.

for one to know what has never affected his organism, and never can. "In virtue of the identity in all of the reason and of the organisation there exist among all men, in the idea of knowledge, a community of experience and a community of principle." *

This identity of thought must not, however, be so understood as to leave no room for the mental peculiarity or idiosyncrasy of individuals and of nations. This is as much a fact as the other ; and exists side by side with it. In thought there is the particular as well as the universal. Men are not only individuals expressing the common typical life of the race, they are also personalities giving expression to their own distinct and original character. As such, they present striking differences, both in the form of their thought and of their speech. These differences—which Schleiermacher assigns to quantitative variations in organization—are more marked in the case of those who are sprung from different races, and speak different languages. Still, however great the maximum diversity, it is never so great as to be inconsistent with the idea of knowledge. The identical character of thought is never lost, even in those instances where the organic variations are most pronounced. This follows from what has already been described as the first criterion of knowledge : the

* *Dial.*, pp. 65-66.

universal identity and validity of the reasoning principle.*

Nevertheless, the very existence of subjective differences in thought proves that "there is in reality no pure knowledge, but only distinct concentric spheres of community of experience, and of principles."† Knowledge, in the individual and in the whole, is partial and relative. Its range is limited alike by the chaos of impressions, from which it sets out, and by the absolute unifying principle towards which it rises. It can, thus, never perfectly correspond to being—for, in that case, it would embrace all existence—neither can it be perfectly identical in the empirical consciousness, for, then, it would reflect the entire reason. It is a never-ceasing approximation towards the totality of thought and being. But, from the very nature of the human mind, it can never be anything else than an approximation which, while correct and uniform, as far as it goes, is still only relatively uniform and correct.

The necessary presence of the organic and the intellectual in thought and knowledge, supplies Schleiermacher with a principle for the classification of mental phenomena. According as the one or the other prevails, he divides all real thought into the three following grades:—*Perception*, commencing with and having a preponderance of the

* *Psych.*, pp. 171-182.

† *Dial.*, p. 68.

organic element ; *Thought Proper*, beginning with and having a preponderance of the intellectual element ; and *Intuition*, or the highest form of knowledge, in which there is a more or less perfect equipoise between the organic and the intellectual.*

In this division there is no dignity assigned to thought but what it derives from its constitutive factors, and from the various stages of its onward movement. The classification is a generalized, or scientific, description of the conscious life in its development from the unconscious to the conscious, from the receptive to the spontaneous, and from the individual to the universal. No other arrangement of the facts of consciousness, or of thought in its becoming, was possible for Schleiermacher : starting, as he did, with the empirical self-consciousness as it exists in living process, and accentuating, consistently throughout, both sides of its manifestation—the conceptual unity and the temporal plurality.

V.—THE FORMS OF THOUGHT.

THAT this world, seemingly so real and tangible, can only be known through certain potential, or *a priori*, forms existing in the human mind, so that nothing is known directly as it is, but only as it is

* *Dial.*, pp. 61, 372, 454, 498 ; *Psych.*, pp. 70-83.

for us, is one of the oldest dreams of philosophic speculation. We find traces of it in all the chief centres of the world's thought. It appears in the Indian doctrine of Mâyâ, in the eternal flux of Heraclitus, in the shadow-world of Plato, and in the idealism of Berkeley. But the honour of being the first to raise this conception to a scientific standing in philosophy must always be assigned to the immortal Kant. The leading purpose of his great work, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is to prove that intellect ever comes between us and things as they are, that it imposes its own forms on the objective world, and that all we can know is phenomenal appearance, as conditioned by the original apparatus of mind.

To many, this view has come as a new revelation, bringing light into the universal darkness. On the other hand, there are those who, while willing to follow Kant as a teacher, refuse to accept implicitly his theory of knowledge, with its cumbersome machinery of forms of sensory intuition, categories of the understanding, and what not. Among these, Schleiermacher occupies a chief place. Although at one with Kant in distinguishing between the matter and the form of thought, he still found it impossible to rest either in his principles or in his results. He refused to receive the view that space and time are the primary forms of our apprehension of things—the intuitions *a priori* which are the necessary conditions of

empirical knowledge. For him space and time had an objective, as well as a subjective, meaning—they were the real forms of the existence of things, not less than the ideal forms of perception. In like manner, too, he dispensed with the twelve categories as builders of thought. The categories were, he maintained, nothing but the relations of empirical concepts. The notion, therefore, that they were pure concepts which rendered ordinary thought possible was the merest assumption; and he felt that to introduce it as an explanation of the origin of the formation of thought was only to complicate instead of simplifying the problem to be solved. Schopenhauer, in his trenchant criticism of Kant, characterized the categories as “blind windows;” and in this characterization Schleiermacher, though otherwise altogether opposed to the conclusions of the great pessimist, would readily acquiesce. The categories might, no doubt, give an appearance of symmetry to the Kantian system; but as philosophical media for the transmission of light, they were regarded as entirely inadequate.

Schleiermacher's own idea of the forms of thought is not only simpler than that elaborated by Kant; it is, in some respects, a distinct advance on the older view. As knowledge, according to him, can only exist in correspondence with being, so the only forms of thought are those which correspond to the forms of being. “Knowledge

as thought exists under no other form than that of the Concept and of the Judgment."*

1. The Concept (*Begriff*) may be defined as that form of thought which represents the manifoldness of being as a definite unity and plurality. It is the combination of the general and the special—a combination which oscillates between the universal and the particular, the higher and the lower. This combination—which is a general or a particular concept according as the contrasts included in it are many or few—is produced by the union of sense and of reason in their relation to the outer world and its impressions. It is the consistent whole, or identity, which exists as the result of the activity of each of these ingredients in building up knowledge.

In the formation of the concept we have, first of all, the activity of sense. The great function of sense is to convey to the brain impressions of the external world. These it conveys, as they arise, without order or definiteness. It has no power either to distinguish, to fix, or to unite them. Images come and go, according to the infinitely kaleidoscopic nature of the world's constantly varying objects. They have no natural permanence; for each succeeding impression blots out the one that went before. They have no faculty of distinguishing or recollecting; for they are blind

* *Dial.*, p. 81.

and incoherent. Their sphere is the sphere of simple perception; and the world which they represent is the world as it stands disclosed to the consciousness of the brute creature—the world of chaos and confused sensation.

But, if it is the part of sense-activity to convey general impressions, it is equally the part of reason to give to these impressions the character of unity and determination. Reason particularizes the vague content of cognition. It gives distinctness and fixity to the indefinite and chaotic manifoldness of the world. It separates between one object and another, between one impression and another impression.

Reason does not, however, exhaust its function when it separates and fixes the content of sense; it further raises it from the particular to the universal. It represents single individual images of objects as the general images of the same objects. That is, reason does not rest in the separate and distinct images conveyed by means of sensation or perception; it goes beyond these to higher and more generic images which embrace the lower and more particular. "There can be no such thing as a concept until the individual thing with its difference from its genus or class (*Art*) is at the same time posited. The general image is the image of the class, and the individual image can only exist when the generic image likewise exists. The universal image is really the indivi-

dual image, but regarded as displaceable (*Verschiebbarkeit*); that is, as being replaceable by another of the same kind. For example, one who had never seen a tower, but who had seen many other buildings, would at the first sight have no difficulty in subsuming it under the concept 'building.' The individual tower would also in its turn become to the spectator an image of every kind of tower, and he on his part would have to think how he could vary this image of the tower without going outside its generic kind. This, then, is contained in sense; but only through the intellectual function is it the general image, which, however, only arises along with the individual image."*

The generalizing of the particular images represented in sense Schleiermacher calls the "Schema," and the process by which it is developed through the agency of reason the "Schematizing Process."

The schematizing process, which corresponds to induction, is never, at any one stage, a completed and final form of the development of knowledge. Beginning with a particular sense-image, it conceives it as a general image; but this general image can again become the starting-point for a further generalization, and so on through all the multiplicity of being until the absolute universality, or the concept of the world, is reached. There is,

* *Dial.*, p. 213.

thus, always in this process something more or less accidental and empirical. Its results lack absoluteness and independence. At most they can only be regarded as schemata, or general images, in which the organic factor is dominant, and where the intellectual acts a subordinate and accessory part.*

This schematizing, or inductive, process is not, however, the only one that enters into the production of the concept. In addition to it there is needed the process of deduction, which begins where induction ends. Its course is thus the antithesis of the other. It begins with the universal, or the world as unity, and it resolves this into the great contrasts that are included therein—the contrasts of the ideal and the real, subject and object, the intellectual and the organic. It next shows that each side of these contrasts—the formal not less than the material—can be postulated as a separate unity, which can again be resolved into its contrasts. And so, the process goes on, from unity to diversity and from diversity to unity interminably.†

Schleiermacher designates the result of each process of deduction by the title "Formula." If, in the schema, the organic is the primary principle and the intellectual the subordinate, the case is reversed in the formula. Here reason assumes

* *Dial*, pp. 84, 205-6.

† *Dial.*, pp. 203, 232-239.

the initiative, and the objective world of impressions, which it determines, may be characterized as passive. Still, although the formula is intellectually in advance of the schema, it does not, any more than the schema, constitute the concept proper. This, in the view of Schleiermacher, can only come into existence when the schema and the formula—induction and deduction—are perfectly united. The two processes must run into and complete each other. The particular must be deduced from the universal, and the universal must be induced from the particular. Until this takes place, the separate results of induction and of deduction are not real concepts at all; they are only concepts in the process of becoming.* The Hegelian dialectic, and the philosophy of identity, are, therefore, at fault when they regard the process of deduction as in itself independent and complete. A deduction *a priori*, a self-originating of pure thought, is an absolute impossibility.

The existence of the concept in consciousness is, then, the definite union of sense and reason. Sense pictures the world as a confused and undefined plurality; reason brings to this plurality the character of order and distinctiveness. The one finds its fulfilment in reason, the other finds its determination in sense. It is only through the coalescence of the two that the true concept can be

* *Dial.*, pp. 241, 250.

produced. "The first fixed point prior to the production of all concepts is the presence of reason as an impulse and the realization of sense as an influence."

But, although the sensuous is a necessary ingredient in the formation of the concept, it must not, on that account, be inferred that Schleiermacher supposed that concepts come from without, or that consciousness is the mere result of sense-experience. His view is the very opposite of this. He held that concepts exist in the reason in a timeless manner, even as the plant is present in a spaceless manner in the seminal germ. The reason, he maintained, is the potentiality, the living force, needed for the production of all true concepts, the lower not less than the higher. It is the place of all real concepts in the sense in which the ancients declared the Godhead to be the place of all living forces.*

This view of Schleiermacher is not to be understood as if it implied that there were innate concepts in the mind ; or, as if they simply slumbered in the reason until awakened by the organic impression. Schleiermacher rejected, in the most emphatic manner, the distinction made by Leibnitz between innate and acquired ideas, and he showed that there could be no such thing as ready-made concepts existing *a priori* in reason. Con-

* *Dial.*, pp. 104, 106, 413-14, 500, 515 ; *Psych.*, pp. 155-56.

cepts, according to his theory, can only exist where there is a definite combination of the organic and the intellectual. Yet, necessary as both sides of this combination are, the principle that gives to the contents of the organic, or to sensations, their true conceptual character is reason. The whole range of concepts—higher and lower, ethical and physical—exist in reason, as to their possibility and disposition, prior to their emergence into actual consciousness. "This timeless existence of all concepts in the reason, if regarded merely as a denial of the view that concepts are the secondary product of organic affection, is the truth contained in the doctrine of 'innate ideas.' But if it is taken to mean that concepts actually exist in the reason antecedent to all organic function, then it is altogether a false notion, since concepts can only come into being through the union of both functions."*

2. The judgment (*Urtheil*), or second form of knowledge, also occupies itself with the interpretation of being. Like the concept, it seeks to bring light and order into the world of chaos. Only, in doing so, it follows its own course and employs its own method. While it is the function of the concept to represent being as it is, unchangeable and at rest, it is the office of judgment to represent being in motion—being as acting or as suffering. The one has a regard to the manifold mass of being as

* *Dial.*, p. 105. *Psych.*, p. 155-56.

a definite unity and plurality ; the other takes this unity and plurality, and shows how they are connected in the relations of actual existence. The one is a combination of characteristics ; the other, a combination of concepts. The judgment, in fact, represents the relations of individual actions and things. Its sphere is that of the organic or the real, as distinguished from the intellectual, or the ideal—which is the sphere of the concept.

As the objects on which the judgment pronounces are not equally definite, it consequently follows that the judgments themselves must vary in character. Some are clear and perfect, others are vague and imperfect. The nearer a judgment is to the starting-point of knowledge, as in the conceptions of children, it assumes the nature of what Schleiermacher calls a "primitive judgment." Such judgments have for their subject chaos, or the vast undetermined world, and are expressed impersonally in the statements : "it thunders," "it glances," and the like. On the other hand, the judgment that is based on the highest concept—the concept of the world—is termed "the absolute judgment." This judgment embraces the sum of all subjects and all predicates, or, what is the same thing, the totality of objects and their actions. Between these extremes—between the primitive and the absolute judgments—all other real judgments must find a place, either as perfect or imperfect judgments. "The imperfect judgment

leans to the primitive, and is more analytic in character ; the perfect judgment approaches the absolute, and is of a more synthetic nature. The imperfect posits the sphere of co-existence in an undefined manner ; the perfect forms, from the subject and the object, a joint higher sphere ; and so approximates towards the formation of the world-concept, since it always transcends the simple concept of its subject." Knowledge, under the form of judgment, is thus a development from the primitive to the absolute, from the undefined to the defined, from chaos to the world as idea.*

The concept and the judgment are mutually dependent upon each other. Into the construction of the concept the judgment enters as a necessary factor ; so that the higher the concept is the more it rests upon a series of judgments ; and the judgment, on its part, presupposes the concept, and attains its greatest completeness when the concepts, on which it is founded, are themselves perfectly formed. But, however perfect, neither the concept nor the judgment can reach the transcendental ground of being. This is closed against them by a twofold barrier. The concept is bounded above by the absolute unity of being, and below by the infinite undeterminateness of impressions, or the world as chaos. It cannot pass into the one or the other of those unknown regions. In like

* *Dial.*, pp. 82-85, 261-287, 561-567.

manner, the judgment is limited above by the highest being, the absolute subject, or the totality of causal relations, and below by chaotic being, which is an infinitude of predicates without determined subjects. The theory of Schleiermacher, by thus correlating and limiting the forms of thought, avoids the one-sidedness alike of idealism and of realism.

Regarded as knowledge, both the concept and the judgment must correspond with the forms of being. The uniform production of thought presupposes, as we have seen, the identity in all of the reasoning principle; it is to the same cause that we must attribute the universal uniformity of the production of the concepts. Though the concepts only come into existence through the medium of sense-activity, yet they exist timelessly in the reason. "Wherever there is knowledge, the system of concepts constituting this knowledge must exist in a timeless way in the all-indwelling reason." The concepts are grounded timelessly in reason in the same way in which plants may be said to be in the seed-germ; only in the one case we have an event taking place in space, in the other a fact existing in a spaceless manner.

But, in addition to this sameness of the intellectual process, another explanation of the uniformity of the production of concepts is to be found in the correspondence of the forms of the concept with the forms of being. The essential

contrasts of the higher and the lower, the universal and the particular—which are indispensable to the building up of the concept—occur also in being. Here they are present as the substantial forms of force and phenomenon, which are related to each other as the universal to the particular. The concept, therefore, corresponds to being in virtue of these permanent forms—the higher concept answering to force, and the lower to the phenomena of force.*

The judgments are likewise produced similarly in all, and correspond to being; but in both of these respects there is a difference between them and the concepts. The universal uniformity of judgments is caused, not by the identity either of the intellectual or of the material process—though, in a certain sense, these are necessary to every judgment—but by the sameness of the relation between the organic function and external being as embracing the sum of organic movement. This relation expresses the truth in the doctrine of an outer world, the same for all; and from which each, according to the activity of his reason, develops his own system of judgments.†

There is also a difference between the judgment and the concept in the way in which they are related to being. While the concept answers to being as such, the judgment corresponds to things

* *Dial.*, pp. 111-112, 116.

† *Dial.*, pp. 122-124.

in their co-existence, or to individual being. In the one we have being as permanent, in the other as in a state of flux. The concept expresses being in the form of force and its appearance, whereas the judgment represents the same being in the form of particular objects and their actions. "All finite being constitutes a system of causes and effects as well as a system of substantial forms, and it is the same being which corresponds to the form of the concept and to the form of the judgment." *

Schleiermacher further distinguishes between the concept and the judgment according to the two dominating forms which they assume. "Knowledge, in its two great aspects, has the same object, and it is, as to its form, only relatively contrasted. When the conceptual form predominates, and judgment is only present as its necessary condition, we have speculative knowledge. But when the form that is supreme is judgment, and the concept appears simply as an indispensable requisite, the result is empirical or historical knowledge." † The speculative thus conforms to the concept, and the empirical to the judgment. As, however, the concept presupposes the judgment, so the speculative must presuppose the empirical. They must not be isolated ; as if each, taken singly, could reach the true conception of

* *Dial.*, p. 127.† *Dial.*, p. 130.

knowledge. It is only in the interpenetration and identity of both that the highest idea of philosophy, which is the resolving of all contrasts, can be attained. Yet, for us, the perfect identity of the two—the real world-wisdom—is impossible. We can never, either by means of the concept or of the judgment, comprehend the totality of being; and nothing short of this is necessary in order to bring about the complete interpenetration of the speculative and empirical elements in thought. All that is within our reach is scientific criticism, or a description of the relation subsisting between the empirical and the speculative. "But if the pure idea of knowledge is nowhere realised, have we any substitute for it? Yes, in criticism, or the comparison of knowledge, as it is, with the highest idea of knowledge; and this principle of criticism occupies in the scientific sphere the same place that conscience occupies in the sphere of the moral life." "This is the relative form of philosophy as criticism; not as criticism of pure reason, but merely as criticism of the self-representation of reason in real knowledge." *

And so, at length, we are led to the conclusion that the forms of thought and of being are alike limited and relative. Even as, in the sphere of thought, we cannot think of a concept without a judgment, a judgment without a con-

* *Dial.*, pp. 142-144.

cept, or the speculative without the empirical, "so we cannot"—to quote the paraphrase of Bender—"conceive, in being, a cause without an effect, a force without its phenomenon, or a substance without an accident, and *vice versa*. We must, on the contrary, regard being as at once unity and plurality, force and appearance, cause and effect, as at rest not less than in motion, as free not less than necessary—free as the self-existing unity of force and phenomena; necessary as conditioned through the joint-whole of existence. Accordingly the difference between the distinct forms of thought and being turns out, at all points, to be relative; and the contrast between thought and being remains as a unique and seemingly unresolvable antithesis." *

VI.—THE FUNCTION OF THE WILL.

IN the foregoing analysis the outer world, or physical being, acts what may be termed the principal part. It is the supreme condition without which consciousness can neither obtain its material nor come into light. Everywhere it is the same all-dominating might, giving shape to spirit, and compelling it to submit to its rude, aggressive sway.

* *Schleiermacher's Theologie: Die philosophischen Grundlagen*, p. 80.

In the production of knowledge it constitutes the real and active factor, while mind is the formal and passive element.

But knowledge does not by itself constitute the whole of conscious life : the co-related, and equally wide sphere of will, has also to be taken into account. Now, in will there is an entire reversal of the process that obtains in knowledge. In knowledge the outer is primary, the inner is secondary : the one acts, the other is acted upon. But in will, thought is no longer receptive and passive ; it becomes spontaneous and initiative. It seizes upon external objects, so as to modify them, and render them subservient to its purpose. Thought can do this, but only in as far as it is will ; that is, thought receiving its content from the inner being of spirit, or ethical being. For, even as it is the nature of physical being to affect the thinking Ego, and to find its representation there, so it is the nature of ethical being to influence the outer world, and in it to attain its realization. Universal being thus presents, according to the way in which it acts, a double contrast : there is the being which precedes thought, and is the object of thought, and there is the being which succeeds thought, the being that is the purpose of thought. Hence, will, not less than knowledge, is the definite expression of the causal relations between nature and mind, organization and intellect ; with the predominance, in the one case of the

ethical, in the other, of the physical. "In both, there is the relation between thought and being : in knowledge, being is the active, in will, it is the passive side ; in knowledge, thought is the passive side, in will, it is the active side." *

Schleiermacher did not think it necessary to give an extended analysis of will ; as, in his view, knowledge and will were but different aspects of the one universal process of the activity of mind. Not only do the organic and the intellectual concur in will as they do in thought ; there can further be no real thought without the presence of will, and no real exercise of will into which the element of intelligence does not enter. Both factors are inseparably interwoven into the common texture of conscious life. We are never will alone, or thought alone. The one is always the necessary predicate of the other ; so that every free product of reason implies a volition, and every act of will implies a thought. Indeed, the more a thought rests upon a volitional basis the clearer and more distinctive does it become ; and, on the other hand, the more decisive an impulse of will is the more directly does it proceed from an intelligent ground.

If, however, knowledge and will are not separate faculties of mind, but different processes of the general movement of thought, it follows that the difference between ethical and physical being, be-

* *Dial.*, p. 519 ; *Psych.*, p. 170.

tween mind and nature, is not absolute but relative, not qualitative but quantitative. The two are related as the ideal and the real—the ideal being mind and matter, with the first predominating ; the real being also mind and matter, but with the predominance of the last. In man the ideal reaches its highest stage ; but it is also present in nature, though with diminishing grades of distinctness down to the lowest form of inorganic life. The real finds its fullest expression in the inorganic ; and from this, up to man, all other forms of being are only successively diminishing phases of the real. We can, therefore, represent the ideal and the real as constituting a single line of development. “The ethical and the physical may be viewed, in each of two ways, as forming a single series ; yet the point where the contrast emerges in man is always a turning-point—(the point at and through which the physical passes through man’s action into the ethical). Below man the contrast between the inner and the outer is blunted, and there is no such thing as determined thought or determined will. These belong essentially to the human self-consciousness, and are denied to the lower creation. But, since there exists in animal and plant life a relation analogous to that of thought and will, we can picture all life as a chain of progressive development of the ideal, with man, and his whole being, as the last link of the chain, and thus the ethical coalesces with the physical

only in man. But, conversely, we can conceive a complete reversion of the process, so that the real is evolved from the ideal. In that case the activity of man, which is a simple modification of the real, would occupy the lowest stage in the process; whereas higher developments of the real take place in animals, whose productive energy is purely material—(real and non-ethical)—and in plant-life, which only produces material germs. And, thus, the whole reality, which is the object of physics, appears as the ethical sphere of the irrational beings." ("So dass die ganze Physik als die Ethik des unbeseelten erscheint.") * That is, the ethical process may be viewed from either side of the contrast given in consciousness—the physical, or intellect as acted on by nature, and the will, as acting upon nature. In the one case we get a preponderance of the ideal with a minimum of the real (man); in the other a preponderance of the real with a minimum of the ideal (plants). The first is the "turning-point" of the ethical, the other the "turning-point" to the fulness of the real.

Still, although the physical and the ethical are so related, that the physical is a limited ethical, and the ethical a limited physical, it is in the region of humanity alone that a true ethic prevails. "In the animal world the contrast between the ideal and the real is wanting in accentuation, and

* *Dial.*, p. 149.

consequently the activity of the ideal principle, in its essential nature, finds no place there. Man is then the only "turning-point" from which being can issue under the form of the activity of the ideal upon the real." . . . "Within the range of the earthly being that surrounds us, man is the efflorescence of the ideal. He is the highest volitional being; a lesser grade of will exists in animals; and in the vegetable creation will is entirely hidden, and we enter upon the inorganic." *

Schleiermacher's identification of knowledge and will recalls the similar doctrine of Spinoza.† Yet, though both are agreed, at the threshold, in characterizing will as being permeated by intelligence, they differ entirely in the scope of activity which they separately assign to it. Spinoza, bound by the logical connection of his system, was forced to limit the activity of the will to the conceptual sphere. Schleiermacher avoided this one-sided determinism by ascribing the phenomena of will to the self-determining purpose of the relatively independent individuality of each. With

* *Dial.*, pp. 149, 150.

† For Spinoza's view consult the *Ethica*, ii. 48, 49; iii. 9. See further, the admirable chapter on *Intelligence and Will* in Principal Caird's *Spinoza*. The modern philosophy of evolution also identifies the physical and the ethical. One of the most interesting of recent attempts in the same direction is that made by the late Professor Henry Drummond in his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*.

him, will is thought ; but it is thought as the deliberate movement of the inner being, not thought as determined, or called into existence, by outer being.

Knowledge and will being, then, in the estimation of Schleiermacher, two relatively independent factors emerging into conscious unity in man, it follows that we as much need a common basis of certainty with respect to will as we do with respect to knowledge. Even as thought is the same for all, so there must be a form of will which is the same and identical for all.

Now, what makes it possible for the individual to determine in the same manner as the whole of humanity determines, is, Schleiermacher asserts, the universal will. "The cause why another can will as we will is not grounded in us as individuals—since it is the basis of the identity of the universal and the particular—but rather in the living force of the race, upon which the essential ethical deduction rests." * This "living force of the race," or the universal will—the antithesis of the substantial forces of the world—is the moral law, and it enters the individual will as a necessity of the human spirit in its relation to the race. It is only when this universal will develops itself in individuals, according to their peculiar disposition, that will becomes distinctly moral.

* *Dial.*, p. 150.

This relation of the will of all to the will of each is not to be conceived as if it were an accidental relation : it is founded on the nature of the human spirit. The ethical forms through which we act upon being exist in the reason in the same way in which the forms of the outer world, by which we represent being, lie typified in the conceptual sphere. "The determinations of will that are viewed as imperative (*Sollen*) have their impulse in the collective consciousness dwelling in us—that is, the consciousness of the race—which embraces in itself the universal assent, because therein all is given as one. The determinations that are viewed as obligation (*Dürfen*), and which are only secondarily determined through the conscience, have their impulse in our individual consciousness. Yet we can only posit both as one—the "ought" as the manifestation of the "shall." The co-existence in us of the consciousness of the race and the consciousness of the individual is, therefore, the presupposition of all real will."*

Further, will, not less than thought, must agree with being. Our conscious will can pass beyond the limits of subjectivity, and can transform itself into a form of outer being. Now, the ground of the conformity of our will to this outer being lies not in the consciousness of the race, but in "the pure transcendental identity of the ideal and the

* *Dial.*, p. 523.

real." For will, as for knowledge, the ultimate basis is the same. "The ground of the one is not different from that of the other; for if they were different, not only would thought and will be differently conditioned, but also each would be double, inasmuch as each is likewise the other. There would, in that case, exist a duality (*Duplicität*) which must either be explained by a higher unity—and this would be the true transcendental ground—or the duality must be regarded as bisecting existence; so that, instead of certainty, confusion would once more prevail." *

Will and knowledge accordingly represent two contrasted functions which must be referred to the same speculative basis. To this they both clearly point; but neither singly, nor together, can they lead us to the common source from which they spring. They cannot discover the absolute, or that which lies beyond all contrast. And yet, in the search for this transcendental ground, they are not to be separated; for both are equally related to the solution of the great problem. They are inseparably connected in their origin and activity; and as far as the one can bring us on our way, so far, and not further, can the other. In discussing the ultimate basis of knowing and being, it is, therefore, entirely unphilosophical to accentuate thought or will, as if either, taken by itself, held

* *Dial.*, pp. 150-151.

the key to this profoundest of all speculative questions. "To regard the one, and to neglect the other, as is done by the natural theology that attempts to prove the existence of God by the function of thought alone, is one-sided and partial. But not less one-sided are the attempts of Kant, who seeks to establish the same fact by the mere function of the will—and of Fichte, who, following in the line of this method, endeavours to reduce the order of the world to a single formula." *

VII.—FEELING, OR THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE.

THOUGHT and will, as we have hitherto followed them, have failed to reach the final ground of knowledge. The sphere of thought is the sphere of the contrasted, or the conditioned. It expresses the causal relations between being and us, between the organic and the intellectual. Pure thought, or thought without an object which excites it, is an absurdity. But thought into which the finite and conditioned must necessarily enter as constitutive elements cannot comprehend the absolute and the unconditioned—the unity at the foundation of thought and being. That unity—the Being of all beings—must, from the nature of the case, be raised above all contrasts or opposites ;

* *Dial.*, p. 428.

and to think of it theistically, as a personality ; or pantheistically, as a *natura naturans*, is to think of it by contrast, or in a finite anthropomorphic and conceptual fashion.

Equally unfitted, too, is will for the attainment of philosophical knowledge of the absolute. The will—apart from the contrasts of subject and object, form and content, which are common to it not less than to thought—is also conditioned or determined. That which is willed must be something definite, something known—a virtue, a duty, or an end. Without this definiteness, which implies relation, volition cannot exist. If, however, in will, we always will the definite or the determinate, it is impossible that the Absolute can ever come within its sphere. This is, as to its very essence, indefinite, pure being ; and we cannot in any way determine it. It lies outside the range of our conscious activity ; and it cannot become the purpose of our thought. We cannot act upon it, or modify it, as we please. “ An impulse of will directed towards the Absolute is a mere blank, since it leads to no definite action, as we see exemplified in the phenomena of quietism.”* The being of God can, therefore, be as little apprehended through the moral side of our nature as through the intellectual, as little through ethical knowledge as through physical, or emperical, knowledge.

* *Dial.*, p. 156.

As, however, the Absolute is the postulate both of thought and of will there must be some way of apprehending it. Such a way, Schleiermacher tells us, is to be found in the next, or highest, stage in the development of the human spirit—in feeling, or the immediate self-consciousness (*Gefühl, unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein*). As this principle of feeling occupies an important place in the doctrine of Schleiermacher, it may be well to endeavour to obtain a clear conception of its nature and content.

Self-consciousness is represented by Schleiermacher as having three stages. First, there is primitive or confused consciousness, where the contrasts of subject and object, inner and outer, remain undeveloped. This vague and distinctionless condition is the state in which the child finds itself before it begins to laugh or to speak—before it becomes conscious either of itself or of things. Its world is the world of chaos, where there is neither totality nor individuality, division nor unity. In this lowest stage—essentially one with the animal sphere of existence—the personal, human consciousness is only latent. Yet, as the real life of man is but a continuous development of consciousness, from lower to higher—a constantly-increasing knowledge on the part of the Ego in relation to itself and objects, humanity and the world—it may be said there is no specific difference between the consciousness of the child and that of the greatest philosopher. The difference is a difference of

degree ; for, as we cannot deny knowledge to the child, even should it exist only in germ, so, regarding the philosopher, we cannot say that his knowledge is entirely perfect. Reason, the active, combining principle, is present in the spirit of each ; since without that presence there could not come into existence, in the case of either, the type of thought that is characterized as rational knowledge.

The second grade is called the sensuous, or individual consciousness (*das sinnliche Bewusstsein*). Here the confused, animal consciousness gives place to the distinctly human consciousness. The vague and manifold state of chaos is broken up into the contrasts of subject and object, I and not I. The inner thought-activity, the essential human unity, begins to know and to distinguish itself from the multiplicity of things. It differentiates between subjective and objective consciousness ; between sensations, the inner feelings we have when acted upon by the world, and perceptions, which express the manner in which objective being mirrors itself in us. But, with this advance from the indifferent and contrastless state of chaos, the living unity of the Ego becomes conscious of its own existence and independence in the midst of the infinite flux of finite things. Man becomes conscious of himself as the active, unifying principle in the world. He distinguishes his own definite, thinking being from the indefinite, non-

thinking objects by which he is surrounded. This is the first great step in the universal process of spiritual existence, or the development of reason in the human consciousness. Man, amidst the totality of outer being, knows and feels himself as no longer one with the vague and universal whole: he knows and feels himself to be a separate and independent being, "a living unity," an intellect, in contradistinction to the world and its "dead unities"—which are but so many points of transition to the essential evolution of the soul's life.

This awakening of intellect prepares us, on the supposition of Schleiermacher that "each extension of consciousness implies a progressive development of life,"* for a further advance of thought and inner life. And so we find that, even as man comes to the knowledge of himself through thought, or "the constant repetition of the fact of consciousness," he now raises himself, a step yet higher still, by means of speech—in this case no longer nomenclature, or the naming of things, but a necessity of intercommunication with fellow-beings. Through the use of language—the organic side of thought—he knows and feels himself to be a man, a member of the human race. He becomes conscious of the family and tribe, the nation and humanity. In

* "*Jede Erweiterung des Bewusstseins ist Lebenserhöhung.*"—*Psych.*, p. 133.

this connection there are developed in him the social and moral feelings, such as fellowship, love and compassion. These, though arising from the inter-relations of the race, are not given as direct objects of knowledge, or as postulates of the will : they are more or less immediate in their character. The moral feelings "can only exist in their integrity when the contrast between one's existence and that of the existence of others is reduced to a minimum." Contrasted conditions are the presupposition of all empirical knowledge ; so that this effort to rise above the contrasted is the first real indication of a movement on the part of intellect towards the higher, or immediate self-consciousness. In the next advance of the individual consciousness this movement is even more pronounced. Man, the restless, thinking being, cannot rest either in himself or in the race : he stretches out further still to that unity which embraces the individual, and humanity and nature. He finds himself immediately one with the world, and feels the unity of all existence. The feelings that represent this oneness with the world are the æsthetic feelings—our feelings for the beautiful, the harmonious, and the sublime. These, though we cannot justify their existence on the ground of real knowledge—any more than we can justify the social and ethical feelings—have a certainty of their own, and act a supreme part in the culture and development of

the race. As they express themselves in Art, through the agency of fancy, the active and interpretive side of feeling, they create, as it were, a new world, without which life would be poor and earth-bound.

But the spirit of man cannot rest in its consciousness of the world, as the final goal of its ever onward movement. The world itself is a contrast in unity, and is consequently only the presupposition and condition of a further impulse towards a still higher stage of feeling. This stage is attained when God, the real Unity, behind all and binding all, is immediately given in the inner consciousness. Immediately given, not in the sense that it is pure feeling—such a state being, according to Schleiermacher, as much an impossibility as pure thought. It is immediate in the sense that the consciousness of God is not formed in us, like the concept or the judgment, through the intervention of an object, or the medium of reflection. In feeling, the contrasts upon which thought rests are suppressed. What we feel is not something external or finite, not the totality of being or the highest power : what we feel is our own individual self-consciousness as essentially related to God. Feeling is the form of subjective knowledge corresponding to the Absolute. It is not wrought in us : it is the immediate relation of the soul to the transcendental Unity appearing and revealing

itself in finite things, and it simply comes to existence in the individual consciousness.

This is the utmost reach possible to the human spirit, the bloom and product of all its manifold development. Here, in the Absolute Ground and Unity of the infinite and all-producing life, it finds rest ; for here it not only knows but is one, in living contact, with the object of its mysterious and necessary search, from lower to higher, from outer to inner, from division to unity. This immediate feeling of God, as distinguished from the moral and æsthetic feelings, is the distinctly religious feeling. Religion has not only its psychological but its essential basis in this immediate consciousness of God ; and, as this consciousness is common to all men—being the characteristic element in the active and living development of the race—it is as natural and necessary that man should be religious as it is that he should think or act.

The immediate self-consciousness is thus the highest stage in the evolution of subjective consciousness. It rests on the earlier stages, and without them it could never come into existence. Without finding the unity of our own life, and without the feeling of our oneness with humanity and the world, we could never rise to the consciousness of the Absolute Unity. “The religious feeling comprehends the feeling for nature and the social feelings, for it is developed from these ; and

its natural tendency may be described as the removal of the contrast between being, as it is consciousness, and being, as it is given in consciousness—subject and object. This removal of the contrast is to be understood as taking place only on the subjective side of consciousness.” And the more truly we develop ourselves, and our objective knowledge, the more perfectly will the immediate consciousness be developed in us. “There is no isolated view of the Deity ; but we view it only through, in, and with the entire system of view. (*Es giebt keine isolirte Anschauung der Gottheit, sondern wir schauen sie nur an in und mit dem gesammten System der Anschauung.*) Consequently our knowledge of God is first attained through our view of the world. It is as we find a clue to the meaning of the one that the characteristic features of the other appear. If our view of the world is defective our notions of Deity will not advance beyond the mythological stage.” . . . “My position is, that, as the Absolute is the basis of all thought, we must accept the idea of God as being present in every real thought. For this reason I find myself in conflict with those who separate God from the world. There is no other way of having the idea of God than in our real knowledge ; and this idea is perfected through the perfection of real knowledge. The idea of God does not exist apart from our knowledge as to the world.” But in all knowledge the life of the

soul is one in all its phases of higher and lower. As ice, water, and vapour are different forms of one and the same substance, H_2O , and not separate substances, each having its principle in itself; so thought and feeling and will are not distinct and separate organs, or capacities, of mind: they are all manifestations of the one spiritual life of the conscious Ego. Feeling, not less than the reflective consciousness, is knowledge, is an activity of reason. In feeling, knowledge is predominantly individualistic; in thought it assumes a predominantly universal type. In the one, the subject is related to its object immediately, without contrast or intermediation; in the other, contrast and reflection are absolutely necessary to the existence of thought and will. In the reflective self-consciousness the opposition between the outer and the inner, the ideal and the real is never wholly removed. It can, therefore, never reach the Absolute ground of being—that ground which science ever postulates, and philosophy always strives to attain, as the rational unity underlying all thought and being, force and appearance. On the other hand, feeling, as a form of the universal activity of reason, finds and represents, in its own way, that Absolute Unity. What knowledge, in the early stages of sensation and perception, concept and judgment, fails to reach, knowledge, in the final stage, as immediate self-consciousness, attains as a sure and certain possession. The last

stage of the individual self-consciousness is thus the necessary continuation and development of the strivings and postulates of the earlier and ever-advancing stages of the human spirit.*

Schleiermacher next distinguishes between the immediate self-consciousness and sensation (*Empfindung*). Sensation he defines as a subjective personal state existing in a distinct moment, and arising in virtue of organic excitation, or affection. This state, which corresponds to the confused animal self-consciousness, is akin to the immediate self-consciousness in one thing, only that it is the negation of thought and will. For sensation, the subjective consciousness and its phenomena, have not yet come into existence; for the immediate self-consciousness they do exist; only not as real thought, and will, and the subjective consciousness, but as the identity, or indifference, of these. Feeling, as sensation, is the lowest stage in the development of the human spirit; feeling, as immediate self-consciousness, is the last and highest stage in the same development.

One of the principal objections adduced by Hegel against Schleiermacher's doctrine of immediate self-consciousness—and one that has fre-

* *Dial.*, pp. 28-29, 150-153, 322, 329, 413-431; *Psych.*, pp. 81-97, 212-236; *Ästhetik*, pp. 67-79; *Der Christliche Glaube*, pp. 21-29. Vide also Balfour's *Foundations of Belief* for an interesting chapter on *Æsthetics* in relation to the findings of critical philosophy and modern science.

quently since been made—is that feeling is the lowest grade in the intellectual process, and is not even distinctly human, being also possessed by the brutes as the sense-form of their consciousness. This objection, in itself psychologically false, fails to apprehend Schleiermacher's view, and confounds his representation of sensation with that of feeling. Sensation, it is true, needs to be supplemented by perception and thought; for it is the non-existence, or rather the prophecy of these. It is not so with feeling. This is not a subordinate stage of consciousness existing prior to the more advanced stages: it is the final stage of all—the stage which, while implying the highest contrasted states of the conscious Ego, is itself higher than these, because reducing them to a unity present, immediate, and without contrast.*

And, here, it may be noted that Schleiermacher further describes feeling as "the relative identity of thought and will." "We have no other identity of the two than feeling, which becomes, by turns, the last step in thought, and the first in will; but this identity is always only relative—both terms being never in exact equipoise."† Again, "regarding life as a process, we find that it is a transition from thought to will, and from will to thought—both of these moments being taken in

* *Dial.*, pp. 151-154, 524; *Psych.*, pp. 182-216; *Æsth.*, p. 67.

† *Dial.*, p. 157.

their relative significance. The point of transition is thought as vanishing, and will as beginning, and these two must be identical. In thought, the being of things is posited in us, after our fashion ; in will, we posit our being in things, also after our fashion. Therefore, only in so far as the being of things becomes posited in us, can our being become posited in things. But, our being is that which posits ; and, as this falls back into the indifference point, our being, as positing, consequently relapses into the indifference of both forms. This is the immediate self-consciousness, or feeling." * In other words, the contrasts of thought and will are united in feeling. We are always that which thinks, and that which wills—what is acted upon, as well as what acts ; but, just because we are, there must exist in our consciousness a point of equipoise, or of transition, where the activities of the two forms are at rest, and by which we can pass from the one to the other. Such a point is feeling. Here the antitheses of willing and knowing are removed ; and the conscious subject, as such, without objective and contrasted relations, alone remains.

Feeling is accordingly the bond by which the coherence and continuity of our consciousness is secured. It is the unity of our being. It is the Ego in its innermost essence, and considered apart

* *Dial.*, pp. 428-429.

from its connection with objects, in knowing and willing. Without it, thought and volition would not only stand separate and apart : they would become disintegrated, and fall asunder. As to either, there could be no stability and no certainty. But feeling is the permanent potency behind both ; and through it the actions of each are constantly renewed. It ensures their continuity, and it gives validity to their determinations. "The immediate self-consciousness," says Schleiermacher, "is not only present in transition (from one intellectual phase to another), but inasmuch as thought is will, and will is thought, it must also be present in each moment. And, so, we find feeling always accompanying each moment ; whether it be prevaillingly intellectual or prevaillingly volitional. It seems to vanish when we allow ourselves to become completely engrossed in an intuition or an action ; but this is only apparently the case. It always accompanies us. At times it seems to emerge, alone, into existence ; and then thought and action appear to sink out of view. This, too, is only apparently so ; for, however much they may seem to have vanished, feeling ever bears in itself traces of will and germs of thought." *

Such, then, being Schleiermacher's account of feeling ; how, it may be enquired, is the idea of God given to us through this activity of conscious-

* *Dial.*, p. 429 ; *cf. Psych.*, p. 213.

ness? In answer to this question, Schleiermacher replies: "We have knowledge only as to the being of God in us and in things, but not as to a being of God external to the world, or in itself. The being of Ideas (*Ideen*) is a being of God in us, not because the Ideas as determined representations fill up a moment in consciousness, but because they express in the same manner in all (therefore in human nature generally) the essence of being, and because, owing to the certainty attaching to them, they indicate the identity of the real and the ideal, which identity is posited in us neither as individuals nor as the whole of humanity. In the same way, the being of Conscience (*Gewissen*) is a being of God in us. Not, inasmuch as it exists in individual representations—in that case subject to error not less than is the individual application of Ideas—but inasmuch as it pronounces with moral certainty the correspondence of our will with the law of outer being, and is, on that account the same identity." "The being of Ideas"—the realism of the concepts—is to be understood in the sense that the forms of thought are identical with the forms of being; concept agreeing with force and judgment with appearance. The same correspondence of the forms of thought and being is also present in "the being of Conscience." We can then say that, in as far as man is the unity of the real and ideal, the being of Ideas, the pure principles, from which consciousness

starts, along with the principle of Will, or of action, represent the being of the Absolute in him. "In the unity of physical and ethical knowledge—knowledge as to the world and man—is the unity of world-order (*Weltordnung*) and law, as both, in their separate movements, establish themselves in each of these spheres. This Unity is what men generally mean by the expression God . . . If we represent the ethical under the potency of the physical, we can say the basis of the world-order is likewise the basis of law; if we represent the physical under the potency of the ethical, we can say the basis of law is likewise the principle of the world-order. In our consciousness of God we have the identity of both. He is the transcendental ground in the separate movements of both functions, and in the unity of self-consciousness in its passages from the one to the other. This is the point from which all enquiry as to the rules of procedure in thought must start."

"Ideas can only be the source of truth in proportion as they picture being, and the Conscience can only be the source of right, in so far as it describes the relation of man to the world. But the Absolute is found only in the identity of both; and this identity represents the highest unity of life, which can never be posited in us in a personal manner, neither can it belong entirely to the human race. It is the unity of Truth and of Conscience; the first as moved by the will, the

other as it is influenced through thought. The unity of thought and being in this unity (of truth and Conscience) is the highest self, the Absolute. The relation of will to thought, and *vice versa*, and the unity thereof, are the divine in us. Religion manifests this divine in life ; speculation manifests it in reflection ; but both manifest it only in something else, not as it is in itself."

"Since, therefore, Ideas and Conscience form a permanent unity amidst the fluctuations of consciousness, God must be given to us as the condition of our inner life. The, to us, innate being of God constitutes our real essence, for, without Ideas and without Conscience, we would sink to the level of the brutes." . . . "But, although the being of God is present in our Ideas and Conscience, these two are not to be supposed as existing in Him ; since in Him there is no contrast of concept and object, or of will and shall. Ideas and Conscience thus fail to express the being of God as it is in itself. . . . "Knowledge of the being of God, in itself, can be nothing else than a concept. But it is all along taken for granted that, in the idea of the highest, the contrast of the concept and of the object is suppressed. The concept of God can only exist in Himself ; and in us only in as far as the being of God is posited in us. He is, however, in us simply as the condition of our self-consciousness—not as He is in Himself, but only as He is in relation to another (to the con-

sciousness of man regarding himself, or his definite human relations). Our concept of God is, therefore, always bound up with that to which our concept is related. If we had a complete concept of Him, the concept would exist in us and the object without us (as happens in thought)." . . . "In that case, the affection of the organic function would be directly connected with God Himself as object, which is an impossibility. Hence we cannot really apprehend the being of God ; and the Absolute, the highest unity, the identity of the ideal and the real, are only schemata. If these conceptions are to become instinct with life, they must again enter the sphere of the finite, and the contrasted ; as when God is thought of as a *natura naturans*, or as a conscious absolute personality." *

This description of God as given in feeling is both negative and positive. As the Absolute is indefinable and indeterminate being lying outside the sphere of phenomena—we are not here to think of Kant's *das Ding an sich* and its appearances—it is evident that it cannot be known. We cannot cognise it as a being external, and separate from the world. To attempt to do so would be to bring it within the limits of thought, and to destroy its essential character. Neither can we, for the same reason, regard God as the absolute force, or the absolute causality. These, though

* *Dial.*, pp. 154-158 ; v. also *Psych.*, pp. 182-216.

they cannot be classified as phenomena, can only be conceived as having a distinct and determined existence. They consequently come within the sphere of the conceptual, or the contrasted, and cannot represent the highest of all beings. Yet, while we cannot know God as an object, or as He is, Schleiermacher maintains that we can know Him as He becomes conscious in us. In feeling, we are the unity of the ideal and the real, of thought and being. But this unity is the consciousness, or being, of God in us. What feeling represents subjectively, as the indifference of all determinate functions, corresponds to the objective being of God, as manifested in the universe. The divine is posited in us by means of feeling, even as external being is posited in us through perception. Still, we must not forget, that this absolute ground of thought and being is given in the immediate self-consciousness, not directly, and as it is, but only as the form and principle of the rational and moral order of the universe. The *Urgrund*, the primal source, the "whence," of all our dependence, we can never really know : we have it ever in us, and we are conscious of its presence as the condition of our intellectual and moral life.

Thus far consciousness presents us with an immediate knowledge of the being of God. But there is also a further knowledge of the same being as it exists in things. "The being of God is given in our knowledge as to things ; for in each indi-

vidual thing, in virtue of the fact of being and co-existence—the whole as embracing its parts—there is not only posited the totality of all being, but the transcendental Ground of the same. And, since things correspond to the system of concepts, there is also posited in our consciousness of things the identity of the ideal and the real, and therewith the transcendental Ground.” Thus, because of the “totality and unity” of all finite things, each act of knowledge as to individual things brings us into contact not only with the world, but with God as its transcendental cause. This knowledge of God in things is, like our knowledge of Him in Ideas and Conscience, relative and formal. It tells us nothing of what He is in Himself, and apart from the world; it simply represents Him as existing in the world, as its underlying ground and perfect unity. He is the explanation of its being, and the principle of its endless movement and combination.

By the “world” is here meant the totality of being in its manifold plurality. It is the sum of contrasted existence—nature not less than spirit. The earth and the star-worlds, with their ethical and physical systems—thought and being, the real and the ideal—these are the elements that go to form the idea of the world. If, however, the world is so wide and comprehensive as this—if it embraces all contrasts and differences—we can, at once, see that it, too, must more or less lie outside the

sphere of real knowledge. "The idea of the world is the limit of our knowledge. We are bound by the earthly. All the operations of thought and the entire system of the formation of our concepts must be grounded therein."* We cannot then form a complete representation of the world's vast whole. Indeed, its true being can no more be conceived by us than the being of God. The totality of determinate existence is, not less than the Absolute, transcendental in its character; and we can never perfectly grasp the boundlessness of its being. The history of our knowledge is only an approximation towards the understanding of the world; hence our views regarding it are as inadequate and figurative as those which we entertain concerning the deity.

The world is thus for our knowledge transcendental; but it is transcendental in a sense otherwise than God is. It is transcendental as the limit of thought, but not as the ground of being. It is the *terminus ad quem*, not the *terminus a quo*. It is the goal towards which our conscious life is ever pressing; it is not the starting-point from which that life has set out. "The idea of the Godhead is the transcendental *terminus a quo*, and is the principle of the possibility of knowledge; the idea of the world is the transcendental *terminus ad quem*, and the principle of the reality of know-

* *Dial.*, p. 333.

ledge in its becoming.”* The one is the transcendental of absolute being, towards which—in all our endeavours—we can never get any nearer ; the other is the transcendental of finite being, towards which we are ever approaching through the extensive and intensive perfection of our knowledge. The one is apprehended *uno actu*, for it possesses no plurality or distinction ; the other, as far as we know it, is perceived by organic thought. The one, while it is the necessary postulate of the forms of knowledge, is for ever inaccessible to thought ; the other, constituting, as it does, the ground of progressive knowledge, constitutes the limits, or bounds, of our thought.

Both these ideas, the world and God, are necessary correlates. The one, for us, cannot exist without the other. The formula expressing their inseparable relation, is “no world without a God, no God without a world.” (*Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt.*) To think of the world without God, would be to think of it as chaos. So also to think of God without the world, would be to regard Him as the principle of non-existence, or as an empty phantasm. The world would, in that case, be purely accidental ; even as in the former case, it would be the result of a blind fate. It is, therefore, evident that the two cannot otherwise be conceived than as co-existing in

* *Dial.*, p. 164.

eternal relation. Without losing their identity, they inter-penetrate each other. If God stood outside of the world, there would be something in Him not world-conditioning ; and if the world stood outside of God, there would be something in it not God-conditioned. " God is the postulate of the world, even as the world is the postulate of God. God is the primary source of all the forces in activity in the universe, even as the universe is the natural and necessary manifestation of the primitive force which is in God. Indifference and difference, the infinite and the finite, God and the world, these are the two constitutive elements of things, the double postulate of universal existence." *

And yet, closely as the world and God are related, they must not be thought of in a pantheistic fashion, or, as if they were identical. Both ideas represent the same being ; but they represent it in a totally different way. The world is unity in plurality, God is unity without plurality ; the world occupies time and space, God is timeless and spaceless ; the world is the totality of contrasts, God is the positive negation of all contrasts. The one is unity—absolute, and without distinction ; the other is unity—with distinctions, and

* *Dial.*, pp. 162-9, 431-3, 526, etc.

Vide Bonifas : La Doctrine de la Rédemption dans Schleiermacher, p. 89, for quotation with which the paragraph ends.

finite. "God is unity, with the exclusion of all contrasts ; the world is unity, with the inclusion of all contrasts." *

It may be objected that this representation of the Absolute, as distinctionless and without contrast, is an empty unity, equivalent to zero, and that the real unity is the world. It is not so, however. God is the full and positive unity which embraces all within itself. As the Absolute, nothing can exist independently of Him. He is the source of life, and the life from which all contrasts are developed—the productive ground whence the finite and its antitheses arise—but, as this takes place in Him timelessly, He Himself never comes within the region of the contrasted. Even the world itself does not stand opposed to Him as an independent being. Its parallel modes of the ideal and the real, find their unity in Him ; just as the organic and the intellectual functions are united in the conscious Ego. How God and the world are thus related, Schleiermacher does not attempt to show. The question as to the manner in which the world has come into existence had no living significance for him, as not coming within the range of practical knowledge. "He sought," to use the words of Sigwart, "no explanation of the world from the Absolute, no cosmogony or theogony, no theory of creation, or of the final

* *Dial.*, p. 433.

return of all things into God." He tried to take account of both God and the world, as they appeared in self-consciousness; and what he found was that the two ideas, though distinct, always co-existed. The one cannot be thought of in isolation from the other; yet they are not identical. God, as transcendent and unknowable, is still immanent in the world; and the world, as finite multiplicity, exists only in God.

Schleiermacher did not seek to define any more closely the relation between God and the world, than as a relation of co-existence. The various efforts that had hitherto been made in that direction—notably, by the theistic theologians, and by Spinoza, Kant and Schelling—he regarded as insufficient, because they failed to reach, or to conserve, in its purity, the idea of God. They simply conceived God as the highest force, or the highest thing. But, in doing so, they limited His being, and brought it within the bounds of the finite and the antithetic. His own view, though not, perhaps, throwing any new light on the matter, is of the greatest philosophic value, as showing that no one need attempt a solution of the problem unless he accepts, in the fullest sense, the separate existence, and the inseparable co-existence, of both God and the world.

As related to knowledge, both these ideas are regulative principles. The idea of God, as the ground of knowing and being, is the necessary

presupposition of all real thought, or the principle of the very possibility of knowledge. "Every act of knowledge, whether as concept or as judgment, is only completed when it is raised to the unity of the universal and the particular, the ideal and the real, being and doing; and this unity can only be thought through the absolute unity."* As Schleiermacher otherwise expresses it, "the idea of God is the form of all knowledge as such."† It is that without which the unity of thought and being would be for ever impossible.

On the other hand, the idea of the world is the principle of the reality of knowledge in its becoming. It is the principle of the combination of thought. All knowledge is a process, an advance. As such, it is grounded not in the Absolute, but in the world. This gives it a distinct content, and an impulse towards an ever onward movement. The theistic and cosmic ideas are thus regulative principles; but they are regulative in a different sense. The one constitutes our real being. It exists, to our consciousness, as the foundation of our thought, as that which gives unity and certainty to its various determinations. The other, as the reality of contrasted being, is the incentive to knowledge. It gives to thought its ever-widening content. It is the principle of its realization and progress.

* *Dial.*, p. 170.

† *Dial.*, p. 169.

God and the world are, therefore, inseparably connected in the production of knowledge. They are correlative ; the one cannot be thought or posited without the other. " For, since God is the ground of the common law, dwelling alike in spirit and in nature, we cannot otherwise conceive Him than in relation to both ; therefore, as the ground of that which, taken together, constitutes the world." * In real cognition, God cannot be predicated without the world, any more than unity can be predicated without plurality. So, too, the idea of the world, isolated and alone, is a mere vague multiplicity, having no connection or order. Each taken separately, leads to no result ; yet the two, in co-existence, are the indispensable factors in the actual process of knowledge. It is only when thus necessarily, though relatively, related—the one more as the principle of construction, the other more as the principle of combination—that knowledge can be said to be perfected.

Schleiermacher's famous distinction between religion and philosophy—first instituted by Spinoza in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, though with a very different purpose—is based upon these views as to feeling and knowing. Religion and knowledge he regarded as belonging to different spheres of the human spirit. Religion is not

* *Dial.*, p. 526.

evolved by a process of speculative reason, neither is it, like science, deduced from any universal principle or principles ; it is an immediate fact of the inner self-consciousness. It is not rooted in knowledge or in action, but in the determination of feeling as directly related to the Absolute. It is its distinctive peculiarity that it is immediately founded in the consciousness and presence of this highest of all unities.

On the other hand, the province of philosophy is the knowable. It occupies itself with the phenomena of thought and being, the connection of the ideal and the real. Its legitimate sphere is the field of empirical consciousness. When it goes outside of this province, and tries to find the Absolute, its results are purely negative. To that original ground of all, it can be only indirectly related. It cannot discover, or produce, the idea of God. All that it can do, is to show the necessity why this idea must be postulated as the form and presupposition of all thinking and willing.*

From the above description, it would seem as if religion were the highest potentiality of the human spirit, and that philosophy must be subordinated to it. In the clearest manner, Schleiermacher admits the truth of the first part of this statement. Re-

* Professor H. Ulrici, whose philosophical and religious views seem to have been influenced by Schleiermacher, has tried to prove, in *Gott und die Natur*, that "God is the absolute presupposition of natural science."

ligion, according to him, is not the lowest form of consciousness—not what Spinoza, and those who regard philosophy and science as alone supreme and valid for reason, would characterize as ignorance, superstition, or myth—it is the highest subjective moment in conscious experience, the factor that most perfectly develops the highest rational and volitional in man, the solution and the goal of all human development. Yet, while it is so, religion claims no primacy over philosophy. Both are co-ordinate, and equally valid functions. Religion, as the highest subjective state of consciousness, is to man as natural, universal, and trustworthy as thinking is; as perceptions, conceptions, and judgments are. Philosophy, on the other hand, as the highest objective moment in conscious experience, has its own sphere and interest. The one derives its content from the world, as formulated by reason, in sense and perception, thought and will; the other is immediately related to the ground of all being, through feeling—not in the sense of pure feeling, but feeling as the indifference of thought and will—feeling as the highest content of both. Here, there can be no question either of primacy or of subordination: it is simply a matter of the interpretation, definition, and classification of the facts of consciousness, as we find them in the evolution of man's nature.

These views of Schleiermacher have been characterized as pure mysticism, veiled Spinozism, and

what not ; yet I cannot help thinking that the distinction he here makes is, both for philosophy and religion, one of the most important and fruitful that has been enunciated in modern times. Philosophy has its own defined sphere—the facts of empirical consciousness—and it can never get beyond them. When it tries to do so, as when it discourses on the being of God and its relations—unless, indeed, to find in this conception both the ground and possibility of all knowledge—it is untrue to its function. But it is equally true that religion, dealing as it does with the facts of immediate self-consciousness, must be true to its own data. These are not ideas or volitions, philosophies or actions, dogmas or creeds : they are the direct feelings which we have of God in the world, in the soul, and in the inner human life. No doubt these feelings must be expressed in a definite, scientific, or philosophical form, but never in the form of any defined philosophical or ethical system. When religion does that, it empties itself of its true content, and ceases to have any real worth for the human spirit.

Very significant, too, in this connection, is the idea of Schleiermacher that religion, dealing, as it does, with what is behind all knowledge—the Absolute, or ground and explanation of the world—is the highest and most essential factor in human development : the goal towards which all consciousness—the empirical, rational, and ethical—ever

tends. In the actual processes of life, religion—subjective, ultra-rational, supernatural—has ever exercised the foremost place in the intellectual, social, and ethical development of the race. More than intellect, more than morality, it has been the chief actor in the civilization and betterment of the nations. Especially is this so, when we think not of the positive religions, but of religion in its ideal aspect—religion in Jesus Christ. By the might of His sinless life, and perfectly divine consciousness, He does for men what the positive religions never did: He raises them above the tyranny of the sensuous, sinful experience, and brings them into the blessed fellowship, and the redeeming love of God. The world in Christ is a new creation, a unique and miraculous fact, for which there is no explanation or validity in the ordinary processes of life and thought. Yet, supra-rational as Christianity must ever be, it has transformed the world; and contains the hope both of the present and the future. The nations that are, to-day, the most intelligent, active, civilizing, and triumphant, are the Christian nations—or, rather, the nations that are truest to the historical idea in Christ: the distinctly Protestant nations. Benjamin Kidd, in his works on *Social Evolution*, and *Principles of Western Civilization*, and, less directly, the late Henry Drummond, in *The Ascent of Man*, have recently given scientific expression, in a most interesting manner, to this great, fundamental

thought of Schleiermacher, that religion is the essential and creative potency in the evolution of the human race—the factor that has, since the dawn of our era, ever lifted man to the highest development on the intellectual, ethical, and spiritual sides of his nature, and that is still destined to raise him to an ever fuller and richer life.

We can thus see that Schleiermacher distinguished between philosophy and religion, science and faith, not because of the influence of Spinoza, as some are never weary of telling us, but because of the inner necessity of his own peculiar view of the world. Schleiermacher in working out, to their logical issues, the principles laid down by Kant, was the first to see that in the sphere of the empirical self-consciousness there can be no rational theology, no scientific development of the idea of God and His attributes. All that we can ever get in that line, are the temporal plurality and the conceptual unities—the knowable—human consciousness as the correlate of being. Will, or the practical reason, can no more predicate God than the intellect can ; for both occupy the same plane, and are explained in the same way, as being the causal relations of organization and reason. It is in another way than by the empirical consciousness that Schleiermacher sought to reach the absolute ground of all our conscious relations—by the way of feeling, or the unity of the rational and the volitional. In feeling, we have a direct and

immediate consciousness of God, and this consciousness is religion. Its source and certitude depend neither upon the principles of universal reason, nor upon the mere verbal authority of Scripture: they are grounded in the living consciousness of the redeemed in Christ, and their validity is independent of all logical or historical proof.

Yet, clearly as Schleiermacher emphasised the fact, that the basis of Christianity lies outside the province of philosophy, he was very far, indeed, from thinking that theology was given in the same immediate and direct way in which feeling is given. Theology, as the expression of the facts of spiritual experience, is purely human in its form, and subject to the laws of human thought and expression. The historical facts of Christianity must be judged by the general laws of evidence; the articulation of the different phases of the inward spiritual life must proceed on philosophic or scientific lines; and all such articulations must conform to the historical ideal in Christ, and the universal type of doctrine as formulated in the Confessions. In this sense, theology and philosophy are indirectly related; for theology, if it is to be a clear expression of facts, must necessarily adopt the most correct philosophic or scientific form. The separation of the philosophic form from the Christian content has, as in the case of the Eastern Church, resulted in stagnation and

decay. Yet the facts themselves, the contents of theology, are not deducible from the speculations of philosophy, or the articles of any creed or symbol. They are the product of the religious self-consciousness; and find there, and there alone, their source and authority.

By thus clearly defining the spheres of philosophy and of faith, and indicating the specific task of each, Schleiermacher has done more for the development of a scientific theology, on the grounds of Protestant principles, than any single thinker, since the time of the Reformation. He was the first to show that religion has a distinct basis lying outside of all rationalism and dogmatism—a basis resting on the facts of the inner human experience. He was also the first to show that theological doctrines are not once for all fixed and stereotyped in written records or rigid formulas, but that they must ever be the outcome of the living, personal, progressive, spiritual consciousness of the Church. On those lines, all that is memorable in theological literature, since his time, has proceeded; and on those lines, too, lies the hope of the future. Theology has, or ought to have, no quarrel with either philosophy or science. Each has its own distinct sphere, and each will fulfil its purpose best when it sets out, free and unfettered on its own pathway—the one giving us the highest objective, the other the highest subjective knowledge and certainty.

ETHICAL DOCTRINE.

THE study of Ethics had a peculiar interest and fascination for Schleiermacher. He was drawn to it, as he was drawn to religion, not on account of its intellectual discipline, or its theoretical problems, but because its phenomena formed part of what was most essential and real in his own inner nature. The type of his being was distinctly ethical. He was a moral genius—one of the most original in modern times—and his labours in the sphere of Ethics were primarily conditioned by the need and the impulse of his being. They were not occasional inter-meddlings with deep speculative questions ; they were the products of his ever-widening life—the outcome of his thought and action. His ethical studies always kept pace with the growth of his spirit. They were not formed and stereotyped once for all : it was his constant aim that they should be as perfect and true as possible. To this cause it is that they owe their organic form, and their stages of advance and development. Indeed, one of the larger hopes of his life, was to discover for Ethics a basis broad and assured as that upon which physical science rested. What he might have done, had he lived

to give as complete a form to his ethical system as he gave to his theological, we know not. As it is, with the exception of the *Monologues* and the *Critique*—written in the early years—his riper ideas on the subject exist in a more or less fragmentary state in works published after his death, and based on notes and memoranda, originally intended for the class-room, and for the hour.

Schleiermacher divided the science of Ethics into two parts, *Philosophical Ethics* and *Christian Ethics*, the one discussing moral action from the general position of humanity or reason, the other looking at it from the more particular aspect of the religious or Christian consciousness. The *Philosophical Ethics* is carefully edited by the theologian, Alexander Schweizer. There is a more recent edition of the same work by Twesten, another disciple, which, if it does not give the text so fully as in the older edition, arranges it better, and has the advantage of being prefaced by an excellent general introduction to Schleiermacher's ethical system. The *Christian Ethics*, edited by Ludwig Jonas, is contained in one large volume of nearly nine hundred pages, and may be taken as representing, in a pretty complete manner, Schleiermacher's views on this special branch of the subject. This work possesses great value, on account of the originality of its conceptions, and the admirable architectonic skill with which it is put together. It is a wonderful monument to the

Christian piety and philosophic insight of the writer ; and, had nothing else appeared under his name, this alone would have placed him in the first rank of modern ethical teachers. By it, he gave an abiding impulse to the study of the moral side of Christianity. It was by means of it also that Schleiermacher became the recognised founder of modern theological Ethics. Many have, since his time, devoted themselves to the construction of a Christian Ethic—and that with the most fruitful results—yet no one, unless his pupil, Richard Rothe, has produced anything that is at once so scientific, so profound, and so far-reaching, as this first attempt.

I.—PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS.

FOR Schleiermacher, Ethics did not consist in a series of rules or maxims, for the guidance of the moral life, which derive their authority from some conditional principle, either of law, or experience, or custom ; he regarded it as a process having its basis in the final ground of knowing and being. As real and certain as science or religion, so real and certain is Ethics. Its existence must be referred to the one primal source of life and activity, and it must be conceived as forming a part of the great organism of human thought and reality in their movement and becoming. Until the science

of Ethics is studied from this point of view, it can neither be understood as a whole, nor can the living harmony of its parts be apprehended. A bare description of the phenomena of moral action is not Ethics, any more than a bare description of the facts of nature constitutes physical science : what is needed, in each case, is a principle from which all the facts can be evolved and around which they can be grouped as around a common centre.

In thus demanding for the ethical process a fundamental principle deeper than mere law or custom, Schleiermacher is at one with Kant and Schelling, Fichte and Hegel. Nevertheless, he differs from these philosophers as to the character he ascribes to this principle. Kant, and particularly Fichte, made the basis of morality purely subjective and individual, so that each carries within himself the infinite vocation and the infinite tendency towards duty. Schelling and Hegel, on the contrary, represented morality on its distinctly objective side as abandonment to the universe beyond whose laws freedom cannot pass. Schleiermacher chose the middle course between these opposite views. According to him, the principle of morality is to be found in the combination of the individual and the universal, the subjective and the objective. Without the individual there can be no nature which can become object of reason, without the universal there can be no reason which

can perfect itself in empirical knowledge. But the ethical process, as the action of the rational upon the natural, demands the existence of both these factors. It is the organic union of reason and nature in the individual and the race ; or such influence of reason upon nature that it tends to become its perfect organ and symbol. This movement of mind which seeks to dominate and rationalize the entire sphere of nature—which strives to press into its service the cosmic material—is described by Schleiermacher as a permeation of nature by reason. It is the continuous realization by the human spirit of its purpose and function in the world. When the outer becomes thoroughly permeated by the inner, when there is an absolute interpenetration of the world of things and of humanity by the conscious spirit, the highest form of being is reached, and Ethics has fulfilled its purpose. “The ethical process only terminates with the positing of a nature which has become altogether reason, and of a reason in which all has become nature.” Such an absolute unification of the two is, however, never perfectly attained, since the contrast between the physical and the spiritual is always present, sometimes more predominantly spiritual, at other times more predominantly physical. The sphere of Ethics is thus always the joint spheres of reason and of nature. The higher moral action is, the more is it a perfect combination of the two spheres ; and the lower any action

is, the more does it represent nature in its rawness and isolation. "All ethical knowledge is but the expression of a constantly originating but never completed rationalization of nature." (*Naturwerdens der Vernunft*). *

This union of reason and nature in Ethics is based on the original union of these factors in the world and in man. Nature and reason exist for each other, as by a kind of pre-ordained harmony. In every form of existence—in plant life and in animal life—they are present in active combination. Material being does not exist by itself and alone: there enters into it spiritual being; and spiritual being does not exist in the world as simple being: it is always spiritual being as influenced by the material. That is, the reason that in Ethics acts upon the world is not pure reason; it is reason in combination with nature; and the world that is acted upon already possesses, though in a limited degree, the properties of reason. Nature and reason are, in fact, but different aspects of one and the same being. In degree, or quantitatively, they differ; in kind, or qualitatively, they are identical. The true essence of mind and of matter is reason. Natural being is a limited ideal being, and ideal being, when it reaches its lowest, or vanishing point,

* *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, p. 47; v. also pp. 25-37, and Twisten's Introduction to his edition of Schleiermacher's *Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik*, pp. xiv.-xl.

passes over into real being. Hence it is, as Schleiermacher constantly reiterates, that moral and natural law, though differing as to the manner of their manifestation, are at base the same. They are the realization of the highest intellectual principle, or the expression of the being of reason in nature.

Yet, ever active as is the tendency to the union of reason and nature in every form of existence—a tendency which finds its metaphysical explanation in the primitive unity of the ideal and the real—it is in man alone that the activity of the universal reason becomes ethical. He is the apex, or culmination, of the ideal, its last and highest stage in the evolution from the elementary vitality of the earth to vegetation, from vegetation to animalization, and from animalization to humanization. What was unconsciously active in all the lower forms of development—in the mechanical and chemical, the vegetable and animal processes—becomes in him consciously active. Man, and man alone, recognises the contrast between reason and nature. The ideal, the rational, has arrived in his spirit at such a degree of perfection that he knows that he is more than an unconscious link in the universal life-chain. He is a conscious actor—one who can, by the inner determination of his being, influence nature, and make it the organ or implement of his activity. The moral process is consequently confined exclusively to man, or

rather to humanity, since it is in humanity that the action of reason comes to its complete manifestation.

By thus limiting Ethics to the being of reason in nature, Schleiermacher raises the science of moral action above the sphere of the conditional and the unreal, the hypothetical and the possible. For him, the perfect ideal, the highest good of humanity is not simply a duty, a shall, a categorical imperative: it is the natural and free realization of moral being—a form of being which is as real as that of nature itself. There is a conscious evolution, a development, of the moral reason in individuals, which is as fixed and as certain as that which takes place unconsciously in the physical world. In the one, as in the other, there is an “ought,” a necessity, but it is internal, not external; a necessity grounded in the ultimate basis of all: the absolute unity of reason and nature. Hence, according to this view, freedom has only a relative existence. We are free in as far as we can act from our own inner being; we are not free in as far as we can be determined by the objective whole, of which we are an integral part. Evil is, therefore, regarded as a negative factor in the union of reason and nature. It is not a true ethical conception, and can find no real place in the speculative construction of Ethics. The thought of the good, as the universal ethical form, can exist without the contrast which it creates. Otherwise sin would

constitute a Manichæan dualism. The sphere of evil is the empirical, human life; and sin exists there, not by absolute necessity, but through the act of the human will as influenced by the sensuous environment.*

It is in this way that Schleiermacher hoped to place the science of Ethics on an intelligent foundation, and to give to it the same certainty as is possessed by physical science. Indeed, in the light of his system, only two fundamental sciences are possible: the ethical, or the science of reason (Ethics and history) and the physical, or the science of nature (natural science and theory of nature). These, corresponding respectively to the great world contrasts of the intellectual and the material, embrace the totality of existence. Under the one form or the other, every particular branch of science can be classified. And as the ground of reality upon which they all ultimately rest is identical, they are, as objects of knowledge, equally true and valid. The method, too, in which the ethical and the physical are to be studied, is the same, the only difference being that caused by the content of each. The one expresses the action of the ideal upon the real, the other describes the action of the real upon the ideal. Taken in conjunction, they build up the highest unity of knowledge, the true philosophy, or world-wisdom. †

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 52-67.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 32-36, 85-86.

The action of reason in nature manifests itself in three forms, each of which, in its own fashion, represents the whole ethical life. There is, first, the form that expresses the various ways in which nature and reason are combined, or the progressive unity of the two in every stage of existence, from the lowest to the highest ; then there is that which expresses the different ways in which reason as an active force dwells in human nature ; and, lastly, there is the form whose function is to describe the method in which this rational force acts in the individual and in the whole. These aspects of the being of reason in man and in nature are severally designated the doctrine of goods, the doctrine of virtues, and the doctrine of duties ; and they constitute for Schleiermacher the natural and necessary parts into which the science of speculative ethics must be divided. The three describe different sides of the same object, but always in such a manner that each of the three presupposes the other two. And yet, in each there is something which the others fail to accentuate. For this reason, ethics can only be adequately represented when the various forms of its manifestation are considered in their relation to each other. The weak point in the ethical systems of Schleiermacher's time—particularly those of Kant and Fichte—consisted in the fact that they attempted to solve the moral problem by confining themselves entirely to the conceptions of duty and of virtue.

One of the notable services of Schleiermacher was to show that these conceptions are incomplete, and incapable of being established, apart from the idea of the highest good.

Schleiermacher further tries to justify this three-fold development on the ground that an analogous development takes place in physical science. There we find the mechanical, the chemical, and the organic—forms of nature which, instead of being mutually antagonistic, are in reality separate representations of the one idea of nature. The mechanical—or physics as the expression of the living, reproductive forms in a state of rest—corresponds to the doctrine of the highest good ; the dynamic—or physics as the system of living forces—corresponds to the doctrine of virtue ; and the organic—or physics as the system of variously inter-related movement—corresponds to the doctrine of duty. Such a similarity in the mode of the development of the physical and the ethical is, as Schleiermacher thought, no accident or coincidence ; it has its root in the peculiar nature of speculative knowledge.*

1. *Doctrine of the Highest Good.*

The doctrine of the Highest Good and its elements (*Güterlehre*) has a pre-eminent place assigned to it in Schleiermacher's ethical system.

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 78-80.

The conception of the highest good—under which all forms of the moral good are subsumed—represents in his view the ideal and problem of the entire moral process. It occupies in his ethics a place akin to that ascribed to the idea of knowledge in the *Dialectic*. This part of his subject is, therefore, described with a care and fulness which are wholly wanting when he comes to discuss the doctrines of virtue and duty.

As every moral good is determined by the action of reason in nature, it must bear the manifold impress of this originally active principle. It must be organ and symbol, universal and individual. These are the distinctive forms of the activity of the moral reason, and in all ethical products each of the four is present, though not always in the same manner or with the same force. Indifferent or sinful actions are consequently excluded from the sphere of Ethics because they are the outcome only of the partial union of reason and nature.

Human reason, as the organizing activity, the all-dominating principle, moulds and transfigures physical being. Its action is formative and expansive. It extends and develops the potential or original union of reason in nature. It gives shape to the raw stuff, the rude materials of the world, and it groups and classifies the stages of its development. Under its influence nature becomes an instrument, or organ, (*ὄργανον*, *Werkzeug*).

Reason is the spontaneous, directive power, and it acts upon nature so as to fashion it and make it subservient to its purpose. This is what is called the "organizing" activity of reason. But along with the organizing activity, there always co-exists the "symbolizing" activity. It is the function of this activity to manifest reason in nature. Its character is descriptive, not formative, as in the other activity. Its most general form is consciousness, and every symbol is an image or representation of consciousness. The symbolizing activity represents reason, and its interpenetration of nature, as knowable. In other words, nature, which is the organ of reason, likewise becomes its symbol.

Now, each of these activities of reason, the formative not less than the representative, are inseparably connected in the reality of human life. They condition and limit each other. They are related as willing and knowing are related; the "organizing" activity corresponding to will, and the "symbolizing" to thought. There can, therefore, be no organizing without symbolizing, no permeation of nature by reason without also the exhibition of reason as the sovereign power in the universe. It is only as we conquer and systematize the material world that it becomes intelligible. We cannot, in short, know and feel nature until reason has first entered into it as an organizing, shaping, and classifying principle. Every interpenetration or unity of reason and nature is thus

both organ and symbol. Sometimes it is more distinctly organ, and then reason appears as will; at other times it is more distinctly symbol, and, in that case, reason assumes the form of understanding. When the organizing side prevails, we have the activity of reason represented as in agriculture, architecture, and mechanics; when it is the symbolizing side that is supreme, we have the same activity as is manifested in science, art, and the kindred disciplines.*

If, however, the contrasted activities of reason in nature condition and limit each other, it is easy to see why the idea of the good must consist in the union of both. A moral good is the organizing and symbolizing of nature—the ever persistent end which the universal reason sets before it. Beginning with the first, or nature as the transition point for the operation of reason, it passes on to the second, or nature as resting in and with the reason; and the process only reaches its highest, or perfect form, when reason becomes nature and nature becomes reason. Every moral product is thus at once organ and symbol. An activity which is a symbol, but not an organ, does not come within the sphere of the moral process, and possesses no ethical value.†

The doctrine of the good further rests on the contrast between the universal and the individual

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 88-93.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

activity of the reason. Moral life and conduct must bear this two-fold character. As related to reason—the one, identical principle of all action—every ethical product must be the same and universal. And yet, as related to the individual, every ethical product is separate and distinct. This differentiation of moral action is grounded in the original individuality, the primitive and subjective peculiarity of human beings, by which each moral individual becomes a world to himself, possessing his own significance and vocation and combining in his own personality all the distinctive forces of humanity. Universality and individuality, humanity and personality, are consequently inseparable moments in the construction of the morally good. If the being of reason can only be perfectly represented in the totality of human nature, or the social organism, it is only by means of the individual that it can find its realization there at all. In fact, the two forms—reason as universal in human nature and as differentiated in individuals—cannot be separated. Since, without the characteristic of universality, there could be no rational being; and, without the characteristic of particularity, there could be no natural being. In the moral process identity and individuality are thus always found in combination. “Universal reason, with the absence of personality, is incomplete, and the same thing can be said of individual reason which lacks the impress of universality.”

The true ethical can only exist in the idea of a community which is composed of separate human beings, or in the idea of a separate human being in his relation to the whole.*

Organization and symbolization, identity and difference, are thus the essential elements of all moral life. But they are more than this. They constitute, in the method of their combination, the distinct spheres of ethical action. The peculiar types of the vast complex of subordinate goods owe their origin to the predominance of the universal or individual elements, and can be classified accordingly. Universal organizing activity creates the sphere of commerce, while the individual organizing activity produces the sphere of property. On the other hand, universal symbolizing activity gives rise to the different forms of thought and language, or science; and the individual symbolizing activity constitutes the province of feeling with its manifold representations, such as religion and æsthetics.†

Corresponding to these spheres of ethical action, and arising from the intercourse of individuals in each, are the four ethical relations of right, sociability, faith, and revelation. The relation of right is the moral co-existence of individuals in common action. It implies possession and com-

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 93-96, 116-120.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99, 122-142.

munity, wealth and trust. Sociability is produced by the moral relation of individuals as exclusive proprietors. Domestic right and hospitality are the essential conditions of this relation. Faith—not religious faith, but certainty as to the universal trust-worthiness of thought and speech—indicates the relation of men to each other in the community of knowledge, or the mutual dependence of teacher and taught on the common use of language. Revelation—self-revelation—is the moral relation of individuals to one another in the separateness of their feelings, or that condition by which what is exclusively the feeling of one can be imparted to another. These four relations are characteristic of the whole human race, and determine every form of moral action. But, though they are universal in their extent, they are not necessarily the same in the case of each and all.*

Now, as every kind of ethical activity is defined by the above relations of right and sociability, faith and revelation, the highest good must be sought for, not in the individual *per se*, but in the individual as related to the great moral organisms which are produced within these spheres of relations. These organisms—called by Schleiermacher “the perfect ethical forms”—are the State, Society, the School, and the Church. The necessary link between the individual and each of these

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 142-156.

domains of moral being is the family. This is the basis of all higher ethical developments, the first and most elementary representation of the highest good. Here the one-sidedness of individuals, indicated by sexual distinction and psychical difference, is removed, and the naturally imperfect personality of each is rendered complete by the physical and spiritual union of monogamistic marriage. It is here, too, that the foundations of authority, of fellowship, of knowledge and of piety, or parental obedience, are first laid. Indeed, the idea of the family enters as a dominating and primal condition, into the entire moral process. It holds within itself the promise and the potency of the State and the Church, of science and social fellowship; and without it these higher forms of personal and moral being could have not come into existence.

The State, the first of the perfect forms of ethical being, is the creation of the universal organizing activity of reason. It is a vast, living unity composed of groups of families allied together for the general good and the general action of the whole. Its natural ground is the horde, or the common individuality of tribal masses. Only, the State is related to the horde as the conscious to the unconscious. It is a higher development of the individual fellowships, and community, than obtains in the lower and more primitive stage. The life it represents is not the

life of tribe or clan, but the life of a people or a nation—life possessing advanced organization and fixity of abode. It is, in short, the identity of the people and the soil, since a nomadic people can scarcely be called a State.

As a peculiar form of the community of individuals, the State is regarded by Schleiermacher as an ethical person, bound by the relations, not only of kinship and common need, but also by the conditions of authorities and subjects, rulers and ruled. Schleiermacher discarded the old idea, so prevalent in the theories of the eighteenth century, that the State is a creation of mutual contract or agreement entered into for purposes of self-protection and advancement. A contract is the result rather than the cause of State organization; and, even if it were not, it would fail to explain the inner life and harmony of the great body politic. These can only be understood when the State is conceived as an organic whole—a living unity, a real personality—which is the product of the moral nature of men in their efforts to develop the instincts and capacities of their being. The ethical aim of the State is not therefore simply the protection and benefit of the individual; it is the perfecting of the whole by means of the individual, and the individual by means of the whole.

Society, the next form of ethical being, is the union of men for individual organizing activity.

The aim of social fellowship is the mutual culture of individuals. It proceeds upon the recognition of personal rank and grades of culture and enlightenment ; and its sphere is boundless as the intercourse of humanity. It is in no way limited by the State ; for persons of similar tastes and education, no matter to what nation they belong, are drawn more closely to one another than they are to persons of their own nationality who occupy a lower plane of thought and life. Friendship, hospitality, courtesy, are some of the manifestations of this organism or community. Although free sociability cannot compete in ethical dignity with the State, or the other perfect forms of being, it is of the utmost importance in the development of man's social and emotional nature. It does for his craving after human friendship what the State does for his political instincts, what science does for his aspirations after knowledge, and what religion does for the perfecting of his religious feeling.

Another of the ethical forms is the School, taken in its widest sense ; or the national community of knowledge. This organization is produced by the universal symbolizing activity. It, not less than the State, is founded on the idea of the national unity, with its distinct individuality of thought and speech. Yet it is not dependent upon the State ; it is rather a co-ordinate existence representing a different side of the national unity.

The community of knowledge is conditioned through the awaking of the distinction between the learned and the public. This distinction corresponds to that which obtains in the State between the governing classes and those who are governed, and is the first requisite towards a progressive civilization. Until it is accentuated, families and tribes are ruled by traditional codes, from which there is scarcely ever any divergence ; and they live alongside each other, in homogeneous masses, without division of labour or grades of life. The activity of the public is more of a materially productive kind ; that of the learned more of a formally productive kind. The one occupies itself with knowledge as arising from the organic function and from feeling ; the other produces knowledge in relation to the idea of knowing (*die Idee des Wissens*). The learned exercise a permanent, though elementary, influence on the public by means of the School-system. A higher influence still, and one which qualifies individuals for the functions of the learned, is obtained through the institution of the University. The most perfect organic whole of knowledge is the Academy, or the unity composed of the teachers and masters in every branch of science. This organization occupies the place in the sphere of knowing that the State occupies in the sphere of doing ; it is the highest development or "unity of all that comes under the universal symbolizing activity of reason,

even as the State is the highest development or unity of all that is included in the universally organizing activity.

The Church, the last of the perfect ethical forms, is a religious community existing in virtue of the symbolic activity of the individual. It is defined as "the organic combination of a mass of men—of the same inner type, and with the distinction of clergy and laity—for the subjective activity of the cognitive function." All views that regard it as an institution for the repression of the passions, or as an absolute ethical community to which all the other forms are subordinate must therefore be taken as incomplete—being either too narrow or too wide. It is essential to the idea of the Church that it be an organic unity brought about by the development of a peculiar type of the religious consciousness in its relation to the universal moral reason.

Like the State, the Church rests on the family, and the primitive, or patriarchal condition of men, as living in hordes. It also—and in this it agrees with the School as well as with the State—advances beyond this original and organic condition by means of the contrast of higher and lower. The distinction of priests and people corresponds to the distinction between rulers and ruled, or learned and unlearned; and it is only with the awaking of this distinction that the religious consciousness

begins to rise above the patriarchal or unconscious state.

In the homogeneous mass of humanity the religious feeling, or typical potency, is the same ; yet in the process of development it presents considerable variations. The form of its manifestation is always art—religion being related to art as knowledge is to language. But the system of art and cult which each Church creates and fosters, differs according to the relations of knowledge and temperament existing in the religious unity constituting the particular Church. In the ethical religious feeling, it assumes an eminently free and spiritual aspect, while in the natural religions it becomes more enslaved and physical in its tendency. Further, the striking modifications which temperament exerts on religious feeling are well known. The religion of India is, for example, phlegmatic ; that of Greece sanguine ; that of Judea choleric ; and the Christian religion is the religion of sorrow. These definite forms, or schematisms, of feeling, give rise to the different kinds of religion—such as Fetischism, Polytheism, and Monotheism—and to the several stages of art, or outer representations of feeling, that are associated with them.*

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 257-327 ; *Reden*, pp. 123-130.

2. *Doctrine of Virtues.*

The object of the Doctrine of Virtues (*Tugendlehre*), the second main division of Schleiermacher's philosophical ethics, is defined as being "not the totality of reason as acting upon the totality of nature, but reason in its relation to individual men." It describes how the moral principle dwells in each as the force which produces those separate personal actions, the sum of which, as represented in the corporate action of humanity, constitutes the entire ethical process. To know how this takes place is as necessary as to know how reason interpenetrates all existence ; for it is only as individuals become virtuous that they are helping to realize the highest good, and it is only as the highest good is obtained through the combined energy of all that the virtue of each is secured and perfected. "Every sphere of the highest good demands all the virtues, and every virtue passes through all the spheres of the highest good." The being of virtue, like the being of reason, is one and indivisible, so that he who possesses a single virtue possesses all the virtues. Still, although this is the essential character of virtue, the mode of its manifestation in the individual varies, even as reason varies in its union with nature. It is on this fact of individual variation that Schleiermacher bases his classification of

the virtues. He arranges them under the two divisions of Disposition (*Gesinnung*) and Skill (*Fertigkeit*). The first expresses the ideal form, the inner, undivided nature of virtue as existing in reason ; the second regards virtue in its temporal form, or in its active relation to the world of humanity. Both aspects of moral action—the ideal and the real—are always found in conjunction. “We are not to think of disposition and skill as if they were separate, as if the one could exist without the other ; on the contrary, we are to consider virtue as appearing under both forms, at one time more as disposition, and at another more as skill. The first, or ideal element in action, is fundamental, since, apart from it, the real element would have no significance. Virtue as skill is represented in its effect or organization.”

The contrast between the ideal and the temporal is further crossed by the contrast of knowing and representing (*Erkennen, Darstellen*)—the original and necessary phases of all intellectual activity—or that directed from without inwards, and that proceeding from within outwards. These contrasts, in intersecting each other, give rise, in their turn, to the four cardinal virtues of wisdom and love, discretion and perseverance. Disposition as knowledge is wisdom ; existing as representation it is love. Knowledge, in its relation to circumstances, forms discretion ; while representation, under the same condition, is perseverance. This division,

when rightly apprehended, coincides with the ancient Greek division of the virtues into *φρόνησις*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*. *Wisdom* is that quality through which all human action, whether of feeling or of knowledge, receives an ideal form. *Love* is a relation of reason to nature—the entrance of reason into the organic process, or reason in its effort to become soul—reason being taken as active and loving, nature as passive and loved. Life is love ; creation is love. Love to nature is only moral, as it is love to God ; and love to God is only true in as far as it is love to nature. Self-love is not moral, except in proportion as it embraces every other form of love ; and all other forms are only true in proportion as they include self-love. Love in its effect can never be anything else than what is posited under the concept of wisdom ; only there is this difference between the two : love is reason in action upon nature, wisdom is reason as active in nature. *Discretion* is the production, in the empirical subject, of all the acts of knowing which go to form in him the component parts of the moral process ; or, in other words, it is the production of moral concepts. As general discretion, it corresponds to “understanding,” and manifests itself as good sense and shrewdness. In its individual character it is what we call “soul,” or the power of so arranging moral ends that one’s personal individuality may find expression therein. *Perseverance* represents the

entire sphere of what is contained in the idea of end or purpose. It is expressive of our battle with the world, and is related to love as discretion is to wisdom.*

3. *The Doctrine of Duties.*

The Doctrine of Duties (*Pflichtenlehre*), the last great division of scientific Ethics, describes the ethical process in movement. It takes to do with the moral action of the individual, and delineates the methods adopted by him in the attainment of the highest good. In seeking to do this, it shows that every action which conforms to duty must have (1) a general reference to the moral idea in its totality, and likewise to the distinctly exclusive will, or definite moral sphere ; (2) it must have a connection with present and antecedent conditions, and yet be an absolutely original production : that is, it must be personally free and objectively necessary ; (3) it must be a decision, in the midst of conflicting duties ; yet so that it does not imply that there is any real conflict between duties ; in other words, that each individual momentarily serves, by means of his own peculiar action, the interest of all. Isolated and egoistic action lacks the ethical physiognomy ; for the individual, as a member of society, must make, as his own, the entire moral problem. Particular

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 328-418.

action has, therefore, an ethical value in its relation to the action of the whole. On the other hand, the action of the whole ceases to be moral when unrelated to that of the individual. There thus runs through the totality of all action the antithesis between community and appropriation (*Gemeinschaft, Aneignen*). The one imparts to life its organic completeness, the other secures the personal independence of each individual that goes to build up the moral whole.

Duties are classified according to this principle of the relation between universal and individual community of production and action. Universal community of productive action gives duties of law (*Rechtspflicht*); universal appropriating action produces duties of vocation (*Berufspflicht*); individual community of productive action is the sphere of love (*Liebespflicht*); and individual appropriation creates the class of duties known as those of conscience (*Gewissenspflicht*). These four moral spheres condition each other, so that no action in any one of them can fulfil the condition of duty unless there enter into it the other three.

The duty of law expresses every action of the universal reason on nature, both in its personal and external aspects. It is further defined by the following formulæ: (1) Enter into community, or association, with the whole, but so that your entrance into it may, at the same time, be an appropriation; (2) enter into community with the

reservation of your entire individuality ; (3) enter into community in such a manner that you may already find yourself therein, and so find yourself in it that you may enter into it ; (4) in all performance of duty so act that the inward impulse and the outward occasion may coincide.

The other classes of duty are likewise more explicitly described, and have their appropriate formulæ ascribed to them. In duties of vocation, the objective action of the identical reason upon nature is represented as a fashioning of nature in the personality and for the personality ; that is, as not only cultivating the capacity for knowledge, but as giving shape to outer nature. The formulæ in this sphere have a universal reference. The duties of love confine themselves to the activity of personal association. Its principal formula is that each should find his place in the existing moral society, and should be willing to enter into all the relationships of the same ; especially those indicated by marriage and friendship. What is distinctive in the duties of conscience is that they have to do with individual productive action ; and, concerning this, each one, seeing he is the morally productive agent, must be his own judge. But, as the individual conscience is only a special form of the conscience of the race, this action, although individual and personal, has a universal tendency as securing the advantage of the whole.*

* *Entwurf der Sittenlehre*, pp. 419-479.

II.—CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS is treated by Schleiermacher as a branch of Christian doctrine. Not less than dogmatics it presupposes the existence of faith and piety, and owes its peculiar character to the fact that it is a distinct phase of the religious consciousness. Dogmatics represents the Christian consciousness as relatively fixed and at rest ; Ethics represents it as in movement, as an impetus. The one regards pious feeling as it crystallizes itself into a belief, an idea ; the other pictures it as finding expression in action. The object of both is the same, but they view it from different sides. Christian self-consciousness being given as the inner condition of the soul, dogmatics has to answer the question what it is that ought to be. Ethics, in like circumstances, has to indicate what it is that ought to become. These two—that which deals with propositions of faith and that which deals with forms of conduct—make up together the totality of Christian doctrine. What cannot be directly classified under either must be referred to some other sphere, such as history or art.

Now, if Christian Ethics is to be taken as a separate and supplementary part of Christian doctrine, it is evident that its most characteristic element must be piety, or that inner condition of the spirit which results from communion with God.

But communion with God—fellowship of the human with the divine—is only possible through the redemptive act of Christ. Christian Ethics must then not only take note of this communion, but must be grounded in it—must find here its being and starting-point. Accordingly, Schleiermacher defines the science of Christian Ethics as “the exposition of communion with God—as determined through communion with Christ the Redeemer—in so far as this communion is the motive of all the actions of the Christian. It is the description of that method of acting which proceeds from the supremacy of the Christianly determined self-consciousness;” such a description having the force of law for all who are within the Christian Church, and for whom there is no other law than what can be developed from absolute communion with God.*

The idea of Christian Ethics is thus ultimately evolved from the idea of the Church—the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher’s religious system. As it is within this sphere that Christian doctrine can have any real value, so also it is here that Christian Ethics comes into existence and possesses validity. The Church is the place where alone the devout consciousness appears as a unifying, dominating impulse. Outside of it the question how to live and act in relation to the Redeemer has clearly no

* *Die christliche Sitte*, pp. 31-35.

meaning ; for it is in the Church that the conditions of the Christian life are at all possible. " Even as in dogmatics "—to quote the words of Reuter—" all dogmas are described in their relation to the person of Christ, or rather to the subjective condition of faith as the indwelling of Christ in the soul, so in morals, all ethical propositions appear as effects of this faith, as effects of the impulse imparted by the historical development of the Church, and originally conditioned by the person of Christ. The Church, as the realization of the absolutely perfect religion, therefore actualizes, or fully expresses, the divine life. Believers are related to it as organs or instruments. They indeed work, but all their actions are, as to their result, representations of the one Spirit dwelling in the Church. Their actions no doubt spring from the movements and determinations of the religious self-consciousness ; nevertheless, the creative substance from which the distinct forms of individual morality are fashioned is the divine Spirit of the Church." * In the Church, however, there is an individual as well as a universal element. It is through the individual that the life of the whole can receive an impetus, and rise to higher things. On the other side, the action of the individual is determined by the whole, of which he is a part. But though there is thus a mutual influence of the

* *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1844, pp. 608-609.

personal upon the common life, and of the common life on the personal, there is no disharmony between the two. The divine Spirit which makes the Church one organic whole, and without which no one can become a member of this whole, is the same in all. Yet it reveals itself differently in each, according to the individualized reason which it already finds in each. It is to this manifestation of the one divine Spirit in the individualized reason, and its diverse influence on the understanding and the will, that the Church owes its infinite variety and its continuous growth and renewal through all the ages.*

From this description it will at once appear how Christian Ethics is related to Philosophical Ethics, and how the one differs from the other. The sphere and obligation of each, though separate and distinct, are still related. The one is the product of Christian faith, the other of the common reason. What the former promulgates is not necessarily binding on the latter, for if nothing is actually binding on the Christian but what is also binding on the rational man, Christianity would in reality be superfluous. "Yet much as it is essential to both that they be considered as constituting distinct spheres, it is impossible that what the one regards as moral the other can regard as immoral. In spite of the fact that the one cannot produce the

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 55-73.

content of the other—seeing that each springs from its own principle—it follows that the two so far agree that there is posited in the one the reality and substance of all that is most distinctive of the other.” The fundamental view, the content, of the one is not absolutely different from that of the other. There are steps and grades of the moral ; but morality is really one. Christianity brings nothing entirely new or alien into the domain of Ethics. It rather supplements the general principle of all morality. The ethics of Christianity is indeed the highest development of the moral reason of humanity, and its spirit—the divine Spirit—is human reason conceived as universal activity. Were there no such affinity between Christian and Philosophical Ethics, did the range of the one lie entirely outside the range of the other, ethics would assume an absolutely dualistic character, and we could at no time be sure whether clearly defined Christian action might not be antagonistic to the universal laws of morality. It is in form not in content that the two are different. Philosophical Ethics originates in the principle of the moral reason of humanity, and regards the individual in relation to the race ; Christian Ethics starts with the Christian consciousness, and regards the individual in his relation to the Church. The sphere of the one is as wide as humanity, and its tendency corresponds to the philosophy of history. The sphere of the other is, on the contrary, narrower

in its area, and if its aim is towards universality its propositions have binding obligation only upon such as have entered into the fellowship of the Church.*

Christian Ethics is thus akin to, but distinct from, dogma and speculation. It is the description of the devout consciousness as accounting for human action, the analysis of life as it moves within the boundaries of the new communion founded by Jesus Christ. It consequently presupposes the capacity of man for divine fellowship, and his inability to develop this capacity, apart from the mediation of the Redeemer. In Christian Ethics, Christ and the Church occupy the centre. It is here that communion with God is possible, and that men can enter into the state of salvation. Around this centre, on the outside, lies the vast world of the weary, the sinful, and the heavy-laden. This is the other, and the necessary part of the picture—the dark background, where the moral life is fettered, and the development of the religious consciousness hindered. As salvation is the positive side of the Christian consciousness—the side where man finds his being in God—so the negative side of this same consciousness is sin—the state where man's life exists in isolation from the divine fellowship. It is on this contrast between sin and salvation that the Christian life rests,

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 24-31, 75-77.

and by means of which it can be understood. "If we hold that communion with God is conditioned through Christ, we must also hold that without union to Christ it does not exist. Separate from redemption, man is in a state of separation from God, and unable to remove the ground of separation. This state can only be thought of as a state of antagonism to the Christian position—therefore of antagonism to God, seeing He is the determining power within the Christian domain. That is, we must regard it as sin. The entire representation of what is most peculiar to the religious consciousness in Christianity, is produced through the constitutive existence of sin as the unavoidable, universal human condition outside the community in Christ. But the state of salvation or blessedness, is the state of communion with God, effectuated by Christ, and must be viewed as entirely different from the condition of man without the pale of the divine communion." *

In its historical manifestation, Christian salvation is not, however, to be conceived as if it were absolutely perfect. For if it were, man's being would be in a state of complete rest, lacking nothing, and impelled to no activity. There would, in that case, be no growth, no struggle, no ethic, no life as we know it. But, as it is, Christian blessedness is not absolutely perfect ; it is blessedness in

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 35-36.

the process of attaining perfection. Only as it is considered in this light, can the consciousness of blessedness become a motive to action. Even in the case of Christ Himself—whose communion and blessedness are original and absolute—there could be no impulsion to an outward life, apart from His connection with the race, and His compassion upon its woes. “By taking upon Him the being of all, His self-consciousness became a feeling for all, and He may be said to have borne by sympathy our imperfection in blessedness; so that our formula also holds good in His case, and a defect in blessedness must be predicated of Him in order that it may become an impulse. This defect consisted in His extended self-consciousness, in His fellow-feeling with our misery; and it became in Him the motive to His whole redemptive activity.”*

The blessedness of the Christian life—never completely existent, but always in the process of becoming—manifests itself in us by means of the alternation of pleasure and pain, and the indifference of both. These states, corresponding to the opposites of movement and repose, determine the consciousness whence every moral impulse and

* *Christ. Sitte*, p. 39. The theories of the *Atonement* advocated by Maurice and MacLeod Campbell are but the amplification of this germinal thought; although it is, perhaps, doubtful whether the Scottish divine had any acquaintance with the writings of Schleiermacher.

action must emanate. In the conception of an absolutely perfect existence, pleasure and pain can find no place, but in the process of the earthly Christian life they are clearly inevitable. Communion with God, the constant aim of the religious aspiration and endeavour, is never fully attained in the temporal sphere ; it is at most an ideal imperfectly realized. The higher life-potencies engage with the lower, but they are sorely handicapped by the fact that the lower have originally had indisputed possession of all the springs and impulses of our being. Not at once, then, can the old order be destroyed and the new introduced. "In the consciousness of the Christian, there is always a sense of antagonism, always a residue of the independence of the lower life-potency, a longing of the flesh against the spirit, and the consequent limitation which is felt as displeasure or pain (*unlust*). But with the rise of the feeling of dissatisfaction, there also arises the effort to overcome the independent activity of the inferior power. This effort, proceeding from the very heart of the higher life, since it is the feeling of the limitation of this life that displeases, refuses to be repressed or to pause until the lower life-potency, while not destroyed—for in that case the higher potency which can only exist in combination with the lower would also be destroyed—yet so becomes the organism of the higher that the higher alone assumes the initiative.

This sense of dissatisfaction with oneself impels to that form of action by means of which the broken relations between the higher and the lower powers of life, the disturbed normal condition, can be restored—a form of activity which may for convenience be designated restorative or purifying action.” On the other hand, the sense of pleasure (*lust*) is awakened when the inferior principle not only admits the claim of the superior, but willingly acquiesces in it. The satisfaction arising from the subordination of the lower nature to the higher becomes in its turn the motive to that kind of action which is known as propagative or expansive. This activity, along with that determined by the feeling of displeasure, constitutes the great class of actions designated by Schleiermacher as realizing or effective action. They are so called because they refer to the influence of man upon man, and have for their object the restoration and advancement of the spiritual life.*

Realizing action, with its two forms of activity resulting from the determinations of self-consciousness as these are pleasant or painful, does not, however, embrace the whole field of moral action. Between the alternations of pleasure and pain, and their consequent impulses and effects, there are intervals of satisfaction, moments which may be characterized as the indifference of the purifying

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 44-45.

and propagative activities. The state of inner rest, created by these moments of repose—necessarily relative, for, if absolute, it would be the complete negation of the temporal life—differs from that created by the emotion either of pleasure or of pain in that it becomes the impulse to no really determined course of action. It does not seek to effect any change in our relation to the world, or to institute any process in ourselves or in others. It is simply the expression of an inward condition of spirit. It has no further aim than of bringing itself to manifestation, or of so fixing its existence by an outward act that it can become cognisable by others. Hence this form of action is called manifestive, and its most general type is religious worship taken in its widest sense.*

These three kinds of activity represent the entire moral life in the process of realization. They are the formulæ under which all our actions can be classified. Yet they are not to be thought of as if they mutually excluded each other. As a matter of fact they are always more or less present in every experience of the Christian life. But as our consciousness is sometimes predominantly determined towards realizing our outer calling as conquerors of self and the world, and at other times towards manifesting our inner state—the image of God in us—the whole course of the Christian

* *Christl. Sittl.*, pp. 45-52.

activity may be adequately represented as coming within these lines. Schleiermacher, therefore, adopts for Christian Ethics a threefold division based on these determinations of self-consciousness. We have pain and pleasure giving rise to purifying and propagative activity, and we have relative blessedness producing the manifestive species of action. This may not seem so complete or scientific a division as that made choice of in the philosophical ethics. But from the Christian view-point the philosophical principle of division is inadmissible. The Kingdom of God no doubt corresponds to the highest good; yet with this single point of coincidence the analogy ceases; for in Christian ethics virtue and duty have no independent existence apart from the conception of the Church as the divine fellowship, or the Kingdom of God. Schleiermacher had, then, to reject this division on the ground that, both systematically and practically, it was too narrow to give expression to the wide and varied content of Christian ethic.* Schleiermacher's description of this science within the new limits which he is consequently forced to mark out for himself is characterized by marvellous completeness and architectonic skill. All that we can hope to do is to give a bare outline of his method of exposition without any detailed reference to the wealth of

* *Christl. Sittl.*, pp. 77-96.

ideas which he brings to the accomplishment of the task.

1. Purifying or Propagative Activity.

The rationale of this activity is to be sought in the fact that the supremacy of the Holy Spirit is never absolutely dominant in the Church. There is always in the whole and in the individual a residuum of sin—an opposition of the flesh against the spirit. The Christian community is not, like its Founder, perfect in every movement of its life ; for it does not, like Him, possess an unconquerable control over the sensuous, an autocracy of the spirit over the flesh. Sinfulness inheres in it—that sinfulness in which the sin of the individual has its ground and existence. Still, if the Christian Church is itself incomplete, its absolute perfection is posited in the idea of Christ. All that He was, all that was in Him, the Church must endeavour to be and to possess. The religious consciousness must strive to overcome the evil by which it is hindered ; the united Christian fellowship must seek to establish in its members that authority of the Spirit which is the life and law of its being. Hence the necessity of the purifying activity. It is the indispensable condition of the inner life and development of the Church.

This activity, by which the moral Christian consciousness is ever resisting and minimising the

power of the sensuous, is twofold. It is a common activity and a personal activity—the one manifesting itself in a universal, the other in a particular way. The first corresponds to the action of the Church as a unity, the second to the action of the individual Church member. How are these two related?

In dealing with this question, Schleiermacher discards all one-sided views. To regard the impulse towards restoration as issuing solely from the Church and its clerical representatives—the Roman Catholic notion—is not only really and historically false, but it presents an idea of the Church that is incomplete and unnatural. Equally inadmissible is it when the individual is regarded as the source whence alone the restorative activity proceeds. This view goes to the other extreme, only its tendency is to break the universal unity of the Church, and to deorganize instead of organizing the whole. If we would, therefore, obtain a full and impartial conception of the matter, we must acknowledge that there is a mutual influence—an influence of the Church upon the individual, and of the individual upon the Church.

The influence of the Church is described in the following manner. Individual Christians are the product of the common life, the life of the religious community. They exist by means of it, and, where necessary, they are reformed by it. If they come short of the universal standard, the self-con-

sciousness of the entire community can so determine their self-consciousness that it can become an elevating and purifying impulse. There is a transmission, a passing over, of the universal spirit into the particular—a process which may be construed as an influence of the whole on the individual. Only this influence must not be viewed in the light of a constraining power or necessity: it must always be willed by the individual himself. Indeed, the will of the individual is nothing else than his living susceptibility for receiving the influence of the whole—a susceptibility grounded in the innermost unity of his life. Each Christian is a separate individuality as well as a member of the Church, and if the Church is to move him it can only be through the determination of his own self-consciousness. If the whole tries to act restoratively upon him under any other formula—consequently without this individualizing of the general type—it follows a course which cannot morally be justified.*

When the Church is thus in a properly organized condition, it acts upon its constituent members so as to bring them up to the typical form of the Christian life. There is, however, a possibility that the Church itself may not attain to this standard—that it may come short of the true spiritual ideal. In that case, if it is to be raised to

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 117-120.

its proper life and function, the work of restoration must initiate with individual members. The Spirit is not present equally in each and all, and in dark periods of the Church's history—notably when it lacks organization or has the form but not the substance—there can be a consciousness of the individual that is in advance of the whole. When this takes place individual consciousness becomes the impulse to a general reformation. There is an activity of the individual directed towards the community, an effort of the one to purify the many.

This effort—and the fact is important—must not, indeed, be regarded as possessing a distinctly individual tendency. It is only as the individual acts in the capacity of organ, or representative of the whole, only as he moves in the line of the type of life and activity originated by Christ, that his influence becomes right and moral. The universal element must always prevail; and if the individual is present, it is present only as a minimum: only as the means, never as the end of the process. Particular personal activity can therefore never have as its object the producing of division or schism. Its aim is not revolutionary but reformative, not separative but supplementary. When it ceases to be this; when it destroys the continuity or unity of the Church; it loses its ethical character. All genuine reformations, like that of Luther, have had a far other than a schismatic

intention. The great Reformer did not desire separation from the Church ; he sought to reform it from within in virtue of the eternal principle upon which it was founded. The separation, the split, which ultimately did come, was not his act, but the act of the Church when it repudiated him and the common feeling to which he gave expression.*

These two forms of contrasted activity find their outgo in what Schleiermacher entitles Church Discipline and Church Reform—the one having the individual for its object, the other the community.

Church Discipline is necessary in the development of the Christian life, because the separate moral calling of each is naturally one-sided, and fails to form a complete ethical whole. The tendency of this discipline is therefore extensive as well as intensive, propagative not less than purifying. On this account what is merely personal or individual is excluded, as being outside, or antagonistic to, the fulfilment of the moral calling. In this category are included physical privations and scourgings, which weaken the bodily organism and unfit it for its real functions ; fasting which, as a discipline, has no moral worth, and which, if it be regarded as the expression of an inward condition of soul—such as pain or

* *Christl. Sittl.*, pp. 120-139.

sorrow—belongs to another sphere of activity altogether: the manifestive sphere; and formal prayer which, although in one sense at the root of all religious impulse, is distinctly personal and manifestive in its character. Restorative action must be positive in its character; and it can be this in either of two ways. It can so influence the flesh that it subordinates itself in willing obedience to the spirit, or it can so strengthen the power of the spirit that it can overcome the flesh. Either form can only be produced by the concurrence of the self-activity of the individual with the activity of the whole. The individual cannot of himself correct the defects of his character or supplement its onesidedness; he needs to be educated and strengthened by the community of which he is a part. His capacity for exertion and self-denial must be developed by training—by that free educative gymnastic which is grounded in brotherly love, and of which the principle is that each cares for all. This is especially the case with reference to those duties which we owe to the poor and the sick. Here personal selfishness must give place to the wider spirit of the whole, and the narrow, self-centred life must find its completion in the great common life. So likewise in the other method of purifying—that acting upon the spirit—the individual is dependent on the Church. He cannot be conceived as moulding his own spirit, seeing that that is already the

highest agent in him. If his spirit is then to be moved and elevated at all, this must be effected by means of the Divine Spirit which has been imparted by Christ not to the individual as such, but to the entire religious community. Consequently, it is as the individual assimilates the Spirit and the life of the whole that he can be quickened and elevated. We have an illustration of this in religious culture. Here the Church expresses itself in an organic manner, and, by reason of its efforts, exerts a stimulating influence on all its individual members.*

If, however, the whole exercises a purifying effect on the individual, not less is it true that the individual exercises a kindred effect on the whole. Church Reform is as necessary as Church Discipline. This necessity is created by the character and limitation of the corporate Christian life. It is a life in development—a life ever reaching towards the ideal in Christ. But just because it is so, it is apt to be hindered or arrested in its growth. If it has its seasons of special progress, it has also its times of general stagnation, or of backward movement. Now, whenever the life of the Church falls below the normal condition, and the original organization is more or less lost, the Church must be called back to its true standing by means of the individual. This takes place

* *Christl. Sitte*, 140-177.

when the individual is convinced by Scripture, and by an intelligent understanding of the historical elements of Christianity, that the prevailing sentiment and practice are not consistent with the universal Christian principle. Wherever this conviction is strong, it causes the subject of it to feel that he can no longer act as a representative of the whole. But this conviction does not drive him out of the Church, neither does it lead him to break up its original unity. Instead of pursuing either course—both of which are morally wrong—the true reformer aims at restoring the religious community to its former organization. By acting on the general conscience, and by opposing in the most public manner the common retrogression, he endeavours to purify the whole, or, what is the same thing, to restore the organization of the earlier and better state. When this is accomplished, the restorative action of the individual ceases, and the action of the whole becomes once more a purifying influence exercising itself on the individual.

All genuine reformatory effort must have a universal tendency. Where the purely personal element manifests itself, division and confusion have always been the inevitable result. This is notably the case in those reforms which have been the growth of spiritual pride and fanatical absolutism, and which have proved greater evils than the original defects which they sought to remedy.

Equally doomed to failure are also those modern ideas of reform that are the outcome, not of the eternal principles already existent in the Church, but of one-sided, egoistic, and doctrinal assumptions. To this class must be referred all attempts at a re-union of the separate Protestant Churches on the basis of a new Evangelical Confession. It is not by a mechanical harmony of symbolical books, that such a consummation, however devoutly to be desired, can be attained. If ever a union of the Churches is attained, it can only be on the ground of a far deeper unity than mere dead uniformity of view: even union on the ground of the organic life and the religious ethical feeling that are present in all the different parts of our divided Protestantism. "Our Church is the Father's great house, in which there are many mansions. As such we will maintain it, and not again go back to the Romish stand-point." Better even a divided Church, than a Church united as is the sandheap without organic coherence and the vital touch of all its parts.*

Under the general heading of purifying activity, Schleiermacher has a long section † on domestic and civil government, both of which, although not the direct creation of the Church, has a close bearing upon the Church life and character.

The family is the chief centre where the moral

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 178-216.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 217-290.

education and discipline of the child must begin. A process similar to what takes place in the Church, when the whole acts on the individual, takes place in each Christian household. As in the one there is a strengthening of the Divine Spirit and a weakening of the sensual nature, so also there is in the other. With the awakening of conscience in the child, the process of training should originate. By family worship, by religious culture, and by the personal influence of the parents, the spiritual capacities of the child should be so educated that it becomes easy for them to obtain supremacy over the lower or material nature. At the same time, the lower nature must be trained to subordinate itself to the higher by means of free exercise and practice in the art of self-government. In the use of both these methods all recourse to force must be discarded. The first duty of the child is willing and unconditional obedience ; and this ought to be secured without discussing the moral ground of the action. To reason with the young before the Christian type of spirit is fully developed is to establish in them, at the merely infantile stage, the independence of the spiritual life. Equally to be avoided in family discipline is the system of rewards and punishments. These excite hope or fear—strong moral motives, certainly—but in this case they have no ethical worth, seeing the purifying action of the child must spring from the pure joy of self-

conquest, and not from any outside or alien stimulus.

In the State, as in the family, there is likewise a peculiar purifying activity. This activity may be described according to the different ways in which it manifests itself.

(1.) There is an inner activity of the State which, after the analogy of ecclesiastical discipline and reform, assumes a twofold character. When the individual subject disobeys the law, obedience must be enforced by the act of the whole. This act of the whole manifests itself as the right to punish—a right which has to be exercised if the divine institution of authority is to be maintained. But in a Christian State punishment should always be educative and restorative, never revengeful or destructive. Capital punishment ought, therefore, to be abolished. It is a survival of pagan times, and is as un-Christian as it is opposed to the ends of civil government. If, on the other hand, the State, or civil community itself, should be in a retrograde condition, reform, as in the Church, must emanate from the individual. The end here is not revolution, but reform.

(2.) In addition to this double inner activity, there is a double outer activity. One State can exert a purifying influence on another ; for States stand related to each other as moral individuals. Each has got its own rights, and the rights of all find expression in the common notion of inter-

national law. Now, when the normal relations existing between States are disturbed or destroyed, they must be restored. If peaceful efforts fail, then physical force, or war, becomes a necessity. Again, it is the duty of Christian States to civilize the savage races that possess no true civil organization, and to bring them under a system of law and government. Yet in the exercise of this restorative function they are prohibited from using violence and oppression. "Christianity knows nothing of a right to civilize uncivilized races by means of force. It insists upon the avoidance of everything by which the Christian name might be blasphemed among the nations (1 Tim. vi. 1; Tit. ii. 5-8); and by nothing has it been more blasphemed than by oppression. We rightly wonder how it is that Christians live in intercourse for centuries with pagan peoples without exciting in them any friendly disposition towards Christianity. But the reason of this is to be sought for, not so much in the circumstance that Christian people have no interest in Christianity, as in the fact that Christianity has made itself hated and contemptible through its deeds of violence. Were it not for this, those plastic races with whom it came in contact fifteen centuries ago would have long since been Christianized. That they are now only partially so is a standing disgrace to the Christian name."*

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 289-290.

2. *Expansive Activity.*

Expansive activity is the positive side of the realizing process. Its universal type is the redemptive work of Christ viewed in its living and aggressive influence on the human race. It differs from restorative activity in that it springs from the feeling of pleasure consequent on the removal of the antagonism between the flesh and the spirit. It differs from the manifestive activity by being transitive in character: it is action passing from one human subject to another. The joy that is experienced by the Christian when he is helpful in leading a fellow-mortal to accord a willing reception to the Divine Spirit becomes in him a fresh impulse towards realizing in other souls the same spiritual condition. Hence the existence of religious education and the dissemination of truth.

But expansive activity, though it has as its type the positive activity of Christ, operates in us in a sense other than it operated in Him. In Him the Holy Spirit—the being of God—acted personally and directly on those whom He sought to bring under the supremacy of righteousness. In our case we cannot so act. The spirit, the *νοῦς*, in us is a lower potency, of which the *πνεῦμα* of Christ, the divine principle in Christianity, is the highest and most perfect development. In the universal human sense the Spirit may therefore be said to have been always in the world as a longing, an aspiration of

man's heart, but never as the highest or absolute potency. It was with the advent of Christ that this human spirit, that this *νοῦς*, so long a desire awaiting realization, first appeared as a mighty agent, a supernatural power, for the restoration and perfection of humanity. What was in us as a germ that could never quicken into the divine life became in Him the Spirit and the being of the living God. And it is only as we are one with Christ and His Church that we can act through the power of this Divine Spirit and that it can operate in us.

The Spirit of Christ, as the essential agent in the expansive process, unites itself to us by means of our entire spiritual organism (the *νοῦς*). When it combines directly with this spiritual organism, it produces in us that bias of the will known as *disposition*; when it joins itself indirectly, through the *νοῦς*, to the organism of the various functions of our sentient nature (the *ψυχή*), it generates that capacity which may be called, in contradistinction to disposition, *talent*, or *faculty*. The first represents a more inward view of the union of the higher principle with our nature, the second a more outward aspect of the same union. Disposition is the inner source of virtuous action, talent is the ability to express in external actions this moral inclination. The Biblical conception of *πνεῦμα* and *χάρισμα* (1 Cor. xii. 4), corresponds to this twofold aspect of the Spirit's indwelling in the natural man. The Christian disposition is one

and indivisible, the Christian talent is various ; but neither can exist without the other. There is no disposition without talent, and no talent, in the true sense of the word, without disposition.

This contrast between the inner and outer relation of the Spirit furnishes Schleiermacher with a principle which enables him to draw a distinction between the expansive activity of the Church and the expansive activity of the State. The former is that activity which has for its object the cultivating of the religious disposition and which utilizes talent only as it furthers this aim ; the latter occupies itself with the development of the entire outer process of culture, as represented by talent and nature, and only recognises the cultivation of disposition in as far as it promotes this general purpose. Both these forms of activity, the religious not less than the civil, have, as their presupposition and basis, the natural and propogative extension of the race through the communion of the sexes. Hence Schleiermacher prefaces his general treatment of ecclesiastical and political expansive operations by an interesting disquisition on the ethics of marriage, with special reference to the Christian principle.

The expansive activity in the Church has for its starting-point the personality of Christ, and for its end the perfecting in Him of the whole human race. As an historical process this activity has both an extensive and intensive direction.

Extensively the efforts of the Church are as wide as humanity, for their one constant aim is to bring all men under the dominion of Christ. Where the Christian disposition does not exist, the Church must create and foster it. This it can do in two ways: either by devoting itself to the religious education of those within its immediate pale and with whom it comes into continuous contact, or by the establishment in heathen lands of Christian missions. The first is the personal duty of every believer, the other can only become so when we feel that we have a special call to take a personal share in such work. The whole extensive process is, therefore, an expression of the degree of perfection which the Church has already attained, or of the measure in which it has become the possessor of the Divine Spirit.*

The intensive form of expansive activity within the Church may be regarded as an action of the Church upon itself. It is constantly deepening and bringing to a more perfect stage the inner life of its members. It is a school—an institution in the theoretical sense—for the strengthening of the activities of the will, and the capacities of the intellect. It maintains, in the midst of continuous advancement, a common standard of Christian morals, a common standard of Christian thought and speech. Both in conduct and in doctrine it

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 373-382.

never ceases intensively to perfect that disposition which the Spirit is striving in every age to produce in the life of the vast religious organism.*

Within the sphere of the State expansive activity is primarily directed towards the developing and organizing of the powers of men that they may overcome nature, and bring it under the influence of mind. In accomplishing this task the State is primarily guided not by the Holy Spirit, the ruling principle of the Church—for the State as a separate institution exists prior to the Church—but by the universal principle of reason. Its act is the act of all communities bound by the ties of race and country, and it rests on the relations of division of labour, property and commerce, possession and exchange, as regulated by the natural laws of right and morality.

The only limit to this process of culture, by which a definite community of men endeavour to develop their inner powers, and the resources of nature, is that it be undertaken in the interest of the human spirit. There may be a culture of nature which, by its severity, is destructive of man's physical and psychical powers. In such a case man ceases to be a free determining agent, and becomes a slave, a piece of mechanism, what Aristotle calls "a living organ." Again there may be a theoretical culture of talent, apart altogether

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 383-397.

from its practical use and result. In this case the opposite extreme is reached, and man develops into an unproductive capacity, a mere intellectual function. The true corrective of both these abnormal forms is Art, taken in the widest sense as the equilibrium of the mechanical and speculative elements.

The Church, much as it differs in aim and principle from the State, is nevertheless related to it in the closest manner. It cannot regard the State as a necessary evil ; and, as there is no political form that is entirely antagonistic to Christianity, it has never sought the overthrow of either an absolute monarchy or an absolute democracy—the two types under which every form of government can be classified. The Church recognises civil government as an institution ordained by God ; it acknowledges civil virtue (*justitia civilis*), and it blesses all efforts that have as their purpose the conquering of nature and the enlargement of human knowledge. There is, in short, no real disharmony between organized life in God and organized life in the world, between the community of Christ and the community of the people. It is in form, not in matter they differ. By means of the one, human reason becomes more and more the instrument of the divine Spirit ; the action of the other secures that all nature becomes ever increasingly subservient to man. The activity of the Church strives to raise men into fellowship with God ; the

Christian State, on the contrary, takes men thus raised, and endeavours so to act through them that the whole sphere of nature may be brought under the sway of the one divine human Spirit.*

3. *Manifestive Activity.*

This form of activity arises from the feeling of blessedness resulting from the supremacy of the spirit over the flesh. It is the consummation of the process instituted by the purifying and expansive activities. Its aim is to give expression to what is the essential element in the Christian disposition—the consciousness of superiority to the sensuous, material life. It does not effect any change in the moral condition of the individual or of the community ; it is simply the externalization of the inner state that has been created by the realizing forms of action. Such an externalization would be unnecessary if man existed in isolation and for himself, but the idea of the community, with which he is habitually associated in his entire moral vocation, renders it imperative. Manifestive action cannot exist without communion with others, and self-manifestation is nothing but the constant realization of our beings in relation to the whole. The principle of this manifestation is love—in the strictly religious sense, brotherly love, and, in the wider and more intellectual sense, universal human

* *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 440-501.

love. Brotherly love forms the basis of the inner religious community, or the Church, all the members of which are represented—in opposition to the Roman Catholic view—as being spiritually equal in relation to Christ and to the Spirit, although not equal in their appropriation and manifestation of the Christian life. Universal human love, the other unifying principle, is the basis of the great outer social sphere which has an existence prior to and relatively independent of the Church.*

Within the Christian Church manifestive activity assumes the general form of divine worship which is defined as the sum total of all those actions, in virtue of which we declare by the help of the Holy Spirit that we are the organs of God. Whether as private or public worship—and, indeed, the two must be so united as to supplement and perfect each other—it has for its object the externalization of the inner consciousness of blessedness arising from the subjection of the flesh to the spirit. If it possesses a realizing tendency at all, it does so only indirectly in the sense that all the three forms of Christian ethical activity imply each other. The channels through which the self-manifestation of the inner life is made, are not new creations of the Spirit: they are the already existing products of the universal reason, such as speech, song, action,

* *Christl. Sittl.*, pp. 502-525.

and tone. Divine worship is thus, in the narrower sense, manifestive action taking place within the sphere of art—art being taken in its widest signification. But it has another and a more comprehensive meaning as embracing the entire moral life. It is the representation of the supremacy of the spirit over the flesh, as manifested in the virtues of chastity, patience, endurance, and humility. In this more extended sense, divine worship is “that kind of action which appears to us as operative in the act of its becoming and as manifestive only in its completed form. It, therefore, implies the whole process of the culture of nature : it is manifestive action taking place within the sphere of the active life.*

In the outer social sphere—that general communion of men which is older than the Church and relatively independent of it—the manifestive form of action also plays an important part. The social life, isolated from the Christian communion, awakens in man a consciousness of his higher nature, and this consciousness finds expression in actions that are not so much operative as manifestive in character. In connection with the social life proper, we have the enjoyment of eating and drinking, and the consequent speech or exchange of thought always combined with this exercise. The satisfaction of man's animal wants becomes

* *Christl. Sitte*, p. 535 ; *vide* also pp. 537-619.

spiritualized through the act of fellowship, and expresses itself accordingly. Then, in a more general sense, we have those actions of the universal human intercourse that are purely self-manifestive. To this class belong art and play—the one more fixed, the other more fleeting in form. Art is the condition of the natural process of culture by which all human capacities are brought to their highest perfection. So it is in the vocal, the plastic, and the mimetic arts. Purity, harmony, seemliness, are the requisites of all true art. Play is different from art in that the activity is here the result, whereas in art the activity and the result are different. Play has always formed an element in the development of moral life. The ancient contests—physical, musical, and poetical—were essential factors in the formation of the national existence. The plays of modern times are specially notable, because of the element of chance that enters into them. Play, to have any moral worth, must not only be pure and chaste, but must help to develop the physical or intellectual side of our nature. Mere games of chance, or plays engaged in for the sake of gain, lose their ethical character. Even card-playing, though it cannot be said to be immoral in all its forms, produces a bad and empty kind of fellowship, and in the case of some it assumes the unhealthy symptoms of a chronic disease.*

* *Christl. Sittl*, pp. 620-706.

EPILOGUE.

KANT tells us that it was David Hume's scepticism with regard to causality that "first awakened him out of his dogmatic slumber, and gave a different direction to his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy." The great sceptic reasoned that what is known as the principle of causality is a purely subjective notion, existing in the mind as the result of association and habit. We cannot say that it has anything really corresponding to it in the objects or phenomena of nature; for all that we can know is the simple sequence of events, or that things happen. We have no warrant, then, for saying that causality has any objective validity, or that there is any necessary connection of events with each other. To this argument, striking at the foundation of all real knowledge, Kant replied by declaring that it is quite true that the principle of causality is subjective and not objective; for it derives its warrant and certainty not from the momentary facts of experience but from the essential laws and forms of reason. All certainty and validity are from within, not from without; and it is just because this is so that causality becomes a necessary and universal principle.

This is how Kant met Hume, and inaugurated a new era in philosophy. But, by admitting that we can only have certainty as to the forms of mind—that we only know appearances and not things as they are—he but half-closed the door against scepticism. What about the forms of being? If we cannot know objects, if we have not at least as good a guarantee for their existence and reality as we have for the facts of intellect, we are still in the region of uncertainty and doubt. Especially is this so when we remember that, on Kant's own showing, there can be no real movement of thought—no conscious experience—until the forms of thought receive their content from that very world of being concerning which, as he tells us, we can know nothing, and whose existence we must consequently predicate as a hypothetical assumption. The forms of thought, with their cognition of appearances, is thus clearly too one-sided and narrow a basis on which to rear a system of critical philosophy.

It was this scepticism of Kant as to being—the content of all experience—that made Schleiermacher enter into the field of speculative philosophy. He was the first to see that the principles of Kant, if carried to their logical issues, were destructive of all knowledge. Reason and will are but two sides of one intellectual process, and, apart from their actual correspondence and identity with being, they can, neither singly nor taken together,

explain the order and certainty of the world and its relations to us. They cannot justify the existence of concepts and judgments; they cannot account for the development of the social and moral, the æsthetic and religious feelings. It is only when we consider all the manifestations of reason as forming a single line of evolution, and when we assign to nature a reality and validity as necessary and as knowable as the validity and reality we assign to spirit, that we can hope to attain either light or certainty. The world of finite things is the sphere in which our knowledge moves. It is in nature, and through nature, that our thought arises and is developed. The organic and the intellectual, the material and the formal, are parts of one whole. They are the primaries of all knowledge, and we know the one as we know the other. The aristocratic view of intellect, as if it stood, in splendid isolation, high above the common plane of the earthly, and could as easily evolve from its own inner consciousness the explanation of a world as a world itself, is nothing but an ancient dream dreamed over again by some of the more idealistic of modern philosophers. What Schleiermacher sought was the art of knowledge—not “knowledge of knowledge,” or the absolute philosophy—and in this search he was content to begin at the very lowest stage in the construction of conscious experience. His capital, to start with, consisted of organic activity, coming

from outer being and representing the forms of the real ; and intellectual activity, dwelling within and representing the forms of inner being. With these he tried to work out a scheme of knowledge, and a view of life and the world.

This, then, being Schleiermacher's method of studying the facts of consciousness, as they come into manifestation in and through the correlated spheres of inner and outer, we may, in closing, briefly accentuate some of his more important conclusions regarding the world, and man, and God.

The world is the sum of finite things, the totality of being as unity and plurality. It is the vast articulate organism of Nature and Spirit—the true identity of all contrasts and aspects of life and becoming. Every part of it is bound together by influences that act and react on each other. The universal comes to manifestation in the particular, and the particular finds its fulfilment in the universal. Activity, unceasing, is at the base of all its movements—the activity of law and harmonious relation. Each living thing, each action, is the identity of force and appearance. In all the world's phenomena of real and ideal, material and spiritual, is an element of force which, from lower to higher, from higher to lower, is ever taking on distinct shapes, reproducing itself in endless varieties, while it ever remains itself, in the midst of all flux and change, constant and unchanged.

As "motion and oscillation, attraction and repulsion, combination and separation, growth and decay," this force enters into the evolution of all finite existence—working and weaving the diversified fabric which we know as the world of experience. Schleiermacher designates these forces "the substantial forms," the fixed points in being which correspond to "the being of ideas," the fixed points, or forms, of thought. They are so called because each force remains constant in its distinct method of action, or manner of coming into manifestation. Its appearances, or effects are, however, subject to change; so that what is an appearance may itself become a force, which also acts according to its nature, and so on throughout the entire series. For example, man is a living unity of forces. Each function, or so called capacity, of his nature is a force, and its individual actions are appearances. But man, regarded as a member of the race, is an appearance of which the race is the force. Again, the race, viewed as human nature, is, in its turn, an appearance of the still higher energy known as the force of spiritual life. And so of every other sphere of existence and activity in the world. At no single, individual stage is there a finally completed system of causality. Only in appearance can anything boast of separate existence. Each is related to a higher, until at last in the ascending scale, we reach the highest force of all, which is the ground

of all appearances. This highest unity of force is what Spinoza meant by God, just as it is the Unknowable of Agnostics, like Herbert Spencer. In the thought of Schleiermacher this force, while it is of God, does not correspond to God. The notion of the highest force does not transcend the sphere of the contrasted, since "every force is measured by the totality of its appearance, and is, therefore, necessarily of a definite or determined extent." Besides, "the highest force only so conditions all that it becomes itself conditioned by all." The highest force taken along with its inseparable appearance, or the system of the reciprocal action of things upon each other, can give us only "the idea of the world—the system of forces, the abiding forms of being, as identical with the system of cause and effect." This, it is true, is the limit of our knowledge—the *terminus ad quem*, but it is not the *terminus a quo*, the "whence" of our knowledge. The real Absolute can never be identical with the totality of knowing and being, since it is the transcendent ground of all knowing and being, the true Unconditioned conditioning all things.

What kind of force is this that is at the base of all movement in the world, and that is ever expressing itself in such countless forms? We may call it the living force of reason immanent in nature—the universal, world-forming *nous*. According to Schleiermacher, reason is originally present

in things not less than in us, in the material not less than in the spiritual. "There is a process of ethic (*Versittlichung*) in the whole earthly nature, in time and space, which is never given as the work of human reason." "Pure dynamical or mechanical force is only to be thought of as existing before the world, just as pure matter and pure spirit can only be conceived as outside the world, which is the same as saying that they exist nowhere. The perfect unity of finite being, as the mutual indwelling of nature and reason in an all-embracing organism, is the world."* The free products of nature, as in crystallization and the cleavage and peaks of mountain ranges, represent types akin to those predetermined forms of the human spirit which find expression in architecture. In vegetable and animal life there is also an attempt after the ideal form. "In this attempt we find already a tendency, which lies hidden in all earthly bodies, to arrive at consciousness in the sphere of the earthly; although it is in the animal sphere alone that this form is most distinctly developed." The same presence of reason is also manifested in the sub-human region (*Unterhalb des Menschen*) in the efforts after a kind of ethical code, as is witnessed in the case of those animals that live in communities.

"It is, however, in man alone that we find consciousness coming into distinct emergence. He is

* *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, pp. 61 and 31.

the crown of the ascending series of the productions of the earth ; in him is the life of the earth perfected. And he, on his part, when consciousness appears in him, develops once more, in the form of consciousness, the being of the earth ; and this is the cycle of his life and existence." * Yet, though man is a product of the cosmic life, being, before the first distinct act of consciousness, immediately one with all existence, we are not to suppose that his spirit, his intellectual activity, is a mere product of the material. What the earth does for him is to determine the disposition of consciousness originally in him, and adequate to what the earth develops. Otherwise man would not be for this world, and its life would not perfect itself in him. As appearance he is of the earth, but as spirit and consciousness he is of the spirit. The outer force and the inner, the material and the spiritual exist for each other. It is the nature of being that it determines spirit, it is the nature of spirit that it thinks being as it really is. In our bodily organization we have a sense that is open to the manifoldness of the world and its appearances. This is the stuff of which thought is made. But in addition to the sense that is turned outwards we have a sense that is opened to the inner world, to

* *Æsthetik*, pp. 105-106. The whole of the remarkable discussion on man's place in nature, *Æsthetik*, pp. 101-116, is also well worth consulting.

reason as the place of concepts. This is the form of thought, the tendency of reason to determine and discriminate the vague and indeterminate material of thought conveyed by the outer sense. It is only when the two are present, in active combination, the one conditioning the other, that there is the genesis of real thought. The one gives particular images, the other universal images. The all-dominating influence of the one is met by "the inner agility we call spirit or intellect," and is transformed from non-thinking being to thinking being. And, thus, through the tendency of thought and fancy, "the highest and most original factor in man," the process seems at last to be reversed, and we produce the world instead of the world producing us, as it appeared to do at the start. This is the truth in idealism, just as the other is the truth in materialism. It is only, however, as we view the two in living interaction—the material acting upon the formal and the formal acting upon the material—that we have true knowledge, and the real being of man, as the representing and manifesting unity, the active, determining, and regulating principle in the world.

On the moral side, too, Schleiermacher regarded man as a part of the world, finding his life and life determinations there. Nevertheless, though one with the vast whole, he is more than a mere sequence, or point of transition, in the complex movement of cause and effect. He is a conscious

individual, a representative moment in the whole. He is acted on by the world, but he can act upon the world. His real existence is within, not without. Individuality is a fact of freedom, of will. Each human being has a share in the universal reason, which is the same and identical for all ; but each has also an essential existence of his own which he must develop in his own way in relation to the undivided humanity of which he is a part. The eternal self, freed from all that is accidental and empirical, is not a vague and distinctionless will, a single colourless conscience : it is an individual and ever persisting form of humanity which, as such, has an eternal significance in the universal life of the world. Professor Dilthey suggests that Schleiermacher was led to the development of this great "creative thought" through the influence of Fichte. At the same time he shows how widely the view of Schleiermacher differed from that of Fichte. For Fichte, as for Spinoza, "individualism," in all its forms, was a simple limitation of the Absolute.* Schleiermacher did not regard individuality as a determination or limitation of the Infinite, but as a product and representation of the Infinite. Man, as the self-conscious unity of being, both in its conceptual and its ethical side, or as world-order and law, is the image and expression of God. On the other hand, without

* *Leben Schleiermachers*, von Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 342.

this consciousness of his life-unity in the separation of its functions, man would sink to the level of the brutes.

As an ethical being, man develops his will in the common "service of humanity." This service is twofold: firstly, the conquering and rationalizing of nature, as in agriculture, mechanics, and the like ; and, secondly, in developing himself, and the universal will, in the spheres of the family, society, and the State, and in artistic and scientific tasks. This ideal is, therefore, absolutely distinct from the egoism of personal culture, since it directs the will towards a highest good which embraces the whole world of humanity.

Schleiermacher's view as to man's future destiny may be briefly referred to, as it has occasionally been misrepresented. Martineau, in his *Study of Religion*, Vol. ii., pp. 339-345, commenting on the famous passage in the *Reden*, agrees with Professor Pfleiderer in thinking that Schleiermacher rejects the doctrine of a personal existence after death. In defence of this view, he further quotes from Schleiermacher's well-known letter to Henriette von Willich. He then goes on to show that Schleiermacher's view is untenable—that "the pantheistic disparagement of personal life, though very ill-defined, seems to depend upon two pre-conceptions, widely different in character, one moral, the other mathematical," and so on. Had Martineau only been acquainted with the first

edition of the *Reden*, there might be some excuse for his polemic ; but as it is, he quotes from the fourth edition of the *Reden*, that of 1831, to which Schleiermacher added a "note," in which he explained the meaning of the original passage, and sought to remove the misconceptions that had been formed regarding it. In that "note" he declares that what he spoke disparagingly of in the *Reden* were the impure and selfish notions currently held regarding immortality, not immortality itself. The form of a doctrine may be narrow and misleading, while the fact it represents may be eternal. He further says that, as a Christian, he maintained the reality of immortality, and that, as he gave expression to his view of the doctrine in the *Glaubenslehre*, both passages must be taken together, the one as supplementary of the other. To this "note," though it must have been before him at the time of writing, Martineau makes no reference, neither does he mention the *Glaubenslehre* ; and the impression he thus leaves on the mind of the reader is one that is as painfully unfavourable to the memory of Schleiermacher's great name as it is, in fact, incorrect as a representation of his view of the immortal life. It may well have been that, in the early days as in the later years, Schleiermacher found no philosophical argument for the existence of a future state that fully commended itself to his intellect ; yet there is proof that he held, some years before he wrote the *Reden*, the

same view of life and immortality in Christ to which he gave expression in the *Glaubenslehre* thirty-one years after. In a sermon, written about 1790, he says—"Christ is risen not only to better us, but also as the first-fruits of those that follow Him, the type of His true friends. He is only gone to prepare a place for us among His own, and it is His will that in the Eternal His servants shall be where He is. *What reason can only hope, but cannot know : that He has declared ; and after His own glorious awakening there can never again be any doubt upon the point.*"* This was his hope of immortality when he was twenty-two years of age ; this is the hope expressed in the *Glaubenslehre*, the ripest product of his thought and belief ; and this is the hope in which, at last, he commended his spirit to God.

Even in religion Schleiermacher is true to both sides of the contrast from which he set out. Religion is natural as well as supernatural. It is only through knowledge of ourselves and of the world that we can have any knowledge of God. The idea that we can think the Being of all beings, as if He were a mere thing, existing outside the world, that could mirror itself in mind, is one of those peculiar anomalies of thought for which there is no accounting. Thought is not given to us ready-made, as a kind of psychical

* *Predigten ; erste Sammlung*, pp. 85-86.

apparatus by means of which we can see and know all things ; it is itself determined by the world's life, and only comes into existence through the combination and impulse of its elements. So, too, of will. It is no autocratic power that can lift us out of our earth-bound sphere, and posit a Divine in the infinities of space. Where, then, can we find the Absolute being, and the perfect knowledge? Here, where our life is, where we are. In all that lives and moves, in every thought we think, every act we do, is the ground of all, not only presupposed but present in living reality. Without this presence we are nothing, and all our knowledge and volition are but the shadows of a shadow. The highest knowledge is, then, given to us not as a thing, or an activity, but as the ground and source of all our knowing and acting. We attain to it only in and through the sphere of our present life. In the concept, taken in the widest sense, as embracing physical and ethical knowledge, we have it as a necessary presupposition ; in feeling we get it, not apart from but in, through, and with the entire sphere of the conceptual, as an immediate certainty ; though not as an object, or as it is in itself.

This feeling, called by Schleiermacher the feeling of absolute dependence, is not to be understood as if it came to us outside of our relation to the world. Apart from that relation, we could never have any consciousness of the Absolute. Feeling is

immediate in the sense that it is the direct contact of the human and the Divine—an inner certainty that God is in us filling us with His ineffable presence. It is never immediate in the sense that it comes directly from heaven ; for we have it only through our sense of need created by the empirical consciousness. Nor is this feeling to be taken as if Schleiermacher meant by it the feeling that is produced by that tremendous, oppressive, physical power that is everywhere present in the world, and before which we are paralysed. Nowhere does our author speak of God as physical power. Even the forces in the world, of which He is the Source, are not so defined. They are rational, ethical, conscious, and beneficent ; not dynamical, mechanical, dead with the dead-weight of a dead world. To speak, too, of this feeling as if it were a state of passivity, even to unconsciousness, is equally to misunderstand its true character. Passive we must be in regard to God—"in whom we live and move and have our being." What other relation can we occupy towards Him, if we know what we are thinking about ? The state of dependence on God can only be the state of passivity, of surrender, to the Source and Living Unity of our life ; but in this dependence and surrender of our will we attain to our true freedom in every other relation, cosmic and human. As far as God is concerned we are not free, and never can be ; yet, in ourselves and in the world, we are only truly free and

active when we give ourselves up to Him in absolute loyalty, love, and prostration.

Schleiermacher hesitated to call God a person ; for he felt how difficult it was to speak of Him as personal without falling into anthropomorphic misconceptions and confusion. Yet he equally felt the necessity why he should be thought of as personal. Without this conception we cannot interpret to ourselves, or to others, the fulness of our religious emotion and experience. And so, in preaching and conversation, he used the personal names ; though, in exact thinking, he preferred to regard God as the living God. The epithet "living" alone distinguishes the Absolute from materialism and pantheism, and atheistic and blind necessity. For him, as for the profoundest fathers of the Church, there was but "one only, the living and true God."

Schleiermacher's system is thus no mere eclectic mosaic ; it is a single organic whole. Knowledge, ethics, and religion set out from the same starting-point and arrive, each in its own way, at the same goal. Man is a constant unity of matter and spirit, and can only be clearly understood in the light of both. His life is not a series of disconnected leaps and bounds: it is an orderly evolution within the mysterious womb of nature, where all things are originally immediately one in co-existence and relation. We have tried to trace this genesis of man. He is a product of the life of the

world with a preponderance of the spiritual ; and his path, in each individual case, is slowly from lower to higher, from chaos to the world, where, at last, he finds rest in Him who is the true life of the world, and behind the world.

No one who has carefully read even these fragmentary expositions of Schleiermacher's speculative views can have failed to see that he was an evolutionist before his time. It is the method of evolution he adopts to explain the life and thought, the ethic and religion of man. Even in this respect alone his views have a permanent significance. They adapt themselves to modern phases of thought better than any other form of speculation. Though an idealist, in the broadest sense, he was absolutely true to the real. He did not try to belittle it, or to explain it by the spiritual. Both the ideal and the real are equally valid, and, in their difference, they constitute the life of the world. In thought they are distinct, in being they are one, finding their ground and explanation in God. Kant was, in this respect, only partially true to the real, while Hegel was altogether untrue to it, and one-sided. On this account alone Schleiermacher's philosophy and ethics deserve a wider study than they have yet received. "In point of ideal content, systematic division, and terminology," says Ueberweg, "Schleiermacher's system was not developed by him into a thoroughly-finished and all-including

whole, and is, therefore, far inferior in formal perfection to Hegel's and also to Herbart's system ; but it is free from many defects of narrowness which are inseparably involved in these systems, and in its still largely unfinished form is more capable than any other past-Kantian philosophy of a pure development, by which the various defects of other systems may be remedied."*

No philosophy is final, no speculation of man can lay claim to be the perfect world-wisdom. But it is surely worth the noting, where there is so little that is memorable to note, that Schleiermacher was the first to set out on a possible pathway, and to indicate certain lines along which discovery and truth might lie. Here, also, in the fields of philosophy and of ethics, not less than in the field of theology, he was a true pioneer. The knowledge of his time was neither so full nor so extensive as that of our age ; yet the thought of Schleiermacher, as by a kind of divinatory instinct, anticipated the findings of evolution and of biology. In this, as in other things, he was a prophetic citizen of the times that were to be—a rare, intellectual, and moral genius, whose keen, intuitive glance saw far into the depths of the life and reality of the old, mysterious world.

* *History of Philosophy*, p. 245. Schleiermacher's chief philosophical and ethical works were published after his death from notes and memoranda.

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ERRATA

Page 20, line 6, *read* "Schweizer."

„ 93, „ 18, *for* "ascribes" *read* "describes."

„ 184, last line, *for* "coalesces with" *read* "grows out into"—("verwächst").

